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ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

in

SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

(January, 1943 - October, 1943)

VOLUME III ()

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence
to the Operations of the Commander of the United
States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(March, 1943)

29 November 1945

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(March 1943)

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is one of a series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

For the sake of convenience the year 1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of

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longitude 130° were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

There were few activities during World War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Navy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tons of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not

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effect its ambition of creating an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied amphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of August 30, 1945, 1256 Japanese ships had been sunk by American submarines.

During the war submarine operational authorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This

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does not mean that American submarines were not able to operate independently and efficiently on their own account. On some occasions, when the Japanese had changed their cipher systems and for a short period of time no information could be derived from their communications, American submarines sank almost as many, if not just as many, Japanese ships as when the Japanese messages were being read. Submarine operational authorities have pointed out, however, that the information made available when the Japanese cipher messages were being read currently was of great value in the carry over period till American naval cryptanalysts solved the new Japanese cipher systems. Analysis of previously deciphered messages supplied valuable data as to the favorite routes and procedures of Japanese merchant ships, and, thus, even when the flow of intelligence decreased temporarily American submarine commanders could be directed to productive areas.


Chart A shows the relationship between the number of Japanese messages translated by American naval cryptanalysts and the tonnage of sunken Japanese shipping.

Red line - tonnage sunk

Black line - G3 translation

CHART A

ASSESSED (JANAC) SINKINGS OF JAPANESE
MERCHANT SHIPS IN TONS (SHIPS OF 1000 TONS OR OVER)
COMPARED TO NUMBER OF NEGAT TRANSLATIONS OF
JAPANESE NAVY ENCRYPTED RADIO MESSAGES



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Though United States submarines were not always able to sight targets reported to them by communication intelligence sources, submarine authorities have attributed much of their success to information derived from enemy communications. On April 14, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is based on ULTRA information ... (131237 NCR 1231).

On July 3, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet sent the following to the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization:

"Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of ComIntOrg for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

The use of communication intelligence helped revolutionize submarine strategy in the Pacific,

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for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive of targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise unavailable targets were provided, torpedoes were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume outlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during February, 1943. Subsequent volumes will continue the story. Each volume has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

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B. Operational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Report

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submarine or submarines concerned.

Chart B summarizes the results of action taken by United States Submarines from January through October, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence. Another general summary of results will be made in the volumes dealing with November, 1943 to December, 1944.

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CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

Grand Total - January-October 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*.....	<u>810</u>
1. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted.....	<u>445</u>
1. ConSubPac message not received.....	<u>4</u>
2. Submarine not in area.....	<u>100</u>
3. Submarine pursuing other targets.....	<u>80</u>
4. Submarine in area-no contact.....	<u>223</u>
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..	<u>5</u>
6. Rough weather-poor visibility.....	<u>20</u>
7. Information cancelled as incorrect....	<u>7</u>
11. Number of Potential Targets Sighted.....	<u>354</u>
1. Results of the Contact	
A. Targets Sighted and Attacked.....	<u>120</u>
(1) Sunk.....	<u>33</u>
(2) Damaged.....	<u>50</u>
(3) No perceptible damage.....	<u>10</u>
(4) Missed.....	<u>15</u>
B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked...	<u>234</u>
(1) Unfavorable position	
of submarine.....	<u>65</u>
(2) Rough weather-poor	
visibility.....	<u>16</u>
(3) Submarine attacked by	
escorts.....	<u>9</u>
(4) Target showed hospital	
ship markings.....	<u>3</u>
(5) Engaged with other	
targets.....	<u>137</u>
(6) Target not worth torpedo	
expenditure.....	<u>4</u>
2. Quality of the Contact	
(according to charts-Jan. to Oct.)	
A. Positive.....	<u>112</u>
B. Probable.....	<u>11</u>
C. Possible.....	<u>24</u>
111. Number of Potential Targets for which	
the Results Are Unknown.....	<u>11</u>

* The number of potential targets in each Case is

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derived from the number in the ComSubPac Ultra dispatch. If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but merely described the target as a convoy, the target is reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified as a destroyer or a large ship). But if the target was sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol report is the number computed in the analysis. If ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "several ships, the target, if not sighted, is counted as two. For example, in Case 41 of October ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted, was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it. If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee (e.g., Case 23 of July or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

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It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatches:

A. FROM: COMINCH 18/1836 May
TO: CTF 17
CTF 71
CTF 72
INFO: COMSOPAC
CINCPAC
PREC: DEFERRED

SUPER SECRET X ULTRA X WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES
BASING WEST AUSTRALIA FOR MONTHS NOVEMBER
DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE X ALL MENTION THIS
SOURCE MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL
COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES

B. FROM: CINCPAC 18/1836 May
TO: COMSOPAC
PREC: ROUTINE
PASS COMINCH 181836 TO COMSOPAC FOR ACTION

C. FROM: COMSUBPAC 13/0935 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

.....
..... NEITHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION
SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT
BY THIS COMMAND X SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING
UP PATROL REPORTS

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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

March, 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 72

1. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 47

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 0
2. Submarine not in area..... 19
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 11
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 17
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine.. 0
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 0
7. Information cancelled as incorrect.... 0

11. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 24

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 11

- (1) Sunk..... 4
- (2) Damaged..... 6
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 0
- (4) Missed..... 1

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked... 13

- (1) Unfavorable position of submarine..... 6
- (2) Rough weather-poor visibility..... 1
- (3) Submarine attacked by escorts..... 2
- (4) Target showed hospital ship markings..... 0
- (5) Engaged with other targets..... 4
- (6) Target not worth torpedo expenditure..... 0

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to chart-March)

A. Positive..... 7

B. Probable..... 5

C. Possible..... 7

III. Number of Potential Targets for which the Results Are Unknown..... 1

* Convoy of unknown number of ships has been considered as but one target.

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March 1943

Mo.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1.	01-1001	U.S.S. <u>Halibut</u>	Kinai Maru and one unknown type ship would pass through 11-40N, 142-59E; 09-10N, 146-15E; and 07-21N, 147-23E at unknown date and time.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 0955 (GCT) March 3, the Halibut sighted a 9,500 ton passenger-freighter and a 7,500 ton diesel freighter (armed) at 10-18N, 146-42E. The larger ship was sunk with two hits; smaller ship, not hit, was lost in rain squalls. The larger ship may have been the unknown type ship.
		U.S.S. <u>Tripper</u>	Taiwan Maru, leaving Yap at 2300 (GCT) March 2 for Palau, passing through 09-13N, 137-33E at 0300 (GCT) March 3.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Tripper was patrolling south of Palau and on March 4 engaged a freighter at 5-14N, 136-00E.
2.	01-1252	U.S.S. <u>Plunger</u>	Four transports to meet an escort at 0100 (GCT) March 5 at 00-30N, 155-30E, the destination, though uncertain, was likely either at Truk or Palau.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Plunger was patrolling in the area of Ponape, far to the east on a change of orders.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
3. 02-0919	U.S.S. <u>Plunkett</u>	One 14,000 ton tanker being towed to Kaulaia, no date or time given.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. No ship being towed was sighted but a freighter and 2 escorts was seen heading in the direction of Kaulaia. Pursuit of this ship was abandoned in favor of a large unescorted transport. Contact was lost when the ship changed course shortly after dark on March 2.
	U.S.S. <u>Finch</u>	Japanese submarine, I-165, enroute from Sasebo to Sasebo, 2100 (GCT) February 27 position to be 9-12N, 127-50E, 2100 (GCT) March 5 position to be 11-48N, 129-14E. Course after 0500 (GCT) on March 3 would be 355.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. A periscope was sighted at 1450 (H) on the 6th at 23N, 137E. The difference in time and date make it unlikely this should be the same submarine.
	U.S.S. <u>Finch</u>			ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Finch</u> was west of this area on these dates.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
4. 03-0030	<u>U.S.S. Sumner</u>	<u>Okitan Maru</u> to depart <u>Kwajalein</u> at 0100 (GCT) on March 3, to pass through 8-40N, 166-50E and 09N, 165- 10E to arrive at <u>Hauru</u> at 1800 (GCT) on March 5.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Sumner</u> arrived at <u>Hauru</u> at 1645 (GCT) March 5. Contact was made with the <u>maru</u> of the ComSubPac dispatch the ship was damaged but was able to reach <u>Hauru</u> Harbor.
5. 03-0600	<u>U.S.S. Porpoise</u>	<u>Soapstone Tender (Full- Load Maru)</u> will leave <u>Ruotto</u> in <u>Kwajalein Atoll</u> en route to the <u>Kapiri</u> on March 8, time and route unknown.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Porpoise</u> reached <u>Kwajalein Atoll</u> late on March 8, patrolled around the north and west shores but did not sight any ships.
6. 03-0641	<u>U.S.S. Plunger</u>	Tanker and unknown type ship with escort will pass through 1-20N, 151- 10E on March 4 and 4-40N, 151-30E on March 5.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Plunger</u> was in the vicinity of <u>Kwa- jalein</u> on March 4 and 5, far to the east of the Ultra targets.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
7. 04-0404	U.S.S. <u>Trigger</u>	Single ship or convoy en route from Rabaul to Palau will meet DE es- cort at 0100(GCT) on March 6 at 0-30N, 145-30E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The Patrol Re- port of the <u>Trigger</u> show: no entries from March 6 to March 11 inclusive. On March 4, 0302(GCT) the submarine was at 4-08N, 137-43E.
8. 05-1033	U.S.S. <u>Plunger</u>	One type <u>Tathosau</u> Kani to leave Ponape at 0500 (GCT) on March 4 for Kwajalein.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. A ship was sighted on March 6 at 0540(GCT) at 81-165E but contact was lost during darkness.
		Freighter and escort to leave Kwajalein for Ponape at 0500(GCT) on March 4 to meet the <u>Tathosau</u> with which the escort will return to Kwajalein.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. A tanker was sighted on March 7 at 0033(GCT) at 7N, 165E and was attacked with three inch guns, the <u>Plunger</u> was forced to dive when patrol plane arrived.

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ComSubpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
9. 06-0035	U.S.S. <u>Finback</u>	Tokyo Navy to depart Truk for Saipan on March 10. Route un- known.	None	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. The Finback made no contacts on either March 10 or 11. On March 12 a ship was sighted and pursued for 12 hours before it was discovered to be a hospital ship.
	U.S.S. <u>Whale</u>		Possible	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. The Whale sighted a freighter at 1200 (K time) March 12 entering Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, 15-22N, 145-43E.
10. 07-0041	U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	Large tanker to de- part Kwajalein for Jaluit at 0100 (GCT) March 9.	Probable	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. A southbound ship was sighted at 8N, 167E on March 9 at 1628 (L time). The Porpoise was unable to close for attack. (0528 GCT)
	U.S.S. <u>Finback</u>	One ship (type un- known) at 21-25N, 121-10E at 0300 (GCT) on March 14, scheduled to arrive at Takao at 1200 (GCT) March 14.	None	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. No contacts were reported on March 14; a passenger-freighter was damaged on March 15 at 24-30N, 121-45E, north of Tokyo.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
11. 09-1250	U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	One ship (type un- known but important) and DD escort will leave Jaluit (south- east channel) at 0600 (GCT) March 11.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Porpoise</u> at 0540(GCT) March 11 sighted a seaplane tender with destroyer escort leaving the southeast channel of Jaluit. The <u>Porpoise</u> was unable to attack.
12. 10-0737	U.S.S. <u>Trigger</u>	Convoy due at 0600(GCT) on equator at 145E March 15.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Trigger</u> sighted five freighters and 2 escorts at 0-00N, 145-00E at 0035(GCT) March 15. One ship was sunk and one was damaged.
10-0446 (additional information)		Six ships in the convoy will change escorts at above time and position.		
13. 10-1705	U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	One seaplane tender and an unknown type ship will leave Kwajalein at 2000 (GCT) March 10 and pro- ceed through 04-40N, 166-50E and 12N, 164E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Porpoise</u> was engaged off Jaluit on March 11. The <u>Trigger</u> was engaged with several ships in posi- tions to the southwest

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
13. (Cont.) 11-0730 (additional informa- tion)	U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	Their escort will meet a freighter and return with it to Kwajalein passing through 12N, 161E at 0300(GCT) March 11, and 12N, 165E at same time March 12.		07-25N, 159-30E and 07- 15N, 158-50E, from March 12-15.
14. 13-0531	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>	One or two ships at anchor at Wake Island. (Haddock instructed to look for them while on its way to its assigned area.)	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The Haddock reaching Wake March 17, sighted no ships.
	U.S.S. <u>Plunger</u>	ComSubPac asks <u>Plunger</u> to "take a look" at Eni- wetok on your way home." (The Caroline Maru was due at Eniwetok at 2000 (GCT) March 13.)	Probable	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. On March 14 the <u>Plunger</u> sighted a freighter anchored in- side the lagoon and was unable to attack.
15. 14-2352	U.S.S. <u>Grayback</u>	<u>Hon'iro Maru</u> damaged previously by <u>Grayback</u> may be creeping at 3 knots from counter to- ward Truk.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Grayback</u> seemed to think the ship was sinking after the original attack. The

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
15. (Cont.)				submarine had left the wreck at 0835(GCT) March 13 and pursued another ship to the south. Later the <u>grayback</u> returned to the area but did not sight the crippled waru.
16. 14-1741.	U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	American Waru at 0300 (GCT) March 15 will pass through 15N, 163E, next day through 10-50N, 165-30E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received by the <u>Porpoise</u> which was patrolling several degrees south of this area.
	U.S.S. <u>Plunger</u>			ComSubPac messages received by the <u>Plunger</u> which was patrolling off Eniwetok.
15-0317	U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	An unidentified ship with escort will pass through 2-20N, 170-05E, at 0300(GCT) March 14, then 07-50N, 167-15E on March 15; 07-25N, 164-15E on March 16; and 11-10N, 161-50E on March 17.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 1735(GCT) March 15 the <u>Porpoise</u> sighted a small AC (with out an escort) on a north west course in position 7-5N, 165-25E. An airplane prevented attack.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
16. (Cont.)	U.S.S. <u>Plunger</u>		Probable	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 1522(GCT) on March 16, the <u>Plunger</u> sighted a freighter and escort on a northwest course in position 10-30N 162-20E. It attacked but missed.
17. 16-0911	U.S.S. <u>Trigger</u>	An unidentified ship at 0300(GCT) March 18 will pass through 1-30N, 143-15E and 2-00S, 148-30E on March 19.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Trigger</u> reported no contact on March 18 and on March 19 was engaged with ships in position 3-44N, 144E.
18. 16-0400	U.S.S. <u>Pollack</u>	Type Kenyo Maru departing Makin at 2300(GCT) March 19 will pass through 3-30N, 172-30E at 0300(GCT) March 20 and 6-40N, 173-25E at 0300(GCT) March 21 to arrive at Kwajalein at 2300(GCT) March 21.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. A type Kenyo Maru freighter sighted at 0430(GCT) on March 20 at 3-58N, 172-09E which was badly damaged.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
19. (Cont.)	U.S.S. <u>Savfish</u>	1 ship (type unknown) to be at 27-47N, 139- 19E at 0300(GCT) March 19 and at 32-34N, 139- 41E at 0300(GCT) March 20.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Savfish</u> was patrolling this area but no contacts were made.
	U.S.S. <u>Savfish</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Savfish</u> attached a patrol boat on the 20th, east of the area, but inflicted no apparent damage. No other contacts were made.
19. 20-0650	U.S.S. <u>Fluback</u>	One ship (type unknown) to be at 07-16N, 141- 28E at 0300(GCT) March 20; 07-16N, 139-55E at 0300(GCT) March 21 and at 11-22N, 139-45E at 0300(GCT) March 22.	Probable	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. Large steamer (Kinka type Maru) was hit with two torpedoes on 21 March at 0140(GCT) at 7-40N, 139-48E. The ship was on a northeast course.
20. 21-0010	U.S.S.	One ship type unknown to be at 30-50N, 145-30E at 0300(GCT) March 21; at 26-45N, 149-15E at 0300 (GCT) March 22 and 26-40N 150-55E at 0300(GCT) March 23.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Savfish</u> patrolled this area March 21-24 but did not sight the Ultra target.

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Mo. Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	ComSubPac Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
21. 21-0557	U.S.S. <u>Kingfish</u>	Three tankers or possibly Army supply ships to be at 20-30N, 126-00E at 0300(GCT) March 22 and at 20N, 123E at 0300(GCT) March 23. (Time uncertain but presumably 0300).	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Kingfish</u> was occupied on March 22 to the north in the vicinity of Formosa.
22. 22-1810	U.S.S. <u>Finback</u>	Army freighters, one will pass through 10N, 132E at 0300(GCT) March 22 and arrive at Palao from Takao at 0300(GCT) March 23; one will leave Takao to pass through 10N, 129E at 0300(GCT) March 23 and arrive at Palao on March 24 at 0200(GCT).	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Finback</u> , at 2135(GCT) March 23, sighted a ship entering west channel of Palao but was unable to attack. This was possibly the freighter due at 0200 March 24.
23-0530	U.S.S. <u>Finback</u>	Army freighter to leave Takao at 0900(GCT) March 21 and arrive at Palao at 0100(GCT) March 26. En route it will pass through 16N, 126E at 1200(I time) March 23, 130-00N, 129-30E at 1200 March 24 and 9-30N, 132-35E at 1200 March 25. Noon position (I) time.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. For two days after 0745(GCT) March 24 the <u>Finback</u> was pursuing a convoy from Palao to the south.

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29 November 1945

March 1942

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
23.	24-1910 U.S.S. <u>Finback</u>	4,000 ton freighter load- ing at Anguar Island. Will depart at 2300(GCT) March 25 for unknown destination.	None	See Caso 22. <u>Finback</u> engaged in chasing con- voy.
24.	24-0359 U.S.S. <u>Whale</u>	One ship, type unknown, will pass through the following positions at 0300(GCT) on the dates given: 19-45N, 148-50E, March 26, 16-40N, 150-10E, March 27, 13-20N, 151-35E, March 28, 10-15N, 152-51E, March 29.	Possible	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Whale</u> pur- sued a small freighter to the southeast from 18-50N 149-16E, first sighted at 2358(GCT) March 25. Again at 2207(GCT) March 27 the <u>Whale</u> sighted another small freighter headed toward Truk at 13-30N, 150-56E. It is possible that one of the ships was an Ultra target of Com- SubPac 24-0359. Both ships were attacked but escaped.
	U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>	and Another ship, type unknown, will pass through the following positions at 0300(GCT) on the dates given: 19-40N, 149-05E, March 27, 16-20N, 150-40E, March 28, 13-10N, 152-10E, March 29, 10-00N, 153-05E, March 30.	None	The <u>Tunny</u> was engaged at Wake Island at this time (March 27).

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March 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
25.	24-0811	All subs.	Ship, type unknown, at 1000 (I time) on March 25 will be at 11-30N, 143-00E and at 1200 (I time) on March 26 at 10-00N, 148-30E.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whale</u> , on the Empire-Truk route, pursuing other targets several degrees east and north of these positions (March 25-27).
26.	25-1257	U.S.S. <u>Whahoo</u>	Two ships, type unknown, to be at 32-17N, 123-30E at 0300 (GCT) March 26; at 34-03N, 125-47E at 0300 (GCT) March 27 and at 34-07N, 130-10W at 0300 (GCT) March 28.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whahoo</u> reported no contacts on March 26 and 27. On March 28 the submarine attacked the <u>Kimissima Maru</u> at 30-25N, 129-41E.
27.	26-0755	U.S.S. <u>Whale</u>	Man-of-war, type unknown, to be at 12-05N, 142-50E at 2200 (GCT) on March 26. Heading for Area 7 (Bungo Channel).	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whale</u> was pursuing other targets.
		U.S.S. <u>Pompano</u>	Two warships and perhaps escorts to leave Area 4 (Yokosuka) for Area 15 (Truk) on April 3. Routes to be taken and dates are not given.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. On April 3 the <u>Pompano</u> patrolled the area just south of Yokosuka but made no contacts.

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March 1943

ComSubPac Operational Planchettes (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
27. (Cont.)	U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tunny</u> was in Truk area, the designation of the ultra target from April 5-8, but did not sight them.
28. 26-1920	U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>	One ship, type unknown, to arrive at Wake on March 28 and leave at 0300(GCT) on March 29.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tunny</u> attacked and damaged the <u>Sawa Maru</u> at Wake on March 28.
29. 27-1230	U.S.S. <u>Flabac</u>	Five ship convoy en route to Pulwat Island area to be at 13-12N, 146-32E at 0300(GCT) on March 28; at 11-22N, 146-22E at 0300(GCT) March 29 and at 09-32N, 147-49E at 0300(GCT) March 30.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Flabac</u> was patrolling the trade route from the Empire to Rabaul and the Mandates on March 28 and 29 and 30 but made no contacts. On March 30 she began her return trip to Pearl.
1.	U.S.S. <u>Wale</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. Two ships were attacked on March 28 but no contact was made with a large convoy.

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March 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
29. (Cont.)	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>			None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Haddock</u> searched this area but the convoy was not sighted.
30. 28-0422	U.S.S. <u>Whale</u>		Convoy or large ship to pass through 18-32N, 143-07E at at unknown time on March 31; later through 15-51N, 144-22E at 0200 (GCT) on April 1.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whale</u> eventually patrolled the Truk-Empire routes then headed for Midway on March 31 with only one torpedo remaining.
	U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>		Above ship to be at 08-28N, 148-51E at 0700 (GCT) on April 3 and to reach the west channel of Truk at 0200 (GCT) April 4.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tunny</u> had been at Wake until April 2 when it headed for Truk. No contact was made with the Ultra target.
	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>		Two loaded army transports and two or four escorts to leave Palao for the southeast on April 7, exact destination unknown.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Haddock</u> set its course for Pearl Harbor on April 4 to repair damages.

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March 1943

No.	ComSubpac Operational Platpaches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
31.	29-0324	U.S.S. <u>Walalo</u>	One ship, type unknown, en route to Saipan will pass through 15-50N, 152-13E on March 30 at 0300(GCT) and 36N, 149- 00E at 0300(GCT) on March 31.	None	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Walalo</u> was patrolling in this area but no contacts were made.
		U.S.S. <u>Pompano</u>	One ship, type unknown, to be at 29-44N, 138-49E at 0300(GCT) on March 30 and at 32-45N, 138-49E at 0300(GCT) on March 31.	None	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Pompano</u> was in this area and sighted a ship (hospital ?) at 33-42N, 140-04E on March 30 but was unable to close with it.
32.	30-0200	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>	Three army transports en route to Palau will pass through 01-32N, 146-20E at 0300(GCT) March 31 and 06N, 146E at 0300(GCT) April 4. They will arrive at Palau at 2000 April 4.	None	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Haddock</u> sank a Yasununi type freighter carrying fuel on the 3rd at 2N, 133E. On April 4 the submarine set its course to return to Pearl to repair depth charge damage. No Army ships were sighted.
		U.S.S. <u>Porpoise</u>	One ship type unknown will depart for Truk at 0300(GCT) April 2 and arrive at	None	ComSubpac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Porpoise</u> started for home on

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March 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
32.	(Cont.)		Truk at 0600(GCT) April 3.		April 1. Sighted no ships in the Truk area.
		U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>		None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tunny</u> in the Truk area reported no contacts on April 3 and 4.
33.	31-1100	U.S.S. <u>Whale</u>	One ship, type unknown, will pass through 12-21N, 146-55E at 0300(GCT) on April 1; 8-43N, 148-32E at 0300(GCT) on April 2; then through 7-26N, 167-51W(?).	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Whale</u> had already, on March 31, set its course for Midway.
		U.S.S. <u>Tunny</u>		Probable	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Tunny</u> en route to Truk from Wake attached a ship (<u>Arita Maru</u> ?) on April 2 at 1108(GCT) in position 7-23N, 149-12E. The ship was headed toward Truk.
34.	31-1115	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>	Loaded tanker at the following positions at	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Haddock</u>

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March 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressed(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
34.	(Cont.)		0300(GCT) on the days Given: 4-10N, 125-37E, April 1; 7-36N, 130-10E, April 2; 10-30N, 135-10E, April 3; 10-30N, 140-30E, April 4; 10-30N, 146-25E, April 5; 7-08N, 151-09E, April 6.		sank a Yasukuni type freighter carrying fuel at 9-31N, 133-39E, April 2, 2158(GCT).
		<u>U.S.S. Tunny</u>	Note tankers positions on April 5 and 6.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The Tunny was in this area but did not sight the tanker.
		<u>U.S.S. Finback</u>	One damaged ship beached on South shore of Wake Island.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The Finback sighted the ship on south shore of Wake and scored one hit on the wreck be- fore withdrawing under bomber attack.

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Chapter III

March 1, 1943

Case 1

According to several intercepted Japanese dispatches, the Taian Maru, after arriving at Yap Island on March 1, would depart at 0800 (I) on March 3 for Palau, where it would arrive at 1000 (I) on March 4.¹ Communication Intelligence also learned three positions through which the Kinai Maru would pass, the third point, or point "C", being given as 20 miles east of Satawal Island (7-21 N,² 147-20 E.)

Transmitting the positions for the Kinai Maru (which was accompanied by a merchantman type unknown) to the U.S.S. Halibut, ComSubPac informed the submarine on March 1 that the exact times and dates of the positions were unknown. At the same time, the course and schedule of the Taian Maru were³ sent in this Ultra dispatch to the U.S.S. Trigger.

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- 1 - Appendix III, Case 1, No. A-1 and No. A-4, hereafter referred to as III, Case 1, A-1 - A-4.
2 - III, Case 1, A-2 - A-3.
3 - III, Case 1, B-1.

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The U.S.S. Halibut received ComSubPac's Ultra message when it was patrolling between Hall Island and the Onon (Anon?) group.⁴ At 0955 (GCT) on March 3, the Halibut sighted in position 10-13 N, 146-42 E, two ships.

The submarine attacked and sank the larger of the two, believing it to be of the Manila class (9,500 tons). The other ship, a flush deck diesel freighter of about 7,500 tons, was lost in a rain squall.⁵

The vessel sunk could not have been the Kinai Maru, which ComSubPac had reported would pass through positions 11-10 N, 142-59 E and 09-10 N, 146-15 E at an unknown date and time, since the Kinai Maru was sunk in May, 1943, by the U.S.S. Plunger.⁶ However, it might have been the unknown merchantman which was to accompany the Kinai Maru. Positive identification of the vessel is not possible and the dates of the Kinai's course are unknown. The positions given in the two translations of the Japanese dispatch differ, and one position given in

4 - III, Case 1, C-1 - C-2.

5 - III, Case 1, C-2.

6 - See Japanese Merchant Ship Losses (15 January 1944).

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ComSubPac's dispatch does not agree with either translator's position. This can be regarded only as a probable contact with the Ultra target.

On March 2 and March 3, the U.S.S. Trigger was patrolling southwest of Palau, whereas the Telan Maru, as reported by ComSubPac, was sailing from Yap and was passing through 09-45 N, 133 E on March 3 enroute to Palau. The Trigger could not intercept at the given position at 0300 (GCT) on March 3, for it was operating south of Palau on March 3 and 4. At 0140 (GCT), on March 4, the submarine sighted a medium-sized freighter at 5-41 N, 136 E.⁷

Case 2

Information that four Japanese army transports en route to Palau or Truk would rendezvous with their escort at 0100 (GCT) on March 5 in position 0-30 N, 155-30 E was received by ComSubPac and sent to the U.S.S. Plunger for action at 1258 (GCT) on March 1.⁸

7 - III, Case 1, C-5.

8 - III, Case 2, A-1 - A-2.

9 - III, Case 2, B-1 - B-2.

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The U.S.S. Plunger, east of the Marshall Islands (06 N, 177 E), on March 5, reported its fuel situation to the Commander of Task Force Seven. At 1500 (GCT), March 5, this Commander directed the Plunger to patrol in the area of Ponape in the Caroline Islands, approximately 7 N, 158 E. No search for the Ultra target was conducted by the submarine.¹⁰

March 2, 1943

Case 3

In an operational dispatch of March 2 at 0919 (GCT) addressed to the U.S.S. Plunger, ComSubPac stated that a 14,000 ton tanker, previously attacked¹¹ by the Plunger, was being towed to Kwajalein. It also reported that the convoy mentioned in Case 2 was probably making about 8 knots an hour, destination still¹² unknown. Operational headquarters learned of the towing of the tanker Iro Maru to Kwajalein through several¹³ intercepted Japanese dispatches originated on March 1.

Also addressed were the U.S.S. Kingfish

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- 10 - III, Case 2, C-2.
 - 11 - II, Case 25, C-4.
 - 12 - III, Case 3, B-1.
 - 13 - III, Case 3, A-1 - A-3.

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and the U.S.S. Sunfish which were notified that a Japanese submarine, the I-165, en route from Soerabaya to Sasebo, was scheduled to pass through the area patrolled by the two American submarines. The exact route of the enemy submarine was unknown, although its position at 2100 (GCT) on February 27 was given at 9-12 N, 127-50 E. It was scheduled to arrive at 2100 (GCT) on March 5 at 31-48 North, 129-14 East.¹⁴

On March 2 the Plunger was pursuing enemy ships in the area 6-45 N, 169-10 E (Jaluit), several degrees south of Kwajalein. On March 3 and 4, the Plunger was patrolling the southern approaches to Kwajalein Island. At 0813 (GCT) on March 4 the Plunger surfaced and cleared the area since it was known that another submarine was approaching the Marshalls from the east. No contact was made with the target reported by ComSubPac's 020919.¹⁵

The Kingfish at 0650 (GCT) on March 6 sighted a periscope at position 23 N, 133 E, and after opening the range to fourteen miles, dived, in the hope that the submarine would follow. No further

14 - III, Case 3, B-1.
15 - III, Case 3, C-2 - C-3.

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16
contact was reported.

The U.S.S. Sunfish was patrolling in the vicinity of Formosa Straits-Nagasaki routes, and although a tanker, a ship similar to the Baikai Maru, and a freighter similar to the Tazan Maru were sighted between March 2 and 7, no submarine contact was reported.

17
March 3, 1943

Case 4

The #6 Shoonan Maru was assigned to escort the Okitsu Maru which would sail from Kwajalein to Nauru, according to a Japanese dispatch from an unidentified originator on March 2.

18
The schedule of this Japanese maru was sent to the U.S.S. Snapper on March 3 at 0030 by ComSubPac with the additional information that the vessel, loaded with gasoline, would pass through 8-40 N, and 166-50 E and 5 N, 165-10 E en route to Nauru where it would arrive at 1800.(GCT) on March 5.

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- 16 - III, Case 3, C-5.
 - 17 - III, Case 3, C-6 - C-7.
 - 18 - III, Case 4, A-1.
 - 19 - III, Case 4, B-1.

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29 November 1945

The U.S.S. Snapper on March 3 set its course for Nauru where it arrived at 1645 (GCT) on March 5. At 2112 (GCT) the smoke of a ship was sighted and thirty minutes later a submerged attack was made.

Four torpedoes were fired and all were heard to explode. The Snapper's last look at the Japanese ship before diving deep to avoid depth charges revealed the bow 50' above the water and heavy smoke coming from the after part of the vessel.²⁰ It was not sunk, however, for a Japanese dispatch of 1310 (GCT) on March 6 advised the 67th Guard Division of an attack on the Okitsu Maru which was able to come to anchor at Nauru.²¹ This is a positive contact with ComSubPac's Ultra 030030.

Case 5

A Japanese dispatch of March 1 informed Base Force #6 at Jaluit that air group men would be transferred from the Suva Maru to a seaplane tender, the Fujikawa Maru, which would leave Ruetto (in the

20 - III, Case 4, C-2.- C-3.
21 - III, Case 4, D-1.

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29 November 1945

22

Kwajalein Atoll) on March 8 for the Empire.

Assigning this target to the U.S.S.
Porpoise, ComSubPac added in an operational dispatch
of March 3 that, although the time and date were un-
known, more information would be sent if it could be
obtained.²³

On March 8, the Porpoise reached
Kwajalein and patrolled around the northern edge of
the atoll. The submarine then set its course down
the west side of the atoll toward Namu and Jaluit.²⁴
The Ultra target was not sighted.

Case 6

A Japanese operation order of March 1
listed the schedule of a two-ship convoy, composed of
one unidentified vessel and the Kenyo Maru, which would
sail from Rabaul at 1300 (I) on March 2, proceed along
the coast of New Ireland, and arrive at the southern
entrance of Truk at 0800 (I) March 6. Subchaser #13
would escort the vessels to 01-00 N, 151-08 E, at which
point the #2 Surface Escort Unit would assume escort
duties.²⁵

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- 22 - III, Case 5, A-1.
 - 23 - III, Case 5, B-1.
 - 24 - III, Case 5, C-2.
 - 25 - III, Case 6, A-1.

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ComSubPac, advising the U.S.S. Plunger of the convoy, gave two positions, 1-20 N, 151-10 E²⁶ on March 4 and 4-40 N, 151-30 E on March 5.

On March 4 and 5, the Plunger was patrolling the southern approaches to Kwajalein in the vicinity of 09 N, 167 E.²⁷ The submarine was not in a position to intercept the Kenyo Maru en route from Rabaul to Truk. Identity of the addressee "Benny" is unknown.

March 4, 1943

Case 7

Addressed to Subchaser #24 and a torpedo boat, a Japanese dispatch of March 3 revealed that escorts accompanying a single ship or convoy would be changed at 1000 (I) on March 6 in position 00-30 N,²⁸ 145-30 E.

At 0404 (GCT) March 4, ComSubPac sent this²⁹ information to the U.S.S. Trigger,

The Fourth War Patrol Report of the U.S.S. Trigger contains no data on the activities of

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- 26 - III, Case 6, B-1.
 - 27 - III, Case 6, C-2.
 - 28 - III, Case 7, A-1.
 - 29 - III, Case 7, B-1.

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29 November 1945

that submarine from March 6 to March 12. On March 5 the U.S.S. Trigger was at 4-08 N, 137-43 E. On March 12 it was at 2-00 N, 142-56 E. The contacts made by the submarine on those dates were on the probable course of the Ultra target, but the time given³⁰ makes it impossible that they were the Ultra target.

March 5, 1943

Case 8

A Japanese Sixth Base Force order outlined the schedules of the Taihosan Maru sailing from Ponape to Kwajalein, and of the Goryu Maru sailing at the same time from Kwajalein to Ponape. Escorting the Goryu Maru from Kwajalein, the #7 Showan Maru would meet the Taihosan Maru and return with it to Kwajalein.³¹

Should this position be in the path of the U.S.S. Plunger, ComSubPac directed that the submarine attempt to contact the marus; otherwise the Plunger was instructed to stay in its area and await

30 - III, Case 7, C-2.

31 - III, Case 8, A-1 - A-3.

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32
orders.

On March 6 the U.S.S. Plunger was patrolling near Ujae Island just west of Kwajalein on the direct Kwajalein-Ponape route. At 0540 (GCT) on March 6 the smoke and masts of a ship were sighted at position 8-25 N, 165-55 E. Although the Plunger steered its course to intercept the vessel after dark, the target was not again sighted. This is a possible contact with the Ultra target.

It is also possible that the contact made by the Plunger at 0033 (GCT) on March 7 in position 7-45 N, 165-40 E was the Taihosan Maru en route to Kwajalein. An attack was made with the submarine's 3" guns, but it was not known if the vessel were damaged since the Plunger was forced to dive at the approach of an enemy plane.

March 6, 1943

Case 9

On March 4, the Truk Transportation Section originated a dispatch concerning the scheduled departure of the Tokyo Maru from Truk to Saipan.

32 - III, Case 8, B-1.
33 - III, Case 8, C-2 - C-3.

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Previously set for March 9, the sailing of the maru would be postponed, according to the dispatch, until March 10.³⁴

For the information of the U.S.S. Whale and the U.S.S. Finback, ComSubPac sent a dispatch based on this Ultra information at 0935 (GCT) on March 6.³⁵

On March 8-11, the Finback was in the vicinity of Truk, patrolling the Truk-Empire route on which course Saipan lies. On March 12, in North Pass at Truk a vessel was sighted and tracked for eleven hours and fifty minutes; then the red lights of a hospital ship were shown. There was no contact by the Finback with the Tokyo Maru.³⁶

The U.S.S. Whale patrolled west of the Marianas from March 8 through March 11. Until March 19 it was in the vicinity of Tanapag Harbor. On March 12 at 1200 the submarine sighted a single stack freighter (4 to 5000 tons) entering the harbor. The target was completely out of range. It is possible that this was the Tokyo Maru, which left Truk on March 10 en route to

34 - III, Case 9, A-1 - A-3.
35 - III, Case 9, B-1.
36 - III, Case 9, C-2.

29 November

37
Saipan.

March 7, 1943

Case 10

According to a Japanese dispatch of March 6, the #7 Kyoo Maru was scheduled to leave Kwajalein at 1400 (or 1000) (I) on March 9. With escort, the Katori Maru, it was scheduled to reach Jaluit the following day. Other intercepted dispatches on this day revealed that the Uzuki had received an enemy attack near Nauru Island, and for this reason, the Koshin Maru would remain at anchor at Nauru. The Snapper's attack on the Okitsu Maru was confirmed, although it was learned that this vessel had not been damaged to such extent that it could not unload at
38
Nauru.

An operational dispatch sent at 0041 on March 7 informed the U.S.S. Snapper that its target of the March 6th attack was believed to have reached port. The submarine was advised to be on the alert
39
for resulting search planes while en route to Pearl. No aircraft was contacted during the Snapper's return

37 - III, Case 9, C-4 - C-5.
38 - III, Case 10, A-1 - A-3.
39 - III, Case 10, B-1.

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40
trip.

To the U.S.S. Porpoise in the same dispatch was sent the information concerning #7 Kyoo Maru sailing from Kwajalein to Jaluit. This dispatch also listed, for the U.S.S. Kingfish, the position at which an unknown type ship might be found at 0300 (GCT) on March 14 when it would pass through 21-25 N, 121-10 E. The vessel would be due at Takao at 1200 (GCT) on the same day.⁴¹ The Japanese dispatch giving this last information is not available.

At 0100 (GCT) on March 9, the Porpoise was steering a course on the Kwajalein-Jaluit lane near Namu Island, just south of Kwajalein. At 0523 (GCT) the Porpoise sighted a southbound ship and its escort, but because of the difficulty in effecting an approach, it was decided to intercept it later. When the target was later contacted, attack would have been possible; however, the commanding officer decided to wait until after dawn according to the original plan. The submarine did not again get close enough to attack.⁴² This is a probable contact with the #7 Kyoo Maru,

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- 40 - III, Case 10, C-2.
 - 41 - III, Case 10, B-1.
 - 42 - III, Case 10, C-4.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

the Ultra target assigned to the Porpoise.

The U.S.S. Kingfish reported no contacts on March 14, although at 0355 (GCT) on March 15, a passenger-freighter was sighted at position 25-34 N, 121-45 E. Of three torpedoes fired, two may have found their mark, since while diving deep to avoid the three-plane escort, the Kingfish heard a heavy torpedo explosion from the direction of the target. After this sound, the submarine was unable to hear the target's ⁴³ screws.

This could not have been the Ultra target which was arriving from the south at Takao in southwestern Formosa and which was due at 1200 (GCT) on March 14. The ship which the Kingfish attacked was on a northerly course off the north coast of Formosa and the date was March 15.

March 9, 1945

Case 11

An unidentified Japanese ship originated a dispatch for action to the Eleventh Air Group (?) and to one other unit on March 8. Included in the

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list of information addressees were the 952 Air Group, the Takunan Maru #6, the Combined Fleet, and Makin, Jaluit and Imieji units. The dispatch listed changes in the ship's operation schedule, disclosing that it would leave Jaluit at 1500 (I) on March 11, by the southeast channel, and arrive at 1000 (I) March 12 at either Makin or Nauru.⁴⁴

Adding that the unidentified ship was evidently one of some importance, ComSubPac, at 1250 on March 9 informed the U.S.S. Porpoise that the vessel and its destroyer escort would leave Jaluit via the southeast channel at 0600 (GCT) on March 11.⁴⁵

At 0540 (GCT) on March 11, the Porpoise sighted a seaplane tender, similar to the Katori class cruiser, and a two-stack destroyer in the southeast channel of Jaluit Atoll. The tender maneuvered to allow the escort to get ahead, and the Porpoise was unable to approach for an attack. The seaplane tender and escort drew out of sight.⁴⁶ This is a positive contact with ComSubPac's Ultra target.

⁴⁴ - III, Case 11, A-1 - A-2.
⁴⁵ - III, Case 11, B-1.
⁴⁶ - III, Case ~~11~~, C-2 - C-3.

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March 10, 1945

Case 12

On March 9, the Japanese "R Area Defense Force" informed the 43 Guard Division and one other unidentified action addressee that escort of a six-vessel convoy bound for Palau would be turned over to them at 1500 (I) on March 15 at the equator and the 145 Meridian. The Japanese dispatch added that the Noshiro Maru and the Yodogawa Maru bound for Truk would, at 1630 (I) on March 15, be in position on the equator at the 151 Meridian.⁴⁷

ComSubPac, on March 10, sent the position of the six-vessel convoy to the U.S.S. Trigger, which was warned, however, that Task Force 42 submarines might be searching for the same convoy. The dispatch gave the time as 0600 (GCT) March 15.⁴⁸

At 0035 (GCT) on March 15, the Trigger sighted a convoy of five freighters with two escorts at 00 N, 145 E. Two hits, thought to be fatal, were made on the leading ship of one column, and two torpedoes damaged the leading ship in the second column. The submarine, forced to dive because of the escorting

47- III, Case 12, A-1.

48 - III, Case 12, B-1 - B-2.

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destroyers or corvets, surfaced two hours later and again sighted what appeared to be the damaged ship accompanied by a smaller freighter and the two small destroyers or corvets. The first ship, believed sunk, was similar to the Koryu Maru and the one damaged (at which six more torpedoes were fired in vain; the last one circling back barely missed the submarine) was similar to the London Maru.⁴⁹

At 0530 (GCT) on March 15, an unidentified Japanese ship sent a dispatch to the Bismarck Area Defense Force that a maru had received a torpedo attack at 0200 (GCT) in position 00-02 N, 145-05 E, and was unable to navigate. Three hours later 0830 (GCT) another Japanese dispatch addressed to all ships (MAN)⁵⁰ reported this attack. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 13

Information that the Hinode Maru and the #5 Hino Maru would leave Kwajalein at 0500 (I) on March 11 was included in a Japanese operational

49 - III, Case 12, C-2.
50 - III, Case 12, D-1 - D-2.

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dispatch from the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit on March 10. After passing through positions 08-40 N, 166-50 E and 12 N, 164 E, the Hinode Maru was scheduled to proceed to Yokosuka and the #5 Hino Maru⁵¹ to Saipan.

To the U.S.S. Porpoise, ComSubPac directed this information on March 10. In a later dispatch on March 11, the U.S.S. Plunger⁵² was also named as an action addressee.

The Porpoise on March 11 was engaged off Jaluit with the seaplane tender and destroyer⁵³ reported in ComSubPac's 091250. No contact was made with the targets reported in the 101705 Ultra dispatch.

On March 12-15, the U.S.S. Plunger was patrolling near Ponape in position 7-25 N, 159-30 E and 7-15 N, 158-50 E where several ships were sighted and attacked. There was no contact with the target⁵⁴ reported in ComSubPac's Ultra 101705 and 110730.

March 13, 1943

Case 14

According to an operational dispatch

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- 51 - III, Case 13, A-1.
 - 52 - III, Case 13, B-1 - B-2.
 - 53 - III, Case 13, C-4 - C-5.
 - 54 - III, Case 15, C-2 - C-3.

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of March 12 from the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit, the departures from Ponape of an unidentified maru, the Goryu Maru, and the Shiretoko Maru were temporarily delayed. In a later dispatch warning that the waters around Ponape were infested with allied submarines, the commanding officer of the Shunzan or Shunnam Maru was also ordered to delay his departure for Ponape.

The Kwajalein District Transportation Office informed the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit that the Azuti Maru had departed Kwajalein on March 12 for Taroa where it would arrive at 1000 (I) on March 13, and that the Caroline Maru had left Kwajalein for Eniwetok where it would arrive at 0500 (I), on March 14.

Orders to the U.S.S. Haddock, en route to the Truk area from Pearl, directing that the submarine spend one day patrolling Wake Island were sent by ComSubPac on March 13. The Haddock might find one or two ships in harbor there.

In the same dispatch ComSubPac notified the U.S.S. Plunger that shipping had been prohibited

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- 55 - III, Case 14, A-1 - A-2.
 - 56 - III, Case 14, A-3 - A-4.
 - 57 - III, Case 14, A-5 - A-6.

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from entering or leaving Ponape Harbor because of this submarine's presence there. The U.S.S. Plunger was directed, if it had any remaining torpedoes and if its fuel supply permitted, to return to Pearl Harbor by way of Eniwetok.⁵⁸

The U.S.S. Haddock did not arrive at Wake Island until March 17. No shipping was reported by the Haddock in the harbor.⁵⁹

On March 14, the Plunger proceeded along Ujelang Atoll, and at 1325 (GCT) dived off Eniwetok Atoll. Although the submarine started an approach on an KFM freighter anchored at the island, the action was abandoned when the target was plotted anchored inside the lagoon. Since the Ultra target, the Caroline Maru, had been scheduled to arrive at 2000 (GCT) on March 13, it is only probable that the maru inside the lagoon was this ship.⁶⁰

March 14, 1943

Case 15

A Japanese dispatch of March 9, while telling about a six ship convoy which the Trigger

58 - III, Case 14, B-1.
59 - III, Case 14, C-2.
60 - III, Case 14, C-4 - C-5.

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later attacked (see III, Case 12), also added the information that the Noshiro Maru and the Yodogawa Maru bound for Truk would pass through the Equator⁶¹ at 151 E about 0730 (GCT) March 13. No ComSubPac dispatch relaying this added information is available. However, the U.S.S. Grayback, possibly on Ultra information, was patrolling this area, and at 0643 (GCT) March 13 sighted and attacked the Noshiro Maru⁶² in position 00-01 S, 151-00 E.

A message from the Noshiro Maru at 1702 (I) 0802 (GCT), on March 13 reported a submarine attack at 1538 (I) 0638 (GCT), in position 00-10 S, 151-16 E. Asserting that in spite of 2 hits, the damage was light, the maru reported that it would head for Truk at three⁶³ knots an hour.

Utilizing this information, ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Grayback and the Commander of Task Force Seven that the Grayback had reported hitting the Noshiro Maru with four torpedoes, and abandoning the ship with its stern awash. Other indications pointed out that the Noshiro Maru at dusk on March 13 was heading

61 - III, Case 12, A-1.
62 - III, Case 15, C-2.
63 - III, Case 15, A-1 - A-2.

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⁶⁴
toward Truk from the equator at 151-06 E.

After pursuing another ship to the south, the Grayback moved back to the equator and on March 15, 16, patrolled submerged at approximately 151 E. ⁶⁵
The crippled maru, however, was not sighted.

March 15, 1943

Case 16

The #6 Base Force at Jaluit, reporting on the schedule of the Amagisan Maru, listed its time of departure from Yokosuka for Ruotto at 1100 (I) on March 9. The vessel's position at noon (I zone) on March 15 would be 15 N, 163 E, and its noon position for March 16 would be 10-50 N, 165-30 E. A minesweeper was scheduled to rendezvous with the maru at 0900 (I) ⁶⁶ on March 16, and to escort the vessel to Ruotto.

An unidentified Japanese ship, according to a #6 Base Force Order of March 13, would depart Tarawa en route to Yokohama at 1630 (I) on March 13. Noon positions in the I time zone were given for the ship for March 14 through 17. The #6 Eyo Maru would

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- 64 - III, Case 15, B-1.
65 - III, Case 15, C-2.
66 - III, Case 16, A-1.

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depart Jaluit and escort the unidentified ship from
its March 15 noon position to its March 17 noon
⁶⁷
position.

The positions of the Amagisan Maru
for March 15 and 16 were sent for action to the U.S.S.
Porpoise and the U.S.S. Plunger by ComSubPac on
⁶⁸
March 14. Although a second ComSubPac operational
dispatch was not sent until 0317 on March 15, the
noon positions of the unidentified ship and its escort
were sent to the Porpoise and the Plunger for March
14, 15, 16 and 17. The position for March 17 was
doubtful since the vessel's destination appeared to
⁶⁹
be Eniwetok.

On March 14 through 17 the U.S.S.
Porpoise was not in a position to intercept the target
reported by ComSubPac in his 141741. At 1735 (GCT) on
March 15 the submarine sighted a small AZ travelling
to the north west in position 7-57 N, 165-25 E. An
airplane escort prevented an attack. This is a possible
⁷⁰
contact with the Ultra target of ComSubPac 150317.

After sighting an LFM type freighter in

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- 67 - III, Case 16, A-2.
 - 68 - III, Case 16, B-1.
 - 69 - III, Case 16, B-2.
 - 70 - III, Case 16, C-2.

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Eniwetok Harbor on March 15, the U.S.S. Plunger continued to patrol in the vicinity of Eniwetok. At 1522 (GCT) March 16 the Plunger sighted a freighter and escort in position 10-30 N, 162-20 E, steaming on a north west course. The submarine attacked with its one remaining torpedo but missed.⁷¹ This is a probable contact with the Ultra target of ComSubPac 150317, that target being an escorted maru which, travelling on a north west course from Tarawa to Yokohama, was due in position 11-10 N, 161-50 E at 0300 (GCT) March 17.

March 16, 1943

Case 17

The itinerary of an unidentified ship which would depart Palau for Rabaul at 1300 (I) on March 15 was learned by Communication Intelligence from an intercepted Japanese dispatch of March 14. Positions were listed in the dispatch for March 16 through 19, and the vessel was scheduled to arrive at Rabaul at 0600 (I) on March 20.⁷²

71 - III, Case 16, C-5 - C-6.
72 - III, Case 17, A-1.

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To the U.S.S. Trigger, ComSubPac sent the positions of the vessel for March 18 at 1-30 N, 143-15 E and on March 19 at position 02 S, 148-30 E.⁷³

⁷⁴ Having conducted an attack on a convoy on March 17, the Trigger reported on March 18 that the submarine was so low on fuel that, considering the ten per cent reserve supply, it would be possible only to reach Midway on one engine. No ship contact was reported on March 18, although at 2205 (GCT) on March 19, a convoy of four freighters was attacked in position 3-44 N, 144-12 E, and a large freighter sighted in position 3-44 N, 144-08 E.⁷⁵ From these contact reports it is apparent that the Trigger was patrolling north and west of the position reported in ComSubPac's 160811 for March 19.

March 18, 1943

Case 13

An intercepted transportation order from the Fifth Base Force at Saipan on March 15 revealed that an unidentified ship en route from a position in

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- 73 - III, Case 17, E-1.
 - 74 - III, Case 12, C-2.
 - 75 - III, Case 17, C-2.

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the Caroline Islands would follow the 139 Meridian
north to the Empire between March 16-20.⁷⁶

A movement report from the Okitsu Maru
on March 17 advised that the ship would leave Makin at
0800 (I) on March 20, and would expect to arrive at
Kwajalein at 0800 (I) on March 22. Noon positions in I
time zone were listed, and it was requested that arrange-
ments be made for an escort vessel.⁷⁷

To the U.S.S. Pollack, ComSubPac sent
the positions of the Okitsu Maru on March 20 and 22,
as well as the time and point of departure and the
destination. For the U.S.S. Sunfish and the U.S.S.
Sawfish, ComSubPac directed, that, if in the vicinity,
they should try for the unidentified vessel plying
between the Caroline Islands and the Empire. The
dispatch gave the 0300 positions of this ship for March
19 and 20 (27-47 N, 139-19 E and 32-34 N, 139-41 E).⁷⁸

At 0430 (GCT) on March 20, the Pollack
sighted the Okitsu Maru and escort in position 3-58 N,
172-09.3 E. Two separate attacks were made on this
ship by the Pollack, and it was believed that, if not

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- 76 - III, Case 18, A-1.
 - 77 - III, Case 18, A-2.
 - 78 - III, Case 18, B-1.
 - 79 - This vessel was identified by the Pollack as
a Kanyo Class Maru, the same class as the
Okitsu Maru.

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actually sunk, the maru was very badly damaged.⁸⁰

According to a report by the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit, however, the Okitsu Maru⁸¹ suffered no damage from the second submarine attack.

Although the U.S.S. Sunfish was patrolling to the north in the area where the unidentified ship was expected, no contact with ships other than a small tug or trawler at 29-59 N, 141-46 E at 2223 (GCT) on March 20 was reported during March 19⁸² through 22. The ComSubPac message was received, but there is no evidence in the Sunfish's narrative report of any search having been made for this vessel.⁸³

Having patrolled this area but now headed for Midway and considerably to the east of the positions given for the unidentified ship was the Sawfish which reported sighting only a small⁸⁴ patrol boat at 0127 (GCT) on March 20.

March 20, 1943

Case 19

Learning from a Japanese dispatch that

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- 80 - III, Case 18, C-2.
 - 81 - III, Case 18, D-1 - D-2.
 - 82 - III, Case 18, C-4.
 - 83 - III, Case 18, C-5 - C-6.
 - 84 - III, Case 18, C-8 - C-9.

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an unidentified unit had departed Rabaul at 1500
(I) March 17, and was due to arrive at Yokosuka at
1800 (I) on March 27, ComSubPac sent an Ultra dispatch⁸⁵
to the U.S.S. Finback listing the positions for March 20,
21 and 22.⁸⁶

At 0140 (GCT) on March 21, the Finback
sighted a large steamer of the Kinka Maru type on a
north west course in position 7-40 N, 159-48 E. The
position of the Ultra target at 0300 (GCT) on March 21
had been given by ComSubPac as 07-13 N, 139-55 E.
The Finback was successful in getting two hits on this
target, which is a probable contact with the ComSubPac
Ultra target.⁸⁷

March 21, 1943

Case 20

At 0955 (I) on March 19, the Commanding
Officers of the Yokosuka Naval District originated a
dispatch giving the course of an unidentified vessel
sailing from Yokosuka at 0900 (I) on March 19 for
Marcus Island.⁸⁸

Positions at 0300 on March 21 and 22 for
this vessel were sent by ComSubPac at 0032 on March 21

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- 85 - III, Case 19, A-1.
 - 86 - III, Case 19, B-1.
 - 87 - III, Case 19, C-2 - C-3.
 - 88 - III, Case 20, A-1.

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to the U.S.S. Sunfish, should this submarine be in
position to intercept.⁸⁹

The Sunfish, reporting radio reception
complete,⁹⁰ set its course for Marcus Island on March 21.
Only a trawler and a large sampan, however, were sighted
in this area, and the Ultra target was apparently
missed.⁹¹

Case 21

The Japanese Naval Officer at Koji
reported on March 19 that three army cargo ships had
departed Koji at 1800 (I) on March 19. Four positions⁹²
to be passed en route to Manila were listed.

That the three ships, possibly army
supply ships, would pass through 20-30 N, 125 E on
March 22, and 20 N, 123 E on the following day was sent
by ComSubFac to the U.S.S. Kingfish. Although the time
was uncertain, it was possibly 0300 (GCT), according
to ComSubFac.⁹³

According to the positions listed for
the three cargo ships, these vessels would be sailing
west about latitude 20 N on March 22 and 23; but the

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- 89 - III, Case 20, B-1.
 - 90 - III, Case 3, C-6.
 - 91 - III, Case 20, C-2 - C-3.
 - 92 - III, Case 21, A-1.
 - 93 - III, Case 21, B-1.

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U.S.S. Kingfish was operating approximately 4 to 6 degrees north of these positions on the two days. No contact was reported with vessels heavier than trawlers,⁹⁴ a minelayer or a destroyer.

March 22, 23, 1943

Case 22

Because a Japanese dispatch which had been transmitted on March 13 was not translated until⁹⁵ March 22, ComSubPac sent a hurried operational dispatch to the U.S.S. Finback stating that Japanese army freighters were moving from Takao to Palau. The first one would be due at Palau at 0300 (GCT) on March 23, having passed through 10 N, 132 E at 0300 (GCT) on March 22. Another freighter would be due at 0200 (GCT) on March 24 after passing through 10 N, 129 E on⁹⁶ March 23 at 0300 (GCT).

In a second dispatch to the Finback on March 23, ComSubPac sent the information that still another army freighter left Takao at 0900 (GCT) on March 21 and was scheduled to arrive at Palau at 0100 (GCT) on March 26. Noon positions (I) time of this

94 - III, Case 21, C-2.
95 - III, Case 22, A-1 - A-2.
96 - III, Case 22, B-1.

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last vessel on March 23, 24 and 25 were given in this
97
Ultra message.

On March 22 and 23, the U.S.S. Finback was patrolling off the West Channel of Palau. At 2135 (GCT) on March 23, a steamer similar to the Taizan Maru was sighted entering the channel. No attack was made since the closest range that was obtained was 12,000 yards. The vessel was protected by air escort and subsequently by 3 patrol boats. It is possible that this was the army freighter due at 0300 (GCT) March 23 or the one due at 0200 (GCT) March 24, according to the first ComSubPac dispatch.

Ten hours later (0745 GCT March 24), while still waiting off the west channel of Palau, the Finback sighted a convoy of five freighters emerging from the channel and heading south. In a two day chase the submarine obtained three torpedo hits on two of the largest ships in the convoy, tentatively identified as the Tottori Maru and the Taibun Maru. But these ships cannot have been the army freighters reported in the ComSubPac dispatches since this convoy was en

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98
route from Palau to a destination to the south.

March 24, 1943

Case 23

An intercepted movement report revealed to Communication Intelligence that the Kunishima Maru, which had arrived at Anguar at 1230 (I) on March 24, would sail again at 0800 (I) on March 26.
99

Since the U.S.S. Finback was patrolling off Anguar and Palau at this time, ComSubPac sent these facts to that submarine. The Finback, however, passed Anguar Island at 1523 (GCT) on March 24, while chasing a convoy. Two days were spent in making an attack on the convoy. No contact was reported by the submarine with the target mentioned in this ComSubPac Ultra dispatch.
100
101

Case 24

The noon positions (I time), March 22 through March 29, of two unidentified ships sailing from Yokosuka to Truk were recovered in dispatches sent by the Chief of the Yokosuka Naval District on March 21 and March 22.
102

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- 98 - III, Case 22, C-2 - C-3.
 - 99 - III, Case 23, A-1.
 - 100 - III, Case 23, B-1.
 - 101 - III, Case 23, C-2 - C-3.
 - 102 - III, Case 24, A-1 - A-2.

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Positions of the first ship for March 26 through March 29, and positions of the second ship for March 27 through March 30 were sent by ComSubPac to the U.S.S. Whale and the U.S.S. Tunny on March 24.¹⁰³

Although the Tunny was east of this area at Wake Island where it conducted an attack on a ship similar to the Sydney Maru,¹⁰⁴ the Whale was in the vicinity of the Truk-Empire route on these days.

From 2338 (GCT) March 25 the Whale pursued for many hours and twice attacked a small freighter steaming south-east in position 13-59 N, 149-16 E. The attacks failed. Again, at 2207 (GCT) on March 27, the Whale sighted a small freighter headed for Truk in position 13-36 N, 150-56.7 E. Although three torpedoes were fired, all missed their target. Continuing to pursue the target until 0831 (GCT) on March 29, the Whale finally abandoned the chase because of insufficient fuel.¹⁰⁵ It is possible that the small freighter was one of the targets reported by ComSubPac, since it was encountered in approximately the positions scheduled by the Yokosuka Naval District Chiefs.

103 - III, Case 24, B-1.
104 - III, Case 28, C-2 - C-3.
105 - III, Case 24, C-4 - C-5.

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Case 25

A Japanese maru, using the concealed identity call, sent a movement report giving two scheduled positions at 1000 (I) on March 25 at 11-30 N, 143 E, and at 1200 (I) on March 26 at 10 N, 148-30 E. At 1900 (I) the maru would be 20 miles distance from ¹⁰⁶ Ulul Island.

In a ComSubPac dispatch to all submarines copying the NPM Fox schedule, this information was sent out at 0811 (CCT) on March 24. No specific ¹⁰⁷ addressee was given.

The U.S.S. Whale was patrolling the Truk-Empire route but from March 25 to 27 it was pursuing another target several degrees from the positions ¹⁰⁸ named in this Ultra dispatch. There were no other submarines in the vicinity. There was no contact with the Ultra target.

Case 26

On March 24 and 25, Communication Intelligence intercepted the scheduled and revised sailing position of Japanese merchant ships for March

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- 106 - III, Case 25, A-1.
 - 107 - III, Case 25, B-1.
 - 108 - III, Case 24, C-4 - C-5.

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29 November 1945

109
24-28.

ComSubFac informed the U.S.S. Wahoo that two ships of an unknown type would be found at 32-14 N, 123-30 E at 0300 (GCT) on March 26; at this same time the next day, they would be passing through 34-03 N, 125-47 E, and on March 28 would be at 34-07 N, 130-10 E.¹¹⁰

The Wahoo on March 25 sighted several ships in the vicinity of 33-01 N, 123-36 E. On March 28 it reported conducting a surface patrol on the Shimonoseki-Formosa shipping route. The position given for the unidentified ships for March 28 is approximately one degree west of Shimonoseki. On March 28 the Wahoo conducted an attack on the Kimisima Maru in position 30-25 N, 129-41 E, much farther south than the reported position of the Ultra target. The Ultra target¹¹¹ was apparently not sighted.

March 26, 1943

Case 27

On March 24 the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fourth Fleet received a dispatch giving

109 - III, Case 26, A-1 - A-4.
110 - III, Case 26, B-1.
111 - III, Case 26, C-2 - C-3.

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the schedule of an unidentified vessel which would sail from Truk at 0730 (I) on March 25 (?). It was scheduled to arrive at Bungo Channel on March 31 and at Kure at 0800 (I) on April 1.¹¹² According to an intercepted dispatch of March 26, the Chokai was ordered by the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet to accompany a vessel which was sailing from Yokosuka on April 3 for Truk.¹¹³

The U.S.S. Whale in a ComSubPac dispatch of March 26 received the information that an unidentified vessel en route to Bungo Channel and Kure would pass through position 12-05 N, 142-50 E at 2200 (GCT) on March 26. For the information of the U.S.S. Pompano and the U.S.S. Tunny, ComSubPac reported that two vessels probably with some escorts, would sail on April 3 from the Yokosuka area to the Truk area.¹¹⁴

From March 25 through 29 the Whale made three contacts with small freighters along the Truk-Empire route, but only the last of them was steaming north. It was sighted, but not attacked, at 2330 (GCT) March 27 in position 13-23 N, 151-05 E, which does not correspond with the Ultra information.¹¹⁵

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- 112 - III, Case 27, A-1.
 - 113 - III, Case 27, A-2.
 - 114 - III, Case 27, B-1.
 - 115 - III, Case 27, C-2.

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Although the Pompano was patrolling near Miyake Shima, just south of Yokosuka, on April 3 and in this general area on April 4, no contact was reported. On April 5, the Pompano, still patrolling in the vicinity of Miyake Shima picked up an SJ radar contact with a small or medium-sized destroyer in company with a small patrol vessel. No contact with the Ultra targets was made, although the submarine
116
received this Ultra dispatch.

On April 2 through April 4, the Tunny was patrolling the Saipan and Empire traffic lane, east of the Mamonuito Island group. During April 5 to 8 the Tunny was searching in the vicinity of Truk, the destination of the ships which left Yokosuka on April 3. The targets of ComSubPac's dispatch were
116a
page 26 and 36 of Peanut, which are an aircraft carrier of the Kasuga class and a heavy cruiser of the Takao class, the Chokai Maru. These ships were never sighted.
116a

However, page 26 of Popcorn is the Buenos Aires, and the Tunny attacked a ship of that class in position 8-50 N, 147-06 E at 2334 (Z) on

116 - III, Case 27, C-3 - C-4.
116a - "Peanut" and "Popcorn" refer to O.N.I. Publications (restricted) #14 and #208-J respectively. The former publication describes Japanese warships; the latter, Japanese merchant ships.

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April 7.

Case 28

From the Kwajalein District Transportation Office to the #6 Base Force at Jaluit was sent the intelligence on March 25 that an unidentified vessel would depart Jaluit at 1000 (I) on March 25 and arrive at Wake Island at an unidentified time on March 28. It was scheduled to arrive at Yokosuka at 1200 (I) on April 3. Noon positions for the vessel from March 26 through April 2 were listed in the Japanese dispatch. 118

Suggesting that the U.S.S. Tunny attempt to attack this vessel while it was anchored at Wake, ComSubPac informed the submarine that the ship would arrive on March 26 and depart after a short stay there. 119

Reporting in its narrative for March 26 that ComSubPac Serial 32 had been received, the Tunny set its course for Wake, where at 1850 (GCT) on March 27, it attacked and damaged a ship similar to the Sydney Maru. This is a positive contact with the Ultra target. 120 The ship was actually the much larger Suwa Maru, as subsequent Japanese dispatches proved. 121

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- 117 - III, Case 27, C-6 - C-7.
118 - III, Case 28, A-1.
119 - III, Case 28, B-1.
120 - III, Case 28, C-2 - C-3.
121 - III, Case 28, D-1.

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March 27, 1943

Case 29

Possibly en route from Guam or Saipan to Truk, the noon positions of a Japanese convoy composed of five ships were recovered on March 27 by Communication Intelligence. The convoy was scheduled to arrive at the South Channel at Truk at 1300 (I) on April 2.¹²²

With a warning to the U.S.S. Whale and the U.S.S. Haddock to watch out for the U.S.S. Finback and for each other, ComSubPac, on March 27, sent this information in an Ultra dispatch to these three submarines. The positions of the convoy for March 28, 29, and 30 were listed.¹²³

Patrolling across trade lanes from the Empire to Rabaul and the Mandates on March 28 and 29, the Finback moved to the Empire-Pulwat route where it met the Haddock. No contact was made with the Ultra target. The Finback set its course to return to Pearl Harbor.¹²⁴

Two contacts during this period were reported by the Whale at 2207 (GCT) and 2330 (GCT) on

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- 122 - III, Case 29, A-1.
 - 123 - III, Case 29, B-1.
 - 124 - III, Case 29, C-2.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

March 27 with two separate Japanese vessels at positions 13-36 N, 150-56.7 E and 13-23 N, 151-05.5 E, respectively. The 0300 (CCT) March 28 position listed by ComSubPac as the location of the Ultra target was 13-12 N, 146-32 E, which was several degrees west of the location of contacts by the Whale. Moreover, the convoy reported through Ultra was sailing, at that time, almost due south, whereas one of the Whale contacts was headed north.¹²⁵

Although a thorough search of the area was made by the Haddock, no sightings, other than the unexpected meeting with the Finback was reported. No contact by any of the three addressees with the Ultra targets was reported.¹²⁶

March 28, 1943

Case 30

From an intercepted Japanese dispatch of March 25 was recovered the schedule of a Japanese vessel plying between Kure and Truk. Leaving Bungo Channel at 1030 (I) on March 27, the vessel was scheduled to arrive at Truk at 1300 (I) on April 4.¹²⁷

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- 125 - III, Case 24, C-3 - C-4.
126 - III, Case 29, C-6.
127 - III, Case 30, A-1.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

To the U.S.S. Whale, ComSubPac sent the information that this target would pass through position 18-32 N, 143-07 E at an unknown time on March 31. It would then steer on course 156 to pass through 15-51 N, 144-22 E at 0200 on April 1 where it would change course to 105 degrees. For the U.S.S. Tunny, ComSubPac included the position of this target, 08-28 N, 148-51 E at 0700 (GCT) on April 3, when it would set its course at 116 degrees in order to reach the West Channel at Truk at 0200 (GCT) on April 4.

Also, the U.S.S. Haddock was advised that two loaded army transports accompanied by two escorts and two destroyers would leave Palau for the south east on April 7; their exact destination was unknown.
128

During this time, the Whale was patrolling the Truk-Empire route, after which it headed for Midway on March 31 with only one torpedo remaining.
129
Until April 2, the Tunny was in the Wake Island Area, although on that date, the submarine set its course for Truk. At 1108 (GCT) on April 2, the

128 - III, Case 30, B-1.
129 - III, Case 30, C-2.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

U.S.S. Tunny sighted and attacked the Aldta Maru in position 7-23 N, 149-12 E. There was no contact reported with ComSubPac's Ultra 280422.¹³⁰

On April 3, the Haddock sank a Yasukuni type freighter carrying fuel at 9 N, 133 E. On April 4, the submarine set its course to return to Pearl Harbor to repair damage caused by depth charges. No army transports were sighted.¹³¹

March 29, 1943

Case 31

A Japanese dispatch of March 24 from an unidentified escort vessel transmitted its noon positions from March 25 to March 31 en route from Saipan to Yokosuka. It was scheduled to arrive at 1100 (I) on April 1.¹³² According to a Japanese ship movement report, a second unidentified maru would leave a location tentatively identified as Wake Island at 1500 (I) on March 25 and was scheduled to arrive at Saipan at 1200 (I) on April 1.¹³³

If not otherwise engaged, the U.S.S. Whale was directed to search for the unidentified vessel

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- 130 - III, Case 30, C-4.
 - 131 - III, Case 34, C-2 - C-3.
 - 132 - III, Case 31, A-2.
 - 133 - III, Case 31, A-1.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1943

sailing to Saipan, on a route for which the noon positions (I-time or 0300-GCT) were given for March 30 as 15-50 N, 152-13 E, and for March 31 as 15-36 N, 149 E. The information concerning the vessel en route from Saipan to Yokosuka was sent to the U.S.S. Pompano, with the 0300 (GCT) positions for March 30 and 31 listed as 29-44 N, 138-49 E and 32-45 N, 132-49 E.¹³⁴

On March 30, the Whale was patrolling the Truk-Empire route. The target was sailing westward at approximately the 15th parallel of north latitude. On March 31 the submarine moved to the Wake-Saipan route which the Japanese ship was traveling, but no contact with an enemy vessel was made. The Whale then set its course for Midway on March 31.¹³⁵ On March 30 and 31, the Pompano was patrolling just south of Yokosuka which was the destination of its target on April 1. Ship lights believed to be those of a hospital ship were sighted on March 30 at 33-43 N, 140-04 E, north and east of the position of the target.¹³⁶

March 30, 1943

Case 32

ComSubPac, on March 30, sent the

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- 134 - III, Case 31, B-1.
135 - III, Case 24, C-4.
136 - III, Case 31, C-4.

ORIGINAL
20 November 1945

U.S.S. Haddock Ultra information that three army transports en route to Palau would pass through position 01-32 N, 146-20 E at 0300 (GCT) March 31 and through 06 N, 136 E at the same time April 4, reaching Palau at 2000 (GCT) the same day.¹³⁷

On March 31 the Haddock, in the Truk area, set its course for Palau. The submarine did not come in contact with these transports but attacked and sank another Ultra target in this area on April 3 at 09 N, 133 E.¹³⁸

The same dispatch from ComSubPac (March 30) directed the U.S.S. Porpoise to watch for an unknown ship type in position 07-29 N, 150-29 E on April 2 at 0300 (GCT). The ship was to arrive at Truk April 3, the U.S.S. Turny was advised (the date of origin of the original Jap dispatch is given as 23 February which, if correct, would nullify the value of the information).¹³⁹ Because the Porpoise had exhausted its fuel supply, it was "homeward bound" from April 1-3.¹⁴⁰

The Turny, in the Truk area, reported no contacts on April 3 and 4.¹⁴¹

-
- 137 - III, Case 32, B-1.
 - 138 - III, Case 34, C-2 - C-3.
 - 139 - III, Case 32, B-1 - A-2.
 - 140 - III, Case 32, C-6.
 - 141 - III, Case 33, C-4.

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29 November 1945

March 31, 1945

Case 33

On March 31, ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Whale and the U.S.S. Tunny that an unidentified Japanese vessel would pass through position 12-21 N, 146-55 E at 0300 (GCT) on April 1, through 8-43 N, 148-32 E on April 2, and then through 7-26 N, 142 167 (?) - 51 W.

The Whale had already set its course for Midway on March 31, but the Tunny on April 2 at 2108 (X), 1108 (GCT), sighted a ship thought to be the Amits Maru in position 7-23 N, 149-12 E, headed for Truk. The submarine attacked, damaging the ship with a single hit before a destroyer escort forced it to dive. 144 This is a probable contact with the Ultra target.

Case 34

Messages from the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and from the Wake Island Defense Force advised that the Suwa Maru had received a torpedo

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- 142 - III, Case 33, B-1.
 - 143 - III, Case 24, C-4.
 - 144 - III, Case 33, C-4 - C-5.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

attack south of Wake Island, and was in danger of sinking. It was also disclosed that the vessel was attempting to beach itself on the southern end of Wake Island.¹⁴⁵ It was further learned from a dispatch of March 29 that a heavy tanker loaded with oil would leave Balikpapan at 1100 (I) on March 30 and after crossing the Celebes Sea would pass north of Palau proceeding to point 10-30 N, 134 E. Travelling to longitude 143 E, it would proceed to point 07-08 N, 150-49 E and head for the West Channel of Truk.¹⁴⁶

The schedule of the tanker was sent to the U.S.S. Haddock with the information that it was probably unescorted. Noon positions in (I) zone time or 0300 in GCT were sent to the Haddock (and U.S.S. Tunny) for April 1 through April 6. Also, the U.S.S. Finback was asked, while en route to Midway, to destroy the ship damaged by the Tunny and beached at Wake Island. This was the Sawa Maru according to the Japanese dispatches but the Tunny and ComSubPac dispatch 311115 considered it to be of the Sydney¹⁴⁷ Maru class.

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- 145 - III, Case 34, A-1 - A-3.
 - 146 - III, Case 34, A-4.
 - 147 - III, Case 34, B-1.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

At 2153 (GCT) on April 2 the U.S.S.
Haddock sank a Yasukuni type freighter loaded with¹⁴⁸
oil in position 9-31 N, 133-38-30 E. This is a
positive contact with ComSubPac's Ultra target and¹⁴⁹
is confirmed by a Japanese dispatch of April 3.
The Yasukuni Maru is listed as sunk by the Haddock
on April 3, 1943, in Japanese Merchant Ship Losses
(15 January 1944).

The Tunny, meanwhile, was engaged to
the southeast with a ship thought to be the Akita
Maru.¹⁵⁰

Having received ComSubPac's instructions,¹⁵¹
the Finback at 0100 (GCT) on April 1 changed its
course for Midway via Wake Island. According to
the narrative report of the Finback, a steamer of the
Brisbane Maru class was beached on a reef south of
Wake Island. The steamer was well down by the stern
and one hit was obtained by the Finback on this
vessel.¹⁵²

This is a positive contact which
finished the career of the Suna (or Sawa) Maru.

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- 148 - III, Case 34, C-2 - C-3.
 - 149 - III, Case 34, D-1.
 - 150 - III, Case 33, C-4.
 - 151 - III, Case 29, C-1.
 - 152 - III, Case 34, C-6 - C-7.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

The ship is listed in Japanese Merchant Ship Losses
(15 February 1944) as the Sawa Maru, an AP of 10,692
tons, destroyed at Wake Island, March 28, 1943, by
the Finback and Tunny.

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29 November 1945

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: -- 27/1021 February
TO: (Vessel)
(Guard Div #43) Serial 101
INFO: (Taian Maru)

The Toan (Tapen?) Maru left Guam for Yap at 0530 will arrive 0800 the 1st March. Scheduled to leave Yap 0800 the 3rd March, and to arrive PP (Palao) 1000 the 4th March, speed 9.5 knots. Will pass through the following points:

27th Feb at 1200; 13-30 North, 143-40 East.
27th Feb at 1800; 13-30 North, 142-40 East.
28th Feb at 1200; 11-35 North, 140-33 East.
3rd March at 1200; 09-10 North, 137-36 East.

The #10 Kyoo Maru is to return to PS (Saipan) after escorting the Toan Maru as far as 13-30 North, 142-40 East (that is 1800, the 27th).

No. A-2

FROM: 27/1600 February
TO: Serial 503

2nd Surface Escort Unit. Despatch Order #22.

(1) Points to be passed by the Kinai Maru are

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 1, No. A-2 (Cont.)

designated as follows:

11-40 North, and 146-59 East. 09-10 North,
and 146-15 East, 20 miles east of Sasaon
(Jatawal) Island. Report time of arrival at
second point listed above.

GI COMMENT: Kinal Maru (8360 tons). Satawal
Island is 7-21 North, 147-20 East.

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

27/1600 February

Ser. 503

"#2 Surface Escort Force #22-

(1) Points through which Kinal Maru and Nitiyu
will pass are:

A: - 11-40 N., 149-59 E.
B: - 09-10 N., 146-15 E.
C: - 20 mi. East of Sasaon Island.

(2) Inform me of time when it is expected point
B will be reached."

COMMENT: Sasaon Island at 07-21 N., 147-20 E.

GI COMMENT: Other names by which Sasaon Island
is known are: Satavan, Jatawal, Selecd,
Tucker.

No. A-4

FROM:

27/1921 February

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Case 1. No. A-4 (Cont.)

TO:

INFO:

____ (Taian Maru)

Taian Maru departed Omiya Island at 0530 for Yap Island. Arrive at 0800 March 1st. Depart 0800 March 3rd. Arrive Palau 1000 March 4th. Speed 9.5 knots. At 1200 February 27 position 13-30 North, 143-40 East. At 1800 position 13-30 North 142-40 East. At 1200 February 28 position 11-35 North, 140-33 (or 53) East. At 1200 March 3rd position 09--- 13 North 137-33 East or (36) East. After escorting her as far as 13-30 North, 142-40 (or 47) East return to Saipan.

COMMENT: Badly garbled but believe above correct.

DI COMMENT continued - C I COMMENT: Here are 5 Taian Marus as follows:

5655 tons
5411 tons
3670 tons
3158 tons
193 tons

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBMARINES
NEW FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

01/1001 March

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29 November 1945

Case 1. No. B-1 (Cont.)

DAILY DEVASTATOR X SUBFAC ULTRA SERIAL 65 X IN
THE NEAR FUTURE BUT EXACT TIME AND DATE UNKNOWN
048 POPCORN AND ONE FOPLAR WILL PASS THROUGH
11-40 NORTH 142-59 EAST, 09-10 NORTH 146-15 EAST

AND 07-21 NORTH 147-23 EAST X HALIBUT CAN HANDLE XI
132 POPCORN DEPART YAP AT 23 HOURS GOT MARCH 2nd
FOR PALAU X AT 3 HOURS GOT ON 3RD SHE WILL PASS
THROUGH 09-13 NORTH 137 DEGREES 33 or 36 MINUTES

EAST X TRIGGER DO THE HONORS IF IN VICINITY AND NOT
OTHERWISE ENGAGED I Wahoo DEPARTED MIDWAY 27TH
FOR AREAS 9 AND 12 X FLYBACK LEFT SAME PLACE SAME
DATE FOR AREAS 15 NORTH, 10 AND 14 SPENDING

10 DAYS IN EACH X WEALE LEFT MIDWAY 26TH FOR AREA
14 I LAST 2 MAY SIGHT RETURN ENROUTE MIDWAY OR
PEARL FROM 11 NORTH 147 EAST X

PLUNGER SCHEDULED TO ENTER AREA 15 SOUTH ABOUT
MARCH 1ST HAS BEEN DELAYED SEVERAL DAYS BY
IMPORTANT BUSINESS IN MARSHALLS XX

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Halibut

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was excellent
throughout the patrol. Last
serial sent 231000. Last serial
received 41.

No. C-2

March 1

0200 (X) Commenced night search along the track
toward Truk.

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29 November 1945

Case 1, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 1 (Cont.)

1900 (X) Surfaced patrolling north between the Anon and Mall Island groups.

March 2

0034 (X) Sighted lighted Sampan fishing 30 miles northeast of PISARAS ISLAND in the CNON group.

0500 (X) Commenced submerged patrol northwest of the CNON ISLAND along the Saipan-Truk track. Uneventful.

1910 (X) Surfaced and set course for Palau.

2000 (X) Departed Area. Set course for a point on the estimated Empire-Saipan-Pulawet track.

March 3

1442 (X) Commenced surface patrol to northwestward along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire.

1955 (X) Sighted two vessels, distant 14,000 yards, abeam to port.

2000 (X) Reversed course and commenced tracking.

2046 (X) Identified ships as one 9500 ton passenger-freighter similar to Manila Maru (CNI 208J, page 98) and one flush deck diesel freighter of about 7500 tons. Both ships appeared to be zigzagging to eastward.

2055 (X) Radar was unable to obtain contact. Continued tracking using TBT and estimated range and angle on the bow. Decided to attack larger of the two ships first.

2300 (X) Radar obtained intermittent ranges at about 5000 yards. Estimated course 065° (T), speed 10 knots.

2325 (X) Came to course for a 90 starboard track using bow tubes.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 1, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 3 (Cont.)

- 2333 (X) Checked range with radar.
- 2337 (K) Using TBT bearings fired a 2° divergent spread of four torpedoes at the larger target. Torpedoes set for a depth of 20 feet. The first set to run ahead, the center two to hit, and the fourth to run astern. Range 2000 yards.
- 2339 (K) Observed two torpedoes hit the larger freighter, one beneath the bridge and one aft. The second vessel swung away and disappeared behind the target. Closed to attack second freighter.
- 2343 (X) Second vessel reappeared abeam to starboard, closing us rapidly, angle on the bow 10° starboard. He sent a rapid signal similar to "Zero Negat Queen" in the direction of the torpedoed ship and opened fire on us with two guns of about 5" calibre and several machine guns similar to 20 mm using tracer. Swung away to dodge shots dropping two hundred yards on starboard quarter and astern. His ranging was good but he apparently underestimated our speed. Decided this vessel might have been an auxiliary cruiser in view of volume and accuracy of his gunfire and his smart tactics. While retiring observed first vessel burning amidships. Visibility decreasing due to rain squalls. Decided to circle to northward and eastward and close to attack from the north northeast.
- 2349 (K) Heard very loud explosion believed to be targets boilers.

March 4

- 0103 (X) Plotted our position and the position of the action and commenced closing to attack the second vessel.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 1, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 4 (Cont.)

- 0106 (K) Sighted both vessels at a range of about 6000 yards. Visibility improved. The torpedoed freighter was on its beam ends and going down by the stern, no superstructure was visible. Small lights flickering on the water indicated that the crew had abandoned ship. Second vessel was picking up survivors from torpedoed passenger-freighter.
- 0107 (K) We were sighted and the Japs opened fire again with their deck guns and machine guns. Shots were on in deflection but short.
- 0109 (K) Swung away retiring to northward. The freighter was semi-obsured by a squall and we apparently were plainly visible each time we closed. Radar unable to pick up the target, impossible to attack submerged.
- 0120 (K) Lost target in rain squalls. Radar still inoperative. Decided to run to the southeastward and continue search at dawn.
- 0516 (K) Made trim dive.
- 0533 (K) Surfaced.
- 0700 (K) Reversed course and commenced search.
- 0800 (K) Decided to patrol along estimated track to Saipan and the Empire for one more day before leaving for Palau.
- 0901 (K) Sighted unidentified plane distant eight miles coming from astern at an altitude of 4000 feet. Submerged and set course for Palau.
- 1530-1635 (K) Heard fifteen distant explosions in groups of three, similar to depth charge patterns.

No. C-3

Contact Report

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29 November 1945

Case 1, No. C-3 (Cont)

Contact Report (Cont.)

Contact Number	5
Attack Number	2
Time and Date	1955 (X) March 3
Description	Passenger Freighter (Manila Maru type 9500 tons) Unidentified freighter (7500 tons)
Position	10-18 $\frac{1}{2}$ N 146-42 $\frac{1}{2}$ E
Course	085
Speed	10 knots
Remarks	Passenger freighter 2 hits - sunk. Unidentified - Believed an auxiliary Cruiser escort.

U.S.S. Trigger

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Reception in general was excellent.

Last serial sent: No. 4, date and
time group 290800.
Last serial received: No. 56, date
and time group 060700.

No. C-5

No entry made in narrative from February
26 to March 2.

March 2

Off the channel between the islands at
the southwestern part of Palau.

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Case 1, No. C-5 (Cont.)

March 2 (Cont.)

0655 (K) Sighted three vessels similar to PC boats on northwesterly course distant about 4 miles.

March 3

1700 (K) Lat. 7-12 N. Long. 134-24 E.
Three small freighters escorted by one small destroyer or other small escort vessel.
Targets made out to be three freighters each of about 4000 tons, with one escort in the van, heading down the coast. Unable to close.
They probably went south or southwest after dark. The visibility was not, however, good during the search.

March 4

1040 (K) (5th Contact) (2nd Attack)
Lat. 5-41. Long. 136-00 E.
Medium sized freighter - Missed.
Sighted smoke on the horizon bearing 131.
Observed bearing to be nearly constant.
Submerged and started approach. When the ship could be seen the angle on the bow was quite small. The change of bearing was, however, in the opposite direction from that given by initial observations. Therefore, the target was zigging but apparently not radically as we are accustomed to in observing Japanese ships close in to port.
Just after the target could be seen she was lost in rain squalls. Her light gray color blended nicely with the reduced visibility. The approach developed satisfactorily. At a range of about 5000 yards, however, the rain squalls again became most embarrassing and so

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 1. No. C-5 (Cont.)

March 4 (Cont.)

continued to the firing point. All that could be seen was her general shape. Therefore, ranges were most erratic. Attempts to obtain the range by pinging were not successful. We expected to be firing at 15 yards on 60 track. Just before firing she appeared to zig away slightly. The TDC checked satisfactorily and the commanding officer decided to

1216 (X) Fired three bow torpedoes with speed spread of 2 knots. At least one torpedo ran circles. The target turned away after the torpedoes had time to cross the track. She was then lost to view in the rain squalls.

1222 (X) One violent explosion aft. like the two explosions ten minutes after we fired off PALAU of February 27. Inconceivable as it seemed, apparently this single freighter had air coverage 150 miles at sea. Other alternatives are: (1) by coincidence one of their patrol planes happened to be there. (2) the Japanese have some accurate method of catapulting a 500 pound depth charge or bomb at least 3000 yards or 2000 yards further than has been previously reported. (3) One of our torpedoes, circling near this vessel detonated when it reached the end of its run. After hearing low order detonations later on this patrol, detonations in sharp contrast to those we are accustomed to hearing, the commanding officer cannot definitely state that we did not hit this target. It is considered that the TDC setup was sufficiently accurate using 2 knots speed spread, that either the

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 1. No. C-5 (Cont.)

March 4

target was hit or the torpedo, perhaps more than one, which ran erratic was the one which should have hit. The target was similar to the KANEYU MARU (p.61). In the absence of evidence to the contrary this attack has been called a miss. At the time the most logical explanation of the "Block-buster" was air coverage. This discouraged immediate surfacing.

March 5

0902 (K) (6th contact) (No attack)
Lat. 4-08N. Long. 137-43E.
Tanker. Unable to close.

Sighted masts of a ship. It turned out to be a tanker similar to the GENYO MARU (page 262); estimated course 060 to 100, speed 17. Unable to attain position for attack. Her speed nearly equals our top speed.

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____
TO: _____ (Guard Division
43)
INFO: _____

28/2010 February

4 army transports for Palao, speed (making good?)

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

8 knots at about 1000 on 5th March, in position
00-30 North, 155-30 East. Desire you to trace
over escort.

No. A-2

FROM: (Guard 28/2010 February
Division 43)
TO:
INFO:

Desire you to take over escort of 4 army transport
ships headed for PP (Palao) (speed over ground
8 knots) as anticipated on the 5th (March) at
about 1000, position 00-30N, 155-30E.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 01/1258 March
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM
FOX (PLUNGER)
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

NUMBER 66 FROM COMSUBPAC IS ULTRA FOR PLUNGER
X FOUR TRANSPORTS SCHEDULED MEET ESCORT AT ONE
FOUR GCT ON MARCH 5TH IN POSITION ZERO DEGREES
30 MINUTES NORTH 155-30 EAST X

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 2. No. B-1 (Cont.)

DESTINATION UNCERTAIN BUT EITHER PALAO OR TRUK X
AS SUBMARINES FROM TASK FORCE 42 MAY BE AFTER
THEM! ALSO DO NOT ATTACK ANY SUBMARINES THAT
VICINITY UNLESS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS ENEMY X

TASK FORCE 42 SUBS WILL BE NOTIFIED OF YOUR
PRESENCE

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7
TO: CTF 42
INFO: CINCPAC
COMSOPAC

01/1905 March

PREC: ROUTINE

PLUNGER NOW ENROUTE TO PATROL AREA SOUTH OF TRUK
HAS BEEN GIVEN INFORMATION THAT 4 TRANSPORTS ARE
SCHEDULED TO BE IN POSITION 0-30 NORTH 155-30
EAST AT 1 HOUR 00T MARCH 5TH

AND INSTRUCTIONS THAT IN VIEW POSSIBILITY TASK
FORCE 42 SUBS BEING AFTER SAME CONVOY NOT TO
ATTACK ANY SUBMARINES THAT VICINITY NOT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED AS ENEMY X

ULTRA X REQUEST ANY SUBS YOU MAY HAVE THAT
VICINITY BE INFORMED OF PLUNGERS PRESENCE X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Plunger

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: The 4115 KCS. series was received
strength 5 almost every night.

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29 November 1945

Case 2. No. C-1 (Cont.)

----- Interference on 8230
KCS. by an unknown commercial
station was experienced several
times on the 100 schedules.

No. C- 2

March 5

- 0200 (L) Attempted to send message to CTF 7.
Transmitter quit. Patrolled in vicinity
of 06N, 177E, outside areas.
- 1834 (L) Surfaced. Sighted possible smoke bearing
322. Closed for an hour but nothing
developed.
- 1921 (L) Transmitted message to CTF 7, reporting
fuel situation, attacks to date, ships
at KWAJALEIN ISLAND and traffic north of
JALUIT.

March 6

- 0200 (L) Received CTF 7, directing Plunger to
patrol in vicinity of Ponape until fuel
dictated return to Pearl.
- 0544 (L) Dived.
- 1300 (L) Commenced approach on tops sighted bearing
353. These turned out to be tree tops
on Umae Island.
- 1625 (L) Surfaced
- 1640 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 140 about 15 to 20
miles away and headed for it. By 1710
had mast tops in sight with high periscope.
Gaining station ahead on four engines.
Plunger was making 17.7 knots in her
emergency loaded condition. By 1812
we had target on course 180, speed 9-3/4
knots. Lost him in closing darkness and
steered course to intercept. Night was
dark and no radar contact was made.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 2. No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 6 (Cont.)

Covered 9-3/4 knots positions for courses 180 to 100 by 2045. We had positive evidence that the target made a radical change of course shortly after dark.

2045 (L) Abandoned search. (p.9) -----

March 7, 8, 9

Patrolling Ponape-Kwajalein trade route. 1800, 8th, entered area _____ near NE corner.

Case 3

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Unknown originator
TO: (Katori Maru)
(Iro Tanker)
INFO: (Air Flotilla 22)
(#952 Air Group)
(4th Fleet)
(Unrecovered
enciphered call)
(Shonan Maru #11)
(Kyo Maru #7)

01/1959 March

Katori Maru will escort Iro to PQ (Kwajalein). Will indicate entrance channel later. Indicate maximum draft.

(c)

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: (6 Base Force) 01/1959 March
TO: (4th Fleet)
(Tanker Troop)
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(952nd Air
Group)
(Kyo Maru #7)
(Escort Force)

The Caroline Maru will tow the Iroo to Kwajalein. The channel through which she will enter port is (garble). Inform me of maximum draft.

No. A-3

FROM: (#6 Base Force) 01/1959 March

TO: (Iro) Serial #709

INFO: (#2 Escort Force) (4th Fleet)

(Air Force Kwajalein Area)

(Air Flot #22)

(Shonan Maru)

(#7 Kyo Maru)

(Uzi Maru)

Katori Maru will tow Iroo to Kwajalein. Channel for entering port will be advised later. Advise your maximum draft.

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29 November 1945

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. A-4

FROM: (SubRon 30) 21/1242 February
TO: (CofS Sasebo
Naval Station)
(Southwestern
Fleet)
(South
Expeditionary Fleet)
(23 Base Force)
(32 Base Force)

On the afternoon of February 24th the I-165 will depart Surabaya for Sasebo proceeding via Makassar Straits. Her schedule as follows:

February 24th, 1400 depart Surabaya. At 1720 at Western entrance of West passage.
On 25th, at 1900, 03-50 South, 118 East.
On 26th, at 1500, at 00-40 N, 119-45 East.
On 27th, at 1900, 05 North, 124 degrees (?) blank West.
On 28th at 0600, 09-12 North, 127-50 East, course 10, speed 11 knots.
On March 2nd (?) at 1200, 16-40 North, blank degrees 15 minutes East.
On March 3rd, at 1400 bearing blank degrees distant 12 miles from (unident place).
Thence on course 355.
On March 5th, at 1700, bearing 170 degrees distant blank miles from (place).
On March 6th, at 0600, 31-43 North, 129-14 East.
1200 arrive Sasebo.

B - Operational Dispatch

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FCY
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

02/0919 March

PEARL 2 STAR FINAL X SUBPAC ULTRA SERIAL 67 X FOR
PLUNGER X TRANSPORTS MENTIONED IN MY SERIAL 66 WILL
BE MAKING 8 KNOTS X DESTINATION STILL UNKNOWN X
14,000-TON TANKER YOU HAVE BEEN WORKING OVER IS NOW
BEING TOWED TO KWAJALEIN X

SPEED PROBABLY VERY LOW DUE SMALL SIZE OF TOWING
VESSEL X KINGFISH AND SUNFISH NOTE NIP SUB IL65
SCHEDULED PASS THROUGH YOUR AREAS ON 4 AND 5 MARCH X
ENROUTE FROM SOERBAYA TO SASBO X EXACT ROUTE
UNKNOWN X

SPEED 11 KNOTS X AT 21 HOURS GCT 27 FEBRUARY SHE
PASSED THROUGH 9-12 NORTH 127-50 EAST AND AT SAME
TIME 5 MARCH SHE REACHED 31-46 NORTH 129-14 EAST X
COURSE AFTER 5 HOURS GCT 3 MARCH WILL BE 355 X
MIDWAY REPORTS THAT AT 0012 GCT MARCH 2 SUBMARINE
CONTACT 475 MILES BEARING 348 FROM MIDWAY X
NOT OURS

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Plunger

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (See III, Case 2, C-1)

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. C-2

March 2

- 1455 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 090. Commenced approach. 1511 masts were in sight which turned out to be a medium LFM freighter, apparently of unusual value, as he had two escorts. Freighter was on base course 310, speed 9.5 knots headed in the direction of KWAJALEIN. Minimum range 7,000 yards.
- 1735 (L) Still tracking LFM freighter and escorts, intending to get him tonight. While making a low power sweep sighted a large ~~MARKER~~ transport, range 11,000 yards, starboard 70. We shifted targets to the big fellow. Minimum range 9,700 yards. Tracked him until 1830.
- 1840 (L) Surfaced in pursuit of the large unescorted transport. Estimated his speed as 14 knots on course 050, enroute WOTJE. We continued the pursuit until 0047. It now appears that we should have dropped him much sooner, but he did have lots of goal posts. We now think he made a large change of course shortly after dark.

March 3

- 0047 (L) c/c to 190 to clear MARSHALLS.

March 4

- 0524 (L) Dived south of KWAJALEIN ISLAND. Patrolling southern approaches to KWAJALEIN entrances.
- 0623 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 352. Commenced approach. Shortly afterwards saw that we were leaving a suicidal wake of bubbles. (See defects) Discontinued approach and turned away. Leaks were lessened and at 0724 recommended approach on smoke. Determined target was stopped.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Casa 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 4 (Cont.)

- 1012 (L) Sighted two high radio towers on ENUEBUT ISLAND. Approaching SOUTH PASS, three freighters in sight ahead.
- 1212 (L) Sighted patrol boat bearing 116, patrolling 3 miles off SOUTH PASS.
- 1225 (L) Plotted all ships except patrol boat anchored north of KWAJALEBI ISLAND safe behind reef.
- 1913 (L) Surfaced and cleared area as another submarine was known to be approaching the MARSHALLS from eastward. By this time our fuel estimates showed that we would only be able to reach - and return to PEARL, with nothing to spare for patrolling.

No. C-3

Contact Report

No. 5

Time and Date: 1455 (L) - March 2
Lat. and Long: 6-45N - 169-10E
Type: AK
Initial Range: 15,000
Est. Course Speed: 310 - 9.5 knots
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Two escorts - closest range 10,000 yards.

No. 6

Time and Date: 1700 (L) - March 3
Lat. and Long: 6-45N - 169-10E
Type: AK
Initial Range: 11,000
Est. Course Speed: 050 - 14 knots
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Closest range 9,700 yds.
Pursued at dark. Could not contact.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 3, No. C-3 (Cont.)

No. 7

Time and Date: 0623 (L) - March 4
Lat. and Long: 8-50N 167-50E
Type: 4 AK's
Initial Range: 20,000
Est. Course Speed: Anch.
How Contacted: P.
Remarks: Behind reef at Kwajalein
Island. 4 ships off Kwajalein
Island.

U.S.S. Kingfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete
except for about one hour at 2000
CCT in the area when fading was
experienced.

No. C-5

March 6

1450 (H) Sighted periscope on starboard quarter,
distance 5000 yards, opened out to
range of 14 miles and then dived for
two hours in hope that submarine would
probably trail us. Periscope looked
similar to our attack periscope. Did
not send out contact report. Lat. 23N.
Long. 133 E.

U.S.S. Sunfish

Second War Patrol

No. C-6

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

(ont.)

- 1: Radio Reception was complete.
All hands looked forward with
enthusiasm to the daily news
received from Comsubpac.
Last Serial Received: 52
Last Serial Sent: 271145

- 1) Sighted Tungyung Tao Light bearing
265 T, distance 14 miles. Patrolled
along 20 30 fathom curve off China
coast.

- 1 (P) Sighted glow of light beyond horizon.
Increased speed and changed course to
investigate.
- 30 (E) Sighted fishing trawler or patrol vessel
brightly lighted, carrying white over a
red light on mast and several other very
bright lights on hull. At the same time
noted similar glows spaced evenly along
horizon on a line 140-220. This is the
route from Formosa Straits-Nagasaki so
decided not to attack but to remain in
vicinity, undetected, in the hope of
making contact with large ships. No
such lights had previously been sighted
during clear weather so considered it
possible that lighted station patrols are
used as an aid to shipping during in-
clement weather. Remained in visual
contact throughout night. Lighted vessel
patrolled to northward into heavy seas
at 3 knots.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 3, No. C-7 (Cont.)

March 4

- 0518 (H) Dived. Seas condition 7, high wind from northeast.
- 0626 (H) Sighted tanker through surface fog, bearing 110T, 8,000 yards. Commenced approach.....
- 0825 (H) While making last periscope observation preparatory to surfacing sighted masts and stack of large ship bearing 250T, hull down, seen only occasionally through mist or fog. Commenced approach at high speed.
- 0825 to 1100 (H) Enemy was in sight off and on during this period. At 1100 identified ship as Baikal Maru, painted white and ascertained she was listed as a hospital ship. No chance now of overtaking tanker since course information as fragmentary and distance run too great.
- 1851 (H) Surfaced in seas, force 7. Skies heavily overcast, no horizon, position doubtful. Sighted line of lights as on previous night so patrolled this area. No contacts.

March 6

Sighted Chinese junk under sail. Seas moderate during day but picked up after dark.

March 7

- Patrolling along Formosa Straits-Van Diemen and Nagasaki routes. During brief interval when stars were out obtained first star fix since March 2.
- 2020 (H) SJ radar contact, bearing 290T, 6,000 yards. Nothing sighted, poor horizon. Commenced approach. Radar "pip" indicated small ship. Plot and TDC showed target on course 040T, speed 10 knots.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1943

Case 3, No. C-7 (Cont.)

March 7 (Cont.)

- 2105 (H) Sighted smoke as horizon cleared somewhat.
- 2147 (H) Fired 4 torpedoes at heavily loaded freighter, 903 track, 5 degree divergent spread, 8 seconds apart, depth 10 feet, greatest gyro angle 5 L, Range 1,000-900 yards. First shot went ahead; second, third and fourth (which was set 5 L and should have hit where 3rd torpedo hit) crossed under freighter. No explosions heard or felt on bridge, but noted large spray of water followed by dense smoke from position of after hold. Freighter blew whistle at this time. Thought bow shots had run deep or failed to explode. As freighter swung right to ram, range 800 yards, Sunfish swung left for stern shots and as freighter presented 903 angle for second time fired 3 stern shots.... First torpedo went ahead and enemy swung left to avoid; second ran under target, which was now completely obscured by smoke; third torpedo track went into densest part of smoke. Still had not heard or felt explosions on bridge and could not see whether freighter was sinking because of dense smoke and darkness, so maneuvered for position on port quarter as he changed course to left.
- 2150 Saw orange flame shoot from position of ventilator abaft stack and felt explosion on bridge, probably from boiler explosion.
- 2153 Freighter commenced firing gun. Dived to get clear of gunfire and to reload.
- 2157 Sound heard freighter's screws passing close aboard.
- 2205 Screws stopped fairly close aboard, feebly started, then stopped and were not heard again. Shortly thereafter sound heard loud crackling noises definitely never before heard on Sunfish sound gear and on last bearing of screws. Wanted to surface

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 3, No. C-7 (Cont.)

March 7 (Cont.)

2240 immediately but had unwisely commenced reload.
Surfaced. Detected distinct smell of smoke. Searched area at 14 knots for one hour on last bearing of freighter. Nothing sighted or contacted on radar. Consider this ship sank. (p.8)

NOTE: It is regretted that seven torpedoes were expended on this ship. No torpedo explosions were heard or felt by the commanding officer or O.O.D. on the bridge, though five highly phosphorescent torpedo tracks were plainly seen to cross the target. During the dive I was informed that one heavy explosion was felt corresponding to time of torpedo run of third torpedo forward, and that two were heard which corresponded to time of run for second and third aft.

RESULT: 3 hits, 2 misses, 2 which ran under or failed to explode. Identified as similar to Tazan Maru. From past experience this target should have been contacted at 10,000-12,000 yards, but gave very weak fading "pips" at 6,000 yards. Radio log of distress transmissions with original report.

Case 4

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:
INFO:

02/1042 March

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 4, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Okitsu Maru) (B)

1. The Okitsu Maru (loaded with gasoline) will depart PQ (Kwajalein) at 1000, 3rd, pass through positions: 8-40 (garble may be 46) North, 166-50 East and 5-00 North 165-10 East, and is scheduled to arrive RYC (Nauru) about 0300, 6th March.
2. PV (Notje) Frontier Defense Commander dispatch the #6 Shoonan Maru to escort the above ship to RYC (probably coding error for RYC (Nauru)). Upon completion of this duty, return to PY (Jaluit) and after fueling to capacity return to PV (Notje).

GI COMMENT: Okitsu is 6666 tons.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: CTF 42
INFO: CINCPAC
COMSOPAC

03/0030 March

PREC: PRIORITY

REQUEST SNAPPER BE INSTRUCTED THAT IF IN VICINITY AND FUEL PERMITS ATTEMPT INTERCEPTION OKITSU MARU LOADED WITH GASOLINE WHICH DEPARTS KWAJALEIN 1 HOUR GCT MARCH 3 AND ARRIVES NAURU 18 HOURS GCT 5 MARCH PASSING THROUGH 8-40 NORTH AND 166-50 EAST AND 5 NORTH 165-10 EAST THROUGH Y

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 4, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA I NO TASK FORCE 7 SUBS IN VICINITY
EXCEPTING PORPOISE WHICH DEPARTED JOHNSTON
ISLAND 2 HOURS GCT MARCH 2 ENROUTE TO 9 NORTH
173 EAST FOR PATROL ENVAJALEIN-JALUIT AREAS AND
PLUNGER WHICH IS NOW PROBABLY ENROUTE FROM
VICINITY JALUIT TO 0-30 NORTH 155-30 EAST

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Snapper

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception of both BELLS and
NFM was excellent.

No. C-2

March 3

0000	Enroute, patrolling on course 092 ⁰ T.
0610	Submerged.
1614	Surfaced, running battery-motors to discharge battery to L.V.L.
1940	Shifted to engines, speed 15 knots.

	1200	Miles	Fuel
Lat.	02-36-00 S:	205	1910
Long.	157-47-00 E:		

March 4

0000	Enroute, patrolling on course 092 ⁰ T at 15 knots.
0058	Changed course to 068 ⁰ T, heading for area north of MAURU ISLAND.

	1200	Miles	Fuel
Lat.	01-52-30S:	372	4740
Long.	161-38-00E:		

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 5

0000 Enroute to area, patrolling on course
0700^{CT} at 15 knots. Advanced ships clocks
one hour to -12(H) zone time.
1025 Arrived vicinity of patrol area and
submerged.
1926 Surfaced, patrolled area at 4.8 knots until
2034 Increased speed to 12.1 knots and decided
to head for vicinity of NAURU ISLAND so
as to patrol this area and intercept
traffic to arrive. In case there was no
traffic decided to approach close to so
that a survey of the island could be made.

	1200	Miles	Fuel
Lat.	00-28-00 N:	215	2420
Long.	166-35-00 E:		

March 6

0000 Enroute area vicinity NAURU ISLAND at 12
knots.
0345 Slowed to 4.8 knots in order to use sound
facilities.
0345 Sighted flashing light bearing 113⁰T (light
on NAURU ISLAND) Interpreted this as (1)
a signal that they had spotted us by radar
and thought it was their traffic and thus
gave the light as a navigational aid or
(2) that they flashed the light as a
navigational aid to expected traffic.
0619 Submerged, approaching the island on
course 090^{CT}.
0812 Sighted smoke bearing 321⁰T, distance about
16,000 yards. (Enemy ship contact #12)
0835 Changed course to 130^{CT} and started approach
and made attack (See part H*)
0950 Completed attack.
0952 Heard first torpedo explosion.

* See Case 4, C-3.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0953½ Heard one surface explosion followed by three depth bombs fairly close. Decided to go deep.
0954 Heard three explosions in succession.
0955 Heard five minor explosions.
0958 Sound picked up two sets of high speed propellers. Commenced maneuvering to avoid.
1057 Propellers faded out.
1105 Went to periscope depth. Nothing in sight.
1202 While periscope was housed, submarine at periscope depth, received two depth bombs, not too close, however went deep, was at 90 feet in between periscope observations when those went off.
1500 While coming to periscope depth, heard one depth charge, not very close, went deep.
1700 Nothing heard, set course 130°T.
2005 Surfaced. Decided to continue on course 130°T, until south of NAURU ISLAND and then set course for Pearl at 15 knots.
2158 Changed course to 091°T.

	1200	Miles	Fuel
Lat.	00-29-00 S:	141	1330
Long.	169-45-00 E:		

No. C-3

H. Particulars of Attacks

Daylight submerged attack of Nauru Island, March 6, 1943. Location Lat. 00-30-00 S; Long. 166-50-00 E. Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes at 7-8000 ton cargo vessel....last look at target before going to deep submergence revealed much smoke coming from after part of the vessel and the bow was raised 50' above water. All torpedoes were heard to be running in the targets direction. First explosion occurred two minutes and five seconds after firing first shot, second 4 minutes 10 seconds, third 4 minutes 15 seconds, fourth 4 minutes 27 seconds.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 4 (Cont.)

No. C-4

Description of Contact

Contact No:	12
Time and Date:	0850 - March 6
Lat. and Long:	00-30S: - 166-50E:
Course and Speed:	120°T - 11 knots
Type and Tonnage:	Freighter - 6,000 tons
Mast Ht. and Length:	90 ft - 450 ft.
Range:	20,000 yd.

D - Verification

No. D-1

See III, Case 10, A-1.

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	---	01/1050 March
TO:	(Base Force #6, Jaluit)	Serial 024
INFO:	(Suwa Maru) (Kwajalein Area Trans. Section)	

There are about 50 men on the Suwa Maru to be transferred to the 201 Air Group and the Fujikawa Maru. 201st Air Group is scheduled to be transferred to Japan proper aboard the Fujikawa Maru which will depart PQ3 (Rusotto) about 8th March. Inform us of her scheduled arrival at PQ (Kwajalein), also if possible she is to enter PQ via Mellu/Melly Channel and arrange either to accomplish transfer

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 5. No. A-1 (Cont.)

of the men by proceeding via PAB or undertaking the transfer of the men by anchoring (at P₄).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBMARINES COPIING
 NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

03/0600 March

SERIAL 69 IS ULTRA X PORPOISE SHOULD NOTE WITH INTEREST THAT 1 BIG YELLOW SEAPLANE TENDER WHICH IS 062 PEANUT IS SCHEDULED LEAVE RUCOTO IN KWAJALEIN ATOLL ENROUTE JAPANESE ISLE ON 8TH MARCH X

EXACT TIME AND ROUTE UNKNOWN MORE DOPE LATER IF OBTAINABLE X STINGRAY AFTER COMPLETION PATROL AND RECONNOITERING ASSIGNMENTS PROCEED PEARL FOR REFIT INSTEAD OF MIDWAY X CHANGE MY OFCRD 9-43 ACCORDINGLY X

AIR ESCORT ONLY WILL MEET SCAMP ON 30 MILE CIRCLE BEARING 085 FROM MIDWAY AT 1800 GUT 5 MARCH

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Porpoise

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Except for a short period off TRU when all reception was poor, high frequency radio reception was good. However, low frequency reception was poor at all times while in the

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 5. No. C-1 (Cont.)

Area. All serial messages except forty-eight (48), fifty-three x-ray (53X), sixty-two able (62A), and sixty-five (65), and all messages addressed direct to this task unit were received.

No. C-2

March 8

Standing to Westward on all available engines in order to get to Northward of ROI ISLAND during daylight.
0903 (L) Sighted two puffs of smoke bearing 135°T. and changed course to that bearing in order to close.
Not having been able to see any further evidence of ships resumed Westerly course. After surfacing set course to pass around Westerly side of KWAJALEIN ATOLL.

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 01/1809 March
TO: (Minesweeper
#18)
INFO: (Roger Area Air
Force)
(Rabaul or Kavieng
Sea Defense Force)
(Escort Unit or
Command)
(Unit Associated Rabaul
Sea Defense Force)

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 6. No. A-1 (Cont.)

R Area Defense Force Operation Order #141.

1). (-Unident Ship) and Kenyo Maru
will depart RR (Rabaul) at 1500 the 2nd
March and proceed along coast of RN (New Ireland).
At 0700 on the 3rd in (or at) ODC. Noon positions
on 4th and 5th respectively (speed 10, course 005):
4th March 1200 01-20 North; 151-10 East.
5th March 1200 04-40 North, 151-30 East.
Arrive southern entrance PT (Truk) at 0800 on the
6th.

2). Subchaser #1S under orders of Captain of
will act as escort for foregoing ships as
far as 01-00 North, 151-08 East, at which point
she will turn over escort duties to #2 Surface
Escort Unit about 0800 on the 4th March and
return to RR (Rabaul).

3). Blanks will cooperate in above blanks.

NSS COMMENT: Not seen here previously. ECM
guesses as Takakaze a name with which we are
unfamiliar but which sounds like a destroyer.
From contents of this message it appears that
is some large vessel perhaps on same
order as Keiyo Maru. Her captain evidently
senior to latter.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBMARINES COPYING
NFM FOX

03/0641 March

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 6, No. B-1 (Cont.)

INFO: CINCPAC

PREG: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HIP FUEL FOR PLUNGER AND BERRY X TAMEER AND TYPE
UNKNOWN TOGETHER CHANGING ESCORTS AT NOON ON 4TH
X 262 SUBMARINE BLANK BLANK MINUS 10 MINUS 11
QDMF 2010 (1-20 NORTH 151-10 EAST) ALGEROBA
MINUS 10 RSMF 4030 (4-40 NORTH 151-30 EAST) X
SUBPAC SERIAL 70 RED STINGRAY X ULTRA X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Plunger

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 2, C-1.

No. C-2

See III, Case 2, C-2.

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

#24)

(SubChaser

(Torpedo Boat)

INFO:

#43)

(Guard Division

(Rabaul or Kavieng
Sea Defense Force)

(R Area Air Force)

03/1342 March

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 7. No. A-1 (Cont.)

R area Defense Force Operation Order #142. _____s
depart RR (Rabaul) at 1600 3rd _____s CCW _____s
turn over escort of foregoing to GIN about 1800
on 6th in posit 00-30N, 145-30E and return to RR
(Rabaul)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

04/0404 March

FROM: CTF 7
TO: ALL SUBS CARRYING
 NEW FOI
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

UNDERWATER FOWSERET X SUBPAC ULTRA SERIAL 71 X
BLUE STINGRAY X PORPOISE WHILE IN MARSHALLS AREA
MAKE PERIODIC OBSERVATION OF KWAJALEIN AND J. LUT
ATOLLS AND ORIGINATE DISPATCH IF ANY CONCENTRATION
IMMEDIATE SHIPPING OBSERVED X

PLANE REPORTS PORPOISE NOT LEAVING OIL SLICK X
PC 567 WILL MEET S 31 AT 16 HOURS GCT 5TH AT
21-30 NORTH 156-55 WEST X PICKEREL ARRIVED PEARL X

TRIGGER NOTE THAT SINGLE SHIP OR CONVOY ENROUTE
FROM RABAU TO PALAU WILL MEET DESTROYER ESCORT
AT 1 HOUR GCT 6 MARCH AT 0-30 NORTH 145-30 EAST X
PLUNGER DELAY BY SERIAL 66 DOPE INCORRECT GO AFTER
BY SERIAL 70

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 7 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Trizner

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case I, C-4.

No. C-2

March 5

0902 (K) (6th contact) (No attack)
Lat. 4-08N. Long. 137-43E.
Tanker. Unable to close.
Sighted masts of a ship. It turned out
to be a tanker similar to the GENYO MARU
(page 262); estimated course 060 to 100,
speed 17. Unable to attain position for
attack. Her speed nearly equals our
top speed.

March 12

1850 (K) (7th Contact) (No attack)
Lat. 2-00N. Long. 142-56E.
Unknown type of ship.
Sighted smoke on the horizon just at
sunset. We were in the light side of the
horizon and the smoke became invisible in
the dusk within a few moments. Started
search problem at high speed.
2030 (K) The search problem was successful for at
this time the smoke was again picked up.
Commenced tracking and circling the target
to get into attack position. The
visibility was definitely in the target's
favor and our silhouette is too big.
2248 (K) In the numerous small clouds on the
horizon and looking into the low moon, the

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 7, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 12 (Cont.)

target was lost to sight. Headed just ahead of its last bearing. We had by this time nearly reached the target's beam.

2257 (K) Target momentarily in sight. We were approaching at high speed. After a few moments the target was again lost. In spite of all of our efforts for the next two hours at high speed the target was never again seen. Its type unknown. Course about 300 speed about 14 knots.

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (6th Base Force 02/1040 March
(B))

TO:
INFO: (Vessel at
Kwajalein (B))

(Escort vessel in
Marshall-Gilberts
Area (C))

(Air group 952 (B))

(Escort vessel in
Marshall (B))

1. The Taihosen Maru will depart FC (Fonape) for PQ (Kwajalein) at 1400, the 4th. Goryu Maru will depart PQ for FC at 1400 the 4th. Both by direct route.
2. Commander Kwajalein Frontier Defense Force have the #7 Showan Maru escort the Goryu Maru. Enroute meet the Taihosen Maru, after that return to PQ (Kwajalein) escorting the Taihosen Maru.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 8, No. A-1 (Cont.)

GI COMMENT: Taihosan Maru is 1805 tons:
Goryu Maru, 1912 tons.

No. A-2

FROM: (6th Base Force, Jaluit) 02/1040 March
TO: _____
INFO: (42nd Guard Div., Ponape)
(#7 Showa Maru)
(952nd Air Group)
(Escort Vessel, Marshalla Area)

1. The Taihosan Maru will leave PO (Ponape) for PQ (Kwajalein) 1400, the 4th. The #5 Ryu Maru will leave PQ (Kwajalein) for PO (Ponape) 1400, the 4th. Both will proceed on direct route.
2. The Comdr. Kwajalein Sea Frontier Defense Force will have #7 Showa Maru escort the #5 Ryu Maru until rendezvous is made with the Taihosan Maru, and will then take the Taihosan Maru under escort and return to PQ (Kwajalein).

No. A-3

FROM: (#6 Base Force) 02/1045 March
TO: Unknowns Serial #713

The Taihosan Maru will depart PO (Ponape) 1400 the 4th, it is to rendezvous early morning of the 6th with #7 Showa Maru and #5 Ryu Maru and come under the escort of #7 Showa Maru thereafter while returning to PQ (Kwajalein).

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 8 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: ALL STES COMING NEW
FCX
INFO: CINCPAC

05/1033 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR BASS IN PLUNGER X 153 POPCORN LEFT POMAPE
AT 0500 OCT MARCH 4 FOR KWAJALEIN X SAME TIME ANOTHER
BEECH (FREIGHTER) WITH LEXON (ESCOOT VESSEL) LEFT
LATTER PORT FOR FORMER X THEY RENDEZVOUS TO SWAP
LEXON ALONG DIRECT LINE BETWEEN PORTS X

MAY BE IN YOUR PATH X IF UNABLE TO REACH HOT SPOT
PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED STAY IN AREA 16 AND AWAIT
ORDERS X PORPOISE ARRIVES YOUR OLD AREAS ON 6TH X
STAY CLEAR X SUBPAC SERIAL 75

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Plunger

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 2, C-1.

No. C-2

For narrative report of U.S.S. Plunger for March
5, See Case 2, C-2- Nothing sighted.

0200 (L) Received CTF 7 serial directing PLUNGER
to patrol in vicinity of POMAPE until
fuel dictated return to PEARL.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 6

- 0544 (L) Dived.
1300 (L) Commenced approach on tops sighted bearing 353. These turned out to be tree tops on UJAE ISLAND.
1625 (L) Surfaced.
1640 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 140 about 15 to 20 miles away and headed for it. By 1710 had mast tops in sight with high periscope gaining station ahead on four engines. PLUNGER was making 17.7 knots in her emergency loaded condition. By 1812 we had target on course 080, speed 9-3/4 knots. Lost him in closing darkness and steered course to intercept. Night was dark and no radar contact was made. Covered 9-3/4 knot positions for courses 080 to 100 by 2045. We had positive evidence that the target made a radical change of course shortly after dark.
2045 (L) Abandoned search.

March 7

Patrolling FOMAKE-MARSHALL trade routes.

- 1133 (L) Sighted masts bearing 270, distance 8,000 yards, angle on bow starboard 60. Commenced approach at 5-3/4 knots. Identified target tentatively as a harbor tanker, estimated 500-800 tons. Minimum range 6000 yards. Looked him over carefully for guns. None could be seen although we could not be sure, prepared for battle surface.
1230 (L) Surfaced, range 6200 yards, angle on bow starboard 120. Opened fire with 3" gun. He shoveled on the coal; so did we, closing at full power on four engines, keeping him about 40° on the starboard bow.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 7 (Cont.)

(Our gun is still aft). We deemed it advisable to keep him under fire while we closed. He immediately transmitted on 460 kcs., giving position in plain numerals and got a receipt. By the time the range had been closed to 4,000 yards we had straddled him in range and deflection but still no hits had been observed. He was changing course continuously. A few of the shells exploded with a black splash; the remainder made the regular target practice splash. At 1250, 20 minutes after surfacing, the SD reported a plane at ten to eleven miles. Gun crew and bridge force cleared the top side on prearranged whistle signal. The SD reported again that plane was at ten miles. Reluctantly sounded the diving alarm without getting this small unarmed tanker. 43 rounds 3" expended. 107 rounds left.

This little JAP was handled in a very seamanlike manner. His radio communications were a model of efficiency. The plane showed up promptly. A news-cast two days later told about a U.S. sub gunning a JAP ship of less than 1000 tons. If this was our job, the news emanated from TOKYO. There is the possibility that this target was not the innocent harbor tanker he purported to be.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No:	9
Time and Date:	1630 (L) - March 6
Lat. and Long.	8-25N - 105-55E
Type:	Masts

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 8, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Initial Range: 18,000
Est. Course Speed: 080 12 knots
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Surfaced during daylight
and steered to intercept
after dark. Could not
find him.

No: 10
Time and Date: 1133 (L) - March 7
Lat. and Long: 7-45N - 155-40E
Type: Small AC
Initial Range: 8,000
Est. Course Speed: 030 13 knots
How Contacted: S
Remarks: Surfaced daylight battle
surface. No known damage.
Forced down by plane,
Attack #5.

Case 9

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Truk Trans. 04/1535 March
Section) (B)
TO:
INFO: (Saipan Trans.
Section Office) (B)
(Tokyo Maru) (B)

Concerning the schedule departure of the Tokyo
Maru about the 9th, if all goes well (?) will be
completed the 9th. Plan to depart about the

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 9, No. A-1 (Cont.)

10th (garble may be 12th) for Saipan. About 550 tons cargo for Saipan.

No. A-2

FROM: (Truk Transport) 04/--- March
TO: Serial #040
INFO: (Saipan Transportation Section)
(Tokyo Maru)

Tokyo Maru was scheduled depart about 9th. However, for reasons of cargo handling, she will complete work on 9th, and depart about 10th for Saipan. At Saipan she will unload about 550 tons.

No. A-3

FROM: (Truk Area Trans. 04/3535? March
Section)
TO: Serial 040
INFO: (Saipan Trans. Office)
(Tokyo Maru)

With regard to the Tokyo Maru's departure about the 9th, she will finish up on the 9th in accordance with SMS #639 and depart about the 10th for Saipan. Cargo to be loaded at Saipan 520 tons.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 9 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: AIL SUBS COPYING NFM
FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PRIORITY: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

06/0935 March

NUMBER 77 FROM COMSUBPAC 1 PORTCUSE NOW ENTERING
AREAS 19 to 22 INCLUSIVE WHERE SHE WILL PATROL
UNTIL 17 MARCH AND THEN PROCEED TO AREA 15 SOUTH
PASSING SOUTH OF PONAPE I

IF FUEL REMAINING ON FLINGER INSUFFICIENT TO
REACH TRUK FLINGER SHOULD PATROL VICINITY PONAPE
AS LONG AS FUEL PERMITS AND THEN RETURN FUEL
PASSING NORTH OF AREA 19 I

WHALE DISREGARD MY SERIAL 74 REPORT OF PUBLICATIONS
RECEIVED 1 ULTRA 1 FIREBACK AND WHALE NOTE 051
POPCORN DEPARTS TRUK FOR SAIPAN ON MARCH 10TH I
EXACT ROUTE UNKNOWN

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Fireback

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No difficulty was experienced in
copying NFM schedules. Subpac
serial #98 was not received and
it was assumed that it was sent
in a channel not held by the
FIREBACK.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 9 (Cont.)

No. C-2

March 8-9

Patrolling Truk - Empire traffic lane in passage between Manonuito Island and Hall Island. Since no contacts had been made in the passage between Manonuito Island and Hall Island, left this seemingly good spot to make submerged patrol off the North Pass commencing at dawn this date. At 1517 (Z) Sighted smoke inside Truk lagoon. No ship left North Pass today. (No entry made for March 10).

March 11

1756 (K) Sighted smoke of vessel later identified as patrol vessel leaving North Pass.

March 12

The FIREBARK this date was a victim of one of the meanest Jap tricks (planned or unplanned of the war.

0615 (K) Sighted smoke in North Pass while conducting submerged patrol.

0700 (K) (Contact #4) Identified smoke as coming from patrol vessel and steamer proceeding to Empire on course 320°T. Commenced approach. Angle on bow 70° starboard. Closest range 15,000 yards. Hull or upper works of ship were not sighted. Masts and stack were painted black. Stack seemed to have house marking. Decided to trail and chase target after opening range on Truk.

0930 (K) Sighted seaplane at about two miles headed in our direction. Went to 140 feet.

0945 (K) Went to periscope depth, no plane in sight. Smoke of steamer in sight and escort vessel apparently returning to Truk.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 9, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 12 (Cont.)

- 1030 (K) Just prior to planned time for surfacing, sighted plane on target's bearing so assumed air escort had relieved surface escort.
- 1200 (K) Surfaced 16 miles off North Pass and commenced chase at full power. Sighted smoke of escort vessel on port beam. No more planes sighted.
- 1400 (K) Sighted smoke of target. Commenced rounding target, who was zigzagging, for position ahead, keeping masts in sight with #1 periscope.
- 1850 (K) While closing track to attack, observed target to turn on red light. Sunset time was 1804. Further closing of target showed a properly lighted hospital ship with Red Cross near stack, lighted green band along hull, and range lights.

U.S.S. Whala

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: We copied on 4115, 8230, and 12345 kcs, with good results, excepting for about an hour starting at 1700 GCT, when reception was only fair. Transmitted on 4235 kc with no difficulties experienced in contacting a shore station.

No. C-4

0600 (K) Patrolled on the surface, periscopes up, across possible Truk, Saipan routes west of Marianas. At sunset closed to a range of eight to ten miles on the chain of islands and patrolled south towards Saipan.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 9, No. C-4 (Cont.)

March 10

0500 (X) Sighted Saipan Island, dove and approached Tanapag Harbor.

March 11 - 19

(X) Continued to close Tanapag Harbor daily, diving at dawn, arriving at our chosen observation point north of reef to "count our chickens" about 0900. Remainder of day spent at three to eight miles from entrance observing activities of patrol ships and planes. Periodically throughout the day distant small explosions were heard that they may have been blasting. Nothing of any special interest was noted except that when we were to the north of entrance a freighter came in from the west completely out of range. When we moved to the west, a freighter got in the harbor from the north.

No. C-5

Contact Report

Number:	5
Date:	1200 - March 12
Position:	15-22N., 145-43E.
Description:	Single stack freighter 4 to 5000 tons
Initial Range:	10,000
Min. Range:	6,000
Est. Course:	150
Results:	none.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 10

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO: (67th Guard
Division)

On March the 6th originator Captain of Okitsu Maru. Blank Fleet SMS 2 blank. In view of the Okitsu Maru having received an attack from an enemy submarine this morning, carry out as strict a patrol as possible during the period she is at anchor at RYC (Nauru) unloading which is estimated will require blank time.

No. A-2

FROM: (17 Kyoo Maru) 06/1700 March
TO: Action Addressee
missed. Serial 106
INFO: (16 Kyoo Maru)

Scheduled to leave PQ (Kwajalein) 1400 (or 1000)
9th with Katori Maru returning to PY on 10th.

GI COMMENT: PY is Jaluit. Only other PY
designator we have is PYI (Lajeil).

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 10 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM:

06/2210 March

TO:

(Guard Division
#67)

From: Staff 4th Fleet.
4th Fleet SMS _____.

In view of the fact that Uzuki was attacked by
an enemy submarine this morning, the Kooshin Maru
will remain at anchor (?) (or is at anchor) at
Nauru Island (many _____) appears that
there is need for planning _____.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM:

COMSUBPAC

07/0041 March

TO:

ALL SUBMARINES COPTING

NIM FOR

INFO:

CINCPAC

PREC:

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBPAC ULTRA 78 SNAPPER WELCOMED TO TASK FORCE 7
IN VICINITY OF GILBERT ISLANDS X YOU MADE HIPPERS
WAD YESTERDAY NEAR NAURU BUT BELIEVE SHIP WAS ABLE
TO REACH PORT X

WATCH FOR PLANES SEARCHING FOR YOU X THEY MAY
HECKLE YOU HALF WAY TO PEARL X PORPOISE NOTE THAT
ONE NICE LARGE TANKER IS SCHEDULED DEPART
KWAJALEIN FOR JALUIT AT ONE HOUR OCT MARCH 9TH X

FOR KINGFISH ONE MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) MAKING 13
KNOTS IS SCHEDULED PASS THROUGH 21-25 NORTH 121-10
EAST AT 3 HOURS OCT MARCH 14 AND IS DUE AT TAREAO
9 HOURS LATER

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 10 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Snapper

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 4, C-1.

No. C-2

March 7

0000 Enroute Pearl on course 091⁰T at 15 knots.
0745 Passed OCEAN ISLAND astern to port distance
14 miles.
1200 Operational control shifted to CTF - 7
1709 Made quick dive for trim and training.
1735 Surfaced, enroute at speed 13 knots.
2010 Changed course to 082⁰T.

	<u>1200</u>	<u>Miles</u>	<u>Fuel</u>
Lat.	00-59-00S		
Long.	170-46-00E	335	4030

March 8

0000 Enroute Pearl.
1048 Passed thru designated point in
accordance with CTF - 42 orders.
Changed course to 052⁰T.

	<u>1200</u>	<u>Miles</u>	<u>Fuel</u>
Lat.	00-01-30N		
Long.	175-07-30E	324	3180

U.S.S. Fornolise

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See III, Case 5, C-1.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 10 (Cont.)

No. C-4

March 9

- Steering courses to be across the KWAJALEIN-JALUIT Lines Northwest of NAMU during daylight.
- 1245 (L) Obtained fix on NAMU ISLAND which showed that current had set us too far to the Eastward. Changed course to West.
- 1628 (L) (Contact #2) Sighted Southbound ship, bearing 317°T. Went to battle station and commenced approach. Unable to close to attack range, minimum range 8250 yards.
- 1806 (L) Gave up approach and changed course to Eastward. As this was the first time that we had encountered an escort which trailed her convoy it was thought that she might be getting ready to return to KWAJALEIN after dark. In order to avoid running into escort if this assumption was correct and to gain the advantage of the dark side of the horizon as soon as possible, it was decided to run around the Eastern side of NAMU ATOLL and gain a position ahead of the target for a dawn attack on the 10th.
- 1845 (L) Surfaced and set off to accomplish this, using Radar to keep a safe distance off-shore.
- 2340 (L) (Contact #3) Made Radar contact on target, bearing 215°T., distance 10,950 yards. As there was not room to pass between target and WOTJA ISLAND without probable detection, course was changed to pass astern of target keeping contact and tracking by Radar.

March 10

- 0223 (L) Having determined enemy course to be 145°T., speed 8-9 knots, secured tracking. At this

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 10, No. C-4 (Cont.)

March 10 (Cont.)

time the target bore 011^{OT}, distance 15,000 yards. The Executive Officer urged that an immediate attack be made but the Commanding Officer decided to adhere to the original plan of an attack after dawn and course was accordingly set to be ahead of the target at that time.

0623 (L) (Contact #4) Sighted target bearing 325^{OT} Escort still trailing AK. Went to battle stations and started approach. As the target was following a wide sweeping zig plan, FCRFOISE failed to get close enough to attack, minimum range 4600 yards. This failure must be charged to an error in judgement of the Commanding Officer. Second guessing, it is apparent that the attack should have been started at 0223 (L) as urged by the Executive Officer when a favorable position had been attained.

0740 (L) Secured from battle stations and set course to pass North of JALUIT ATOLL.

0942 (L) Sighted plane bearing 144^{OT}. Evidently air coverage for convoy just missed. After surfacing set course to be off Southeast Pass of JALUIT ATOLL during daylight of the 11th.

No. C-5

Contact Report

No.	2
Time and Date:	1628 (L) March 9
Position:	8-16N - 167-54E
Course and Speed:	Zig-Zag Base 14 ^{OT} 8-12 knots
Description:	One AK about 2000 T. (Similar to 208-J Page 153). One escort. Resembled converted yacht. Armed.
Remarks:	Periscope approach failed. Escort stayed behind AK well abast the beam.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 10 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Kinzfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: See III, Case 3, C-4.

No. C-7

March 14

Submerged patrol on 100 fathom curve east of HOKO SHO. Nothing sighted but sampans fishing and patrolling.

March 15

- 1105 (H) Heard pinging and sighted masts and bridge of what appeared to be a mine sweeper of AM-13 class on northerly course range 12,000 yards speed 15 knots. Unable to close range for attack. Visibility is hazy with low ceiling.
- 1155 (H) Sighted passenger freighter on northerly course range 5-6000 yards with 3 plane escort. Two engine bombers. Fired three torpedo spread at estimated range of 1800 yards, 100° port track target speed 12 knots. First torpedo premature at 38 seconds. Sound heard other two torpedoes running. Planes headed firing point. Target turned away. Two minutes and thirty seconds after firing heard heavy torpedo explosion from direction of target. After this sound unable to hear target screws. Unable to make periscope observation since we had started deep to avoid planes. During the next two minutes eight depth charges were dropped at a distance of about 500-1000 yards.
- 1500 (H) Periscope depth. Several planes in sight and one patrol boat searching where we had fired.
- 1557 (H) Depth charges to the west of us estimated range 4 miles. Nothing in sight but visibility is not good.
- 1730 (H) Hear echo ranging but no vessel sighted.
- 1916 (H) Surfaced and stood toward China coast.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 10 (Cont.).

No. C-8

Contact Report

Time and Date: 1155 (H) - March 15
Location: L-25-34N Long. 121-45E
Type: Passenger freighter
Int. Range: 6,000
Est. Course: 020
Est. Speed: 12
Description: passenger freighter of
6,000 tons.

Case 11

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 08/1300 March
TO: (11th Air-?) Serial 004
INFO: (Less RCTAXO -
Marshalls Air Base
Fuel Ship)
(6th Base Force)
(Enciphered Makin
Detachment)
(Combined Fleet)
(Comdr. Jaluit Sea
Frontier Defense Force)
(Takunan Maru #6)
(942nd Air Group)
Enciphered Iriaji Detachment-?

"This ship's operation schedule, ordered in #2 Air
Attack Force dispatch Operation Order #17, will be
changed as follows from tomorrow on:

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 11, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Depart FY (Jaluit) 1500/11 (Southeast Channel).
At 0000/12th at Grid TU TU 36 (grid
garbled). Arrive RYI (Funa Futi Island)
1000/12th. (under escort by Asanagi)".

No. A-2

08/1300 March

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

(11th Air?)

(Marshalls Air Base
Fuel Ship)

(6th Base Force)

(Makin Detachment
(Combined Fleet)

(Comdr. Jaluit
Sea Frontier Def. For.)

(#6 Takunan Maru)

(#952 Air Group)

Enciphered Lileji Detachment

This ship's operation schedule, ordered in #2 Air
Attack Force Dispatch-Operation Order #17, will
be changed as follows: from tomorrow on:

Depart FY (Jaluit) 1500, the 11th (South-
east Channel).

At 0000, the 12th, at grid TI TU 36
(grid garbled)

Arrive RYI, 1000 the 12th (under escort
by Asanagi).

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 11 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

09/1250 March

FROM: SUBPAC
TO: PORPOISE
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBPAC SERIAL 84 K IS ULTRA FOR PORPOISE ONLY X
1 UNIDENTIFIED SHIP TYPE UNKNOWN BUT EVIDENTLY
OF SOME IMPORTANCE AS DD ESCORT BEING PROVIDED
WILL LEAVE JALUIT VIA SOUTHEAST CHANNEL AT 6
HOURS OCT ON MARCH 11TH

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Porpoise

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 5, C-1.

No. C-2

March 9

1245 (L) Steering courses to be across the
KWAJALEIN-JALUIT lanes northwest of
NAHU during daylight. Obtained fix on
NAHU ISLAND which showed that current
had set us too far to the Eastward..
Changed course to West.

1628 (L) (Sighted Southbound ship, bearing 317°T.
(Contact went to battle stations and commenced
#2 approach. Unable to close to attack
range, minimum range 8250 yards).

March 10

0740 (L) Secured from battle stations and set
course to pass North of JALUIT ATOLL.

ORIGINAL
27 November 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 10 (Cont)

0942 (L) Sighted plane bearing 144°T. Evidently air coverage for convoy just missed. After surfacing set course to be off Southeast Pass of JALUIT ATOLL during daylight of the 11th.

March 11

0906 (L) Submerged patrol of JALUIT.
Contact First sighted armed Sampan patrol. She
#5 kept running back and forth all day and was a confounded nuisance as the sea was glassy with a light swell making periscope exposure hazardous.

1635 (L) Sound picked up screws bearing 325°T.
Contact Could see nothing by periscope until

#6
1640 (L) At which time the tops of the masts of a destroyer were first sighted against the land background.

1650 (L) Went to battle stations. The DD was patrolling in wide sweeps but approaching PORPOISE on the line of bearing of Southeast entrance.

1655 (L) Changed course to 165°T. and went to 100 feet to allow the DD to pass over PORPOISE. Range 4,000 yards. Still nothing seen behind her. After going deep, sound reported the DD on a steady bearing on the starboard quarter and getting closer, then she drew over to the port quarter, then back to the starboard to port once again where the bearing stayed constant. All the time sound kept reporting that she was closing and that nothing else could be heard. Sound conditions were extraordinary this day. Initial contact had been at more than 15,000 yards. It was apparent that the DD could not be closing all the time so we came up for a look.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 11 (Cont.)

- 1739 (L) Sighted seaplane tender bearing 010°T., range 11,000 yards, course 080, with the DD astern of her. Change course to close. This vessel looked like a KATORI class cruiser which had had everything on the main deck abaft the stack cleared away and a heavy tail mast stepped right at the stern. Target was zigzagging between 080 and 125 until
- 1802 (L) at which time she was observed to be on course 350. Changed course to North. Having completed turn at range
- 1807 (L) 5,000 yards, bearing 061°T. With the DD now ahead of her. She had evidently made a circle to allow her escort to get ahead. Changed course to 135. This was the closest we ever were to her.
- 1813 (L) Secured from battle stations, but continued tracking as long as she was in sight. Best estimate of base course was 135°T, speed 12-15 knots.
- 1846 (L) Surfaced and set off in hot pursuit at maximum speed.
- 2240 (L) SJ Radar out of commission
- 2330 (L) SJ Radar repaired.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No: 6
Time: 1640 (L)
Date: 11 March
Position: S.E. entrance JALUIT ATOLL
Course: Zig-zag. Base 135.
Speed: 12 to 15 knots
Description: Two stack DD. 1200 ton escort. Seaplane Tender similar to KATORI Class CL, ONI-14, Page 53. Converted. High lifting crane on stern. Deck clear from stack aft to crane. One two gun turret forward.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 11. No. C-3 (Cont.)

Remarks: DD and sampans Patrol searched area off entrance and tender came out and went ahead of escort.

Case 12

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (R Area Defense 09/1600 March
Force)
TO: (43rd Guard
Division)
INFO:

Desire to turn over to you, the escort of the following convoys at position and times indicated:

1. 6 vessel convoy bound for PP (Palao) making 8 knots in position on Equator at 145 Meridian, about 1500 on the 15th.
2. Noshiro Maru and Yodogawa Maru bound for PT (Truk) making 13 knots in position on Equator at 151 Meridian, about 1630 on the 13th.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 10/0237 March
TO: CTF 42
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 12, No. B-1 (Cont.)

THIS IS ULTRA X TRIGGER BEING INFORMED OF ULTRA
CONVOY AT EQUATOR AND 145 EAST AT 6 HOURS GCT
15TH X REQUEST ANY TASK FORCE 42 SUBS IN VICINITY
BE INFORMED OF PROBABLE PRESENCE OF TRIGGER X

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TRIGGER
ALL SUBS COPYING NFM
FOR
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

10/0446

SERIAL 86 FROM COMSUBPAC IS ULTRA X TRIGGER HAVING
BEEN ROBBED OF A CONVOY BY SUBMARINE FROM DOWN
UNDER WE GIVE ROY BINGSON A BETTER ONE X

6 SHIPS ENROUTE RASAU TO PALAO MAKING 8 KNOTS
GOOD KILL CHANCE ESCORTS ON THE EQUATOR AT LONG
145 DEGREES AT 6 HOURS GCT MARCH 15TH X

TRIGGER RENDER ALL NECESSARY HONORS X TASK FORCE
42 SUBS MAY BE AFTER SAME CONVOY AND THEY WILL BE
INFORMED OF YOUR PROBABLE PRESENCE X TRIGGER
CONSIDER LONGITUDE 146 DEGREES EAST AS EASTERN
LIMIT YOUR AREA FOR REMAINDER PATROL

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Trigger

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 1, C-4.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 12 (Cont.)

No. C-2

March 15

- 1035 (K) (8 contact) (3rd and 4th attacks)
Lat. 0-00N. Long. 145-00E.
Convoy of 5 freighters with 2 escorts.
One 7000 ton freighter probably sunk.
One 7000 ton freighter damaged. Picked
up smoke on the horizon bearing 103.
Commenced approach. Turned out to be a
convoy of two columns, 2 freighters in
the right hand column and three in the
left. There was an escort, small
destroyer or other type, on each outboard
bow. The convoy was zigzagging with
escorts patrolling station. We worked
into position ahead in order to get
between the columns. Maneuvers were
successful.
- 1215 (K) Fired three stern tubes at the leading
ship in the right hand column at 1600
yards 90 port track. Two hits. While
these torpedoes were on the way got set
up on the leading ship of the left hand
column. The last zig had placed the columns
in echelon so that the angle on the bow
on our new target was 10 degrees starboard,
relative bearing 300 and at a range of
2000 yards. The first firing, due to
smooth sea, disclosed our position. Our
new target headed for us. There was not
time for us to turn.
- 1217 (K) Fired three bow tubes at zero angle on
the bow range 700 yards, gyro angles about
45 degrees. Used normal dispersion as
the spread. Two hits. Went deep on
firing to avoid the target. The escorts
were after us with depth charges instantly.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 12, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 15 (Cont.)

alternating listening and dropping. The sea was smooth and sound conditions excellent so could not at the time come up to take a look. During the quiet periods the sounds associated with the breaking up and sinking of a ship were heard in the direction of our first target.

1420 (K) Nothing in sound. Came to periscope depth. Nothing in sight.

1437 (K) Depth charges at a distance. Nothing in sight. Assumed they were planes. These distant explosions continued for the next hour.

1515 (K) Sighted smoke on the horizon. Started approach. Its bearing remains constant.

1705 (K) Could now see a ship's masts. Continued the approach submerged. The new target was a ship which looked like our earlier second target, the one at which we have fired and hit twice at 700 yards zero angle on the bow. Alongside of her and on the far side and sticking out astern was the smaller ship resembling the freighter which had been third ship in the left hand column. This smaller ship was furnishing buoyancy and propulsion; speed about two knots, course 190. The pair was being protected by two small destroyers or corvets. Continued the approach.

2142 (K) Fired 3 bow tubes at 700 yards 90 port track to run at 15 feet. Apparently the torpedoes did not get up to the target's keels in time. Sound tracked then straight on the target's bearing. Immediately escorts started running around but apparently did not know where to look. It was bright moonlight. We reversed course and took position for stern shots.

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Case 12, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 15 (Cont.)

Possibly we had been too close but we turned and reversed course at one-third speed without crossing the target's track so it is believed that the range at firing was sufficient. The torpedoes, in any event, did not get up to the target's keel depth.

2201 (X) Fired three stern shots at 1100 yards 100 port track to run at 15 feet. The only one sound heard ran circles; ran right over our engine room. The commanding officer's confidence in himself and his weapons was so shaken that he considered further action by this vessel against those targets futile. After the escorts gave up, surfaced and sent contact report. We were not able to get any station to respond to our calls and therefore sent it blind on 2 frequencies. The ship which probably sunk had the appearance of the KORYU MARU (p.162) of 6668-7072 tons. The ship damaged, the one at which 6 more torpedoes were fired, was similar to the LONDON MARU (p.204) of 7191 tons. Our reason for believing that the first one sank is that she was hit with two torpedoes, the usual crackling sounds associated with a ship sinking were heard very distinctly, she was not in sight when we got a look, both escorts stayed with the other ship. This latter fact is rather impressive.

D - Verifications

No. D-1

FROM:
TC:

(Bismarck Area
Defense Force)

15/1130 March

Serial ?

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 12, No. D-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (11th Air Fleet)
(1st Section Naval
General Staff)
(Marshall Activity
Defense or Escort
Force)

At 1100, in 0-02 North, 145-05 East, the
Maru received a torpedo attack and
is unable to navigate. We are searching
the area.

NSS COMMENT: Position is not confirmed,
but it is believed fairly good. Latitude
may be south instead of north, but in any
case only four miles are involved.

No. D-2

WAM: 15/1730 March

15/1400 00-09 North.

144-55 East.

Torpedo attack. Reliability
excellent.

15/1100 00-02 South.

145-50 East.

Torpedo attack. Reliability excellent.

(15-Mar/DI)

(NOTE: TRIGGER working this convoy)

ORIGINAL
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Case 13

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (6th Base Force, 10/0855 March
Jaluit)
TO: (Kaisho Maru)
INFO: (Hinode Maru)
#5 Hino Maru)
(Comdr. SubChaser
Div. #63)
(Air Flot 22)

1. The Kaisho Maru left Moji 1600, 21st and is scheduled to arrive PQ (Kwajalein) 1200 on 13th. Noon position 10th: 12-00 North, 156-00 East. 11th, 12-00 North, 161-00 East. 12th, 12-00 North, 165-00 East.
2. The Hinode Maru and the #5 Hino Maru will leave PQ (Kwajalein) 0500, 11th and, after passing through 08-40 North, 166-50 East, and 12-00 North, 164-00 East, the Hinode Maru is scheduled to proceed to NAA (Yokosuka), and #5 Hino Maru to PS (Saipan). Speed 10 knots.
3. The Comdr. of PQ (Kwajalein) Sea Frontier Defense Force will have the #11 Shonan Maru escort the Hinode Maru and the #5 Hino Maru as far as their position at 0500, 12th. After separation it will meet the Kaisho Maru at the Kaisho Maru's noon position on the 12th and will escort it to PQ (Kwajalein).

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: NFM
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOR

10/1705 March

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 13, No. B-1 (Cont.)

INFO: - - -

.PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR PORPOISE ULTRA SERIAL 88 X ONE APPLE (SEA-
PLANE TENDER) AND ONE MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) DUE
DEPART KWAJALEIN 0500 MARCH 11 MINUS 9 TIME
X WILL PASS THROUGH LAT 8-40 NORTH LONG 166-50
EAST AND LAT 12 NORTH LONG 164 EAST SPEED ABOUT
10 KNOTS

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX

11/0730 March

INFO: CINCPAC

PREG: PRIORITY

NUMBER 89 FROM COMSUSPAC IS ULTRA I FOR TRIGGER
COMBATANT 42 REPORTS NONE OF HIS SUBS WILL BE IN
VICINITY JVEZ (0 DEG N & S 145 DEG E) WHEN
CONVOY MAKING 8 KNOTS PASSES THROUGH THERE ENROUTE
TO PALAO AT 6 HOURS GCT 15TH X

2 SHIPS LEFT KWAJALEIN AT 20 HOURS GCT 10 MARCH X
WILL PASS THROUGH SMFV 4050 (3 DEG 40 MIN N 166
DEG 50 MIN E) AND THEN REACH VCQE (12 DEG N 164
DEG E) AT 20 HOURS GCT 11TH WHERE ESCORT LEAVES
THEM TO JOIN BEECH WHICH IS ENROUTE KWAJALEIN AND
PASSES THROUGH VCTS (12 DEG N 161 DEG E) AT 3
HOURS GCT 11TH AND VCWB (12 DEG N 165 DEG E) AT
SAME TIME ON 12TH X

PLUNGER AND PORPOISE IF IN VICINITY CAN DOE WORK
ON THESE BUT WATCH OUT FOR EACH OTHER X
INSERT "ULTRA" IN MY SERIAL 85 X

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 13 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Plunger

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 2, C-1.

No. C-2

March 7, 8, 9

Patrolling Ponape-Kwajalein trade route.
1800, 8th entered area _____ near NE
corner.

March 10

1155 (L) Sighted two mast tips bearing 230,
distance about 8 miles. Commenced
approach. 1205 masts bore 232.
Unable to pick him up on look at
1215.

1225 (L) Surfaced. Closed at full power on four
engines, heading for last true bearing
of target. Nothing could be sighted
even with high periscope. Whatever he
was, he was traveling.

1255 (L) Dived.

March 11

2350 (L) On course 260, radar contact bearing
290 relative, range 5500 yards. Radar
labeled him destroyer. 2354 full power,
gaining position ahead.

March 12

0005 (L) On radar sweep got a big pip on large

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 13. No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 12 (Cont.)

ship bearing 307 relative, range 9700 yards. Shifted targets. Night was black, squally, with dark clouds. Lightning flashed every minute or two. We saw him briefly in lightning flashes. He was big, lots of freeboard and superstructure, one funnel, smoking a little intermittently. Target's course 250, speed 10 knots. Data checked for an hour and a half. Had only three torpedoes forward and two aft. Expected to fire 3 bow tubes all to hit. 0136 head in for surface attack on 90 S track, bow tubes.

0140 (L) The Executive Officer, who has excellent vision, had his glasses glued on the target. At this time, in brilliant lightning flash, target was seen by him and thought to have an angle on bow of zero, indicating he had sighted us. We were wondering why he had not already. Expected gunfire momentarily.

0140 (L) Dived to 35 feet and continued to watch radar range and bearing. TDC still checked target on original course.

0143 c/c/ 10° toward target to shoot sooner on an 80 S track, zero gyros, torpedoes set on 8 feet.

0145 (L) As radar bearing came on 346 fired #4, then #3, at 1600 yard range. Intended to fire third torpedo, but when firing interval was suitable radar bearing was about 352. C.O. withheld third torpedo as he felt that to fire it would be to throw it away astern of target. Stop watches showed 00 S fired first torpedo. 07 S fired second torpedo, 65 S first hit, 70 S second hit, followed in 10 seconds by serious internal explosion for a good half minute. We went deep, expecting the "DD" to give us a barrage.

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29 November 1945

Case 13, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 12 (Cont.)

- He passed close by but never slowed. No depth charges. He was making 123 RPM. We tracked him out on 280 t. Disrated this "D", now called him small freighter or escort. Commenced coming up to periscope depth.
- 0024 (L) Stuck the SJ antenna out, nothing picked up.
- 0235 (L) Surfaced. Searched area by radar and sight for wreck. No one doubted that this ship was sunk. We knew there was more of this convoy ahead. Radar had indications on their sweeps during previous approach.
- 0244 (L) Tock up course 280, the last bearing of small freighter. After going out 3 miles on 280, estimated this convoy was bound for PONAPE and that they would not take up an evasive course, only 60 miles from their destination. c//c to 260 accordingly. Full power on 3 generators, charging on one.
- 0405 (L) Torrential rain storm.
- 0420 (L) When we on the bridge were half drowned in the downpour radar picked up a contact bearing 351 relative, 2950 yards. Stopped. Range continued to close a little, but we knew the JAPS were as blind as we were in this deluge.
- 0436 (L) Went ahead full on four engines to gain position ahead.
- 0446 When we were abeam of this target, radar picked up a medium target, bearing 277 relative, range 6900. Shifted targets. Rain stopped.
- 0523 (L) Reduced power to 20%. Hot pinion bearing.
- 0537 (L) Resumed full power.
- 0540 (L) Daylight coming fast. Cut in on course 200 until TDC showed angle on bow 5 S, then swung right. Target had tracked for

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 13, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 12 (Cont.)

- an hour on course 265, speed 10 knots. We now had two torpedoes aft and one forward. Planned to give this target the two fish aft, set on 8 feet, both to hit.
- 0551 (L) Dived to 35 feet, and came to 90 S track for stern tubes. Should have waited longer to turn this track, as we had a firing range of about 2200 yards.
- 0617 (L) Picked up target by periscope. The light was not too good but he looked like a 5000 or 6000 ton conventional freighter.
- 0622-00 Fired #5, 0622-07 fired #6, 0622-19 heavy torpedo explosion. 0622-25 second heavy torpedo explosion. Target's bow obscured by giant geyser. C.O. sang out "premature" on first explosion. Two minutes later first depth charge. Three minutes later another depth charge. Flooded negative, started deep. Realized depth charges were not close and probably being dropped by target. Ordered periscope depth. 0627 at periscope depth but trim had been spoiled. Did not see target.
- 0640 (L) With nothing in sight, secured from battle stations. With one torpedo remaining forward, set course for PEARL.

No. C-3

Contact Reports

Number 13.

Time and Date:	2350 (L) - March 11
Lat. and Long:	7-25N - 159-30 E
Type:	Large AP or AX
Init Range:	9,700
Est. Course:	250
Speed:	10 knots
How. Contacted:	R
Remarks:	2 hits, believed sunk, attack #6

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Case 13, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Contact Reports (Cont.)

Number 15
Time. 0420 (L)
Date. March 12
Lat. 7-15N
Long. 158-50E
Type. Medium AX
Init Range. 6,550
Est Course. 265
Speed. 10 knots
How Contacted. R
Remarks. 2 premature explosions
Attack #7

U.S.S. Porpoise

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See III, Case 5, C-1.

No. C-5

See III, Case 11, C-2.

Case 14

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (6th Base
Source)
TO: ... (Maru
arrived Ponape
Feb 7) (A)

12/1449 March
Serial 741

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Case 14. No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (Goryu Maru) (C)
(Shiretoko) (C)

(4th Base
Force, Truk) (B)
(Maru arrived
Ponape Feb 7) (A)

Departure from PO (Ponape) is temporarily delayed.

No. A-2

FROM: (6th Base 12/1449 March
Force Jaluit)
TO: (Goryu Maru) Serial 741
(Shiretoko)
INFO: (6th Fleet)
(4th Base
Force Truk)
(Ponape Guard
Division #43)

"Will postpone your time of departure from
PO (Ponape) temporarily."

No. A-3

FROM: (6th Base 12/1515 March
Force) Jaluit
TO: (Kusaie Serial 742
Address)
INFO: (Associated
Transport Guarded by
Truk)
(6th Fleet)

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Case 14. No. A-3 (Cont.)

(Civ Eng Sec #4)
(Ponape Guard
Division #42)
(22nd Air Flot)
(62nd Guard Div

(952nd Air Group)

"To the Master of the Shunzan Mar.
Postpone departure for Ponape until
further orders as the vicinity of
Ponape is infested with enemy
submarines."

No. A-4

FROM: (Base Force 12/1515 March
#6, Jaluit) (B)
TO: (Kusaie Serial 742
Address) (B)
INFO:

(Maru--Arrived
Ponape, Feb 7) (A)
(Air Flot
22) (B)
(The Guard Div
62) (C) also (Guard
Force 63) (C)

(Air Group 952) (B)

To the C.O. Shunzan (Siyunazn)
Maru. Enemy sub is in the vicinity
Ponape. Delay your departure for
Ponape until receipt of orders.

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Case 14 (Cont.)

No. A-5

FROM: (Kwajalein 12/1855 March
Dist. Transportation
Office)(A) Serial 043
TO: (Base Force
#6, Jaluit)(B)
INFO: (Haruyama
Maru #2, or Hasshu
Maru)(C)
(Eniwetok)(B)

The Azuchi Maru departed Kwajalein
12 March for Taroa to arrive 1000/
13 March.

Caroline Maru departed Kwajalein
for Brown to arrive 0500/14th March.

(March 12/DI)

No. A-6

FROM: (Kwajalein Area 12/1855 March
Transect)
TO: (#6 Base Force) Serial 043
Jaluit
INFO: (Taroa Comm. —
unit)
(#2 Haruyama
Maru)

Kwajalein departures on 12th.
Azuti Maru for Taroa, scheduled arrive
1000/13th.

Caroline Maru for Brown (Eniwetok),
scheduled arrive 0500/14th.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 14, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

13/0531 March

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COMING
 NFM TOK
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

SUBPAC SERIAL 96 X ULTRA X HADDOCK WHO DEPARTED
MIDWAY 11 MARCH FOR AREA 15 NORTH SPEND ONE DAY
PATROLLING WAKE WHILE ENROUTE TO YOUR AREA I
YOU MAY FIND 1 OR 2 SHIPS AT ANCHOR THERE X

FOR PLUNGER SHIPPING HAS BEEN PROHIBITED FROM
ENTERING OR LEAVING PONAPE DUE TO YOUR
PRESENCE I IF ANY FISH REMAINING AND FULL PERMITS
PLUNGER TAKE A LOOK AT ENROUTE ON YOUR WAY
HOME

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was good at all times
on one or more frequencies while
on station and enroute

All consecutive
serials were received except one-
consubpac serial 48. It is not
known why this one was missed

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 14. No. C-1 (Cont.)

since all NPM numbers on the possible 1100, 1300 and 1500 CCT schedules were copied solid.

No. C-2

March 15

2245 (M) Increased speed to three engines to arrive off WAKE at daylight on seventeenth. This resulted in only one day lost due to transfer of appendicitis patient. The additional fuel used was considered justified as it gave us an additional day on station in our next area.

March 17

0455 (L) Arrived off WAKE and found them very much awake indeed for at this moment about fourteen searchlights were turned on and brought to an elevation of about 40 degrees, throwing up a wall of light about the eastern approach to the island in such a way as to illuminate any plane attempting to cross the island. Secured our SJ Radar in case this had given them an indication of our presence. Most likely they were just having a drill. However, when two of the lights were depressed and came dangerously close.

0458 (L) We made a quick dive. During the day we patrolled off the south coast of WAKE and WILKES Island. Considerable construction work has been done on the islands, and it looked as if grading was being carried out on both islands.

0548 (L) The only activity actually observed was near the boat landing. The number of dredges near this point indicated that an attempt was being made to dredge the

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 14, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 17. (Cont.)

channel to the lagoon. The Radar on Peacock Point appeared to be intact, and the battery of either 5" or 6" guns on this point looked formidable. Pictures were taken. No plane activity was observed, and unfortunately no ships were present.

1902 (L) Surfaced, set course for next area.

U.S.S. Plunger

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See III, Case 16, C-4.

No. C-4

See III, Case 16, C-5.

No. C-5

Description of Contacts:

No.	16
Time:	1407 (L)
Date:	March 15
Lat:	11-20 N
Long:	162-20 E
Type:	Small
Initial Range:	12,000
Est. Course Speed:	Anchored
How Contacted:	P
Remarks:	Inside ENINETOE Atoll

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Case 14, No. C-5 (Cont.)

Description of Contacts: (Cont.)

No: 17
Time: 1620 (L)
Date: March 15
Lat: 11-20 N
Long: 162-20 E
Type: Sailing
Initial Range: 12,000
Est. Course Speed: Anchored
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Inside ENIWETCK Atoll

No: 19
Time: 1106 (L)
Date: March 16
Lat: 11-20 N
Long: 162-20 E
Type: Sailing
Initial Range: 10,000
Est. Course Speed: - - -
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Inside ENIWETCK Atoll

No: 20
Time: 1616 (L)
Lat: 11-20 N
Long: 162-20 E
Type: Same as #16
Initial Range: 12,000
Est. Course Speed: Anchored
How Contacted: P
Remarks: Inside ENIWETCK Atoll

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Case 15

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Nosiro Maru) 13/1702 March
TO: (Base
Force #8)
(Base
Force #4)
INFO: (Southeast
Area Fleet)
(11th Air
Fleet or Unit in
Kavieng area)

At 1538 in 00-10 S, 151-16 E and enemy
submarine attacked us with 4 torpedoes.
1 hit in #5 hold and 1 hit in blank.
Damage is light. We are doing blank. If
we are able to blank we will head for Truk
at 6 knots.
At 1630 we joined up with Truk blank subchaser.

GI COMMENT: T2W 132108 has 3 knots speed instead
of our 6 knots. NFM 142352 has
correction.

No. A-2

FROM: (Nosiro Maru) 13/1702 March
TO: (Base
Force #8)
(Base
Force #4)
INFO: (Southeast
Area Fleet)
(11th Air
Fleet or Unit in
Kavieng area)

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 15, No. A-2 (Cont.)

At 1538 in 00-10 S, 151-06 E an enemy submarine attacked us with 4 torpedoes. 1 hit in #5 hold and 1 hit in blank. Damage is light. We are doing blank. If we are able to blank we will head for Truk at 3 knots. At 1630 we joined up with Truk blank subchaser.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 42
TO: CTF 7
INFO: - - -

14/ 2352 March

PRIORITY: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X GRAYBACK REPORTS HITTING NOSHIRO MARU WITH 4 AND LEAVING HER ABANDONED WITH STERN AMISH TO CHASE ANOTHER BOUND SCOUT I

OTHER INDICATIONS NOSHIRO AT DUEK 13TH POSSIBLY MAKING 3 KNOTS TOWARD TRUK FROM EQUATOR AT 151-06

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Grayback

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Communications were excellent throughout the patrol. All Serials were received and decoded without incident.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 15. (Cont.)

No. 3-2

March 13

1643 Posit: 00-01 S, 151-00E. Sighted ship bearing 189T., went to battle stations, commenced approach.

1649 He presented a 25 S. angle on the bow at range of about 13,000 yards.

1654 Target had zigged 40° to left.

1700 Target had zigged 60° to right.

1711 Range was now determined at 8,500 yards, only one other ship in sight; this a Tomazuru class destroyer. Target was making radical zigs but no pinging was heard.

1721 Range was now 3,500 yards with a 45 S. angle on the bow and he appeared to be coming along for an excellent firing set-up.

1725 Target zigged 55° to the right, giving a very small port angle on the bow at a 1,700 yard range. Distance to the track was not great enough to use bow tubes and his speed of 14½ knots (100 RPM) made swinging for stern tube shot impossible.

1728 Escort passed directly over the stern and Maru passed clear about 300 yards ahead. Only possible hitting set-up now was on a very large track with right gyro.

1734 Fired #1, 2, 3, 4 torpedoes with a 9 second firing interval. Torpedoes were heard to run for target. Range was 2050 yards at time of firing.

1736 First of four hits was observed and heard throughout boat. Hits followed at 8 second intervals and were all observed. First hit was in stern and caused usual

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 13 (Cont.)

mixture of black smoke and white spray. Second hit caused a violent explosion on target's stern followed immediately by a sheet of flame hundreds of feet high. The third hit was further along the port side and looked much like the first. The fourth hit was well up on the port bow and might have exploded magnetically along ship's side or in bow wake. Target screws stopped immediately and she quickly took a 20° angle down by the stern with much black smoke.

1738 Escort was observed dropping depth charges but obviously had no idea where we were as they were all at least 4000 - 5000 yards away.

1742 After dropping twelve large-size depth charges, destroyer headed toward us at slightly increased speed.

1745 Fired two torpedoes forward at destroyer who apparently saw them and turned away to avoid. He now had a better idea of our location and we went to 250 feet.

1810 Made observation and saw Maru still afloat but with a 40° angle down by the stern. She was stopped and boats were being lowered away. There was no smoke visible on her however and she must have had a high degree of water-tight integrity to remain afloat for so long. All officers and men in the conning tower were given a look as the destroyer was well clear steaming in circles apparently picking up survivors. Reload completed-commenced closing destroyer for another shot at him.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 13 (Cont.)

1816 Sighted another destroyer bearing 022T. Decided to continue to close slowly and await developments. No signalling was visible between escorts, but the recent arrival seemed to be closing the other while zigging radically.

1825 Sighted smoke bearing 018T.

1830 Sighted Maru bearing 018T. Smoking heavily and also zigging radically. His constant changing angle on the bow made it impossible to determine his course, but it was assumed he was headed for Kavieng and was here to change escorts with the ship we had already hit. The large Maru which we hit resembles exactly the Nagara Maru type of 7,500 tons used as auxiliary cruisers. She was now well down by the stern and sinking.

1840 Two escorts and newly arrived Maru joined and passed well clear.

1853 One more depth charge-large but not close.

1913 Smoking Maru and escort bore 046 now. Only one escort in sight. The other was apparently waiting around for us to surface.

1935 Heard ping-pong but could see nothing. Sun had set and it was quite dark. Sinking Maru was barely visible and much lower in water.

2002 Surfaced on course 130. No sign of Maru we had hit, but smoke still visible from other Maru bearing approximately 250T.

2015 Tried to run slowly with this Maru, just keeping smoke in sight.

2042 Lookout reported ship at 195 relative.

2043 Ship on port quarter began to challenge us with a series of white, red, and green lights. Challenge lasted not more than thirty seconds at which time the ship

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 13 (Cont.)

must have been dissatisfied with our lack of reply, for she opened fire with what was apparently 20 millimeter or its equivalent and two flashes of a larger caliber gun were seen. No splashes were observed with which to judge her accuracy.

2044 (L) Crash dive to 250 feet.

2048 Sound reported screws bearing 358T. Started changing course to right.

2049 Received nine depth charges none close but all of the seemingly larger type.

2053 Finging was heard continually but on a fairly steady bearing. This made a total of twenty-seven depth charges for the day.

2200 Surfaced. No screws had been heard and the pinging seemed further away; nothing visible in periscope.

2203 Destroyer could still be seen well astern pinging and searching. Went ahead at 14 knots, still planning to run ahead of Maru and attack in morning.

March 14

0625 (L) Submerged about thirty miles north of Navieng.

0950 Sighted float plane circling bearing 033T. Headed for bearing of plane.

1018 Posit: 2-10S., 150-55E. Sighted smoke bearing 003, went to battle stations and commenced approach.

1033 Maru and escort in sight. Maru was old type and apparently same one we had seen the night before. Escort was same also. Angle on the bow was about 53.

1044 (L) Range approximately 12,000 yards with angle on the bow of 60 P.

1106 Range was not 10,000 yards with greater port angle on the bow. Sound picked up screws on proper bearing. Sound conditions were excellent in this area.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 14 (Cont.)

- 1120 Ranges were now checking more accurately and speed looked to be about 12 knots which seemed high for an old Maru of this type. Angle on the bow still the same, 75P. Target was making large zigs but continually presenting a port angle on the bow.
- 1132 Fired #1,2,3, torpedoes with a 9 second firing interval using speed spread of 10,11, and 12 knots and 1,850 yard torpedo run on an 80 P track. Target turned toward Grayback just as the third torpedo was fired and all torpedoes ran ahead. This could easily have been a prearranged zig or a turn to avoid, but whatever it was, it prevented what looked like sure hits at the time of the firing. The set-up was perfect, and while the speed seemed excessive for this old-type Maru, it had checked accurately at both plot and TDC for five observations.
- 1135 Escort, the same one we had fired at yesterday, headed for us, went to 250 feet.
- 1140 By this time he had dropped 8 depth charges rather systematically and his screws were easily heard crossing astern of us. He then stopped and listened, just kicking ahead now and then.
- 1153 (L) One very close depth charge, then destroyer screws speeded up and disappeared. He evidently had put considerable time and thought into this last one as he was on in everything but deflection. His screws were heard through the hull as he made this run directly across our stern, and it was quite a relief to realize that this was his final effort. Some paint and cork was chipped, gear came loose from the overhead, and light bulbs were broken in the after part of the ship. No major material

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Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 14 (Cont.)

defects were noticed at the time however. The 150 foot density layer which we have continually encountered in St. George's Channel and the Shortland area does not exist in the Kavieng area.

.1232 Came up and looked around. Destroyer and Mary were just visible bearing 214T.

2151 Transmitted 140935 to CTF-42 with results to date.

March 15

0140 (L) Received CTF-42 Serial #51 for Grayback, Moved slowly north toward equator again and for first time since February 19th had indications that SJ Radar might be working properly.

March 15-16

Patrolling submerged at 151 E. on equator.

March 17-19

Patrolling on surface at equator, diving at sunrise and before sunset each day for an hour or two.

March 19

1740 (L) Sighted two masts bearing 240T. While on surface.

1745 (L) Submerged and commenced approach at 1-12 S, 154-45 E.

1752 (L) On this initial observation, angle on bow was small and range well over 10,000 yards, went to full speed on normal approach course.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 19 (Cont.)

- 1815 (L) Target was identified as Kamikaze class destroyer with large starboard angle on the bow and range of 8,000 yards. Approach was continued on normal approach course at standard and full speeds.
- 1826 (L) Range was 5,100 yards with a 90 S. angle on the bow and checked speed of 18 knots.
- 1832 (L) Range had opened to 6,000 yards, speed still 18 knots and angle on the bow still 90 or greater. Range continued to open and approach was broken off when range reached 7,500 yards and angle on the bow reached 130 S. Decided to spend night and next few days around this spot as we may have hit on a Truk-Bougainville shipping route.

March 20-27

Patrolling east coast of Bougainville in accordance with Serial #54. No sightings. Visibility fair.

Case 16

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	(Jaluit Base Force #6)	14/1705 March
TO:	(garbled)	Serial 751
INFO:	(Amagisan Maru)	
	(#3 Tama Maru)	
	(Airflot 22)	

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 16, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Amagisan Maru departed NAA (Yokosuka) for PAB (Ruotto) at 1100/March 9th.
Time of arrival not set. Noon positions as follows:

15th - 15-CON, 163-00E.

16th - 10-50N, 165-30E.

2. Commander of Kwajalein Sea Frontier Defense Force will have a Minesweeper of Minesweeper Division 16 rendezvous with the Amagisan Maru at her 0800/March 16th position and escort her.

No. A-2

FROM: (Jaluit Base 13/1648 March
Force 6)
TO: (Jaluit Sea
Frontier Defense Unit)
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(?) (MITAKI -- Rabaul
Air Arsenal)
(Eniwatok)
(Escort for 2 suffix 22)
(Guard Division 62)
(Azuti Maru)
(Amanagi)
(Jo Kyo Maru)

1. The (3 blank kanas) departs RYB (Tarawa Island Air Base) at 1630 on 13th March for Yokohama, speed 10 knots. Noon positions as follows:

14th - lat. 2-20(?), Long. 170-05(?).

15th - lat. 4-50(?), Long. 167-15(?).

16th - lat. 7-25 , Long. 164-15(?).

17th - lat. 11-10 , Long. 161 (?) -50.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 16. No. A-2 (Cont.)

2. The Ko _____ maru blank PB (Brown) blank.
(Note: probably concerns an escort from Brown Island).

3. The PY (Jaluit) Sea Frontier Defense Force Commander (?) will have the #6 Kyo Maru depart Jaluit (?) and escort blank from 15th noon positions to the 17th noon position. On completion of this duty blanks. (Remainder 30 groups are blanks or fragmentary but the "KO _____ maru" and "to PQ (Kwajalein)" are mentioned.
NOTE: the questioned minutes are all approximate only. Positions all north and east.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: FORCISE
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX

14/1741 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA SERIAL 98 X FROM COMSUBPAC FOR FORCISE X
123 PCPCORN THREE HOURS GGT 15TH DEG NORTH 163
DEG EAST ALGAROA 10-50 NORTH 165-30 EAST X

IF IN VICINITY PLUNGER CAN WORK ON HIM ALSO BUT
STAY CLEAR OF AREA 19

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7
TO: ALL SUBS UNDER
MY COMMAND
INFO: CINCPAC

15/0317 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 16. No. B-2 (Cont.)

THIS IS SERIAL 2 COES ULTRA TC PORCISE
AND PLUNGER X

FOLLOWING ARE POSITS AT 3 HOURS OCT 14TH OF
1 MAPLE 1 LEMON WFL (2-20 NORTH 170-05 EAST)
ALCAROBA RSHR (4-50 NORTH 167-15 EAST) DCEE
(07-25 NORTH 164-15 EAST) BATS (11-10 NORTH
161-50 EAST) X

POSITION FOR 17TH SOMEWHAT DOUBTFUL AS
DESTINATION APPEARS TO BE ENIWETOK

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Porpoise

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 5, C-1.

No. C-2

March 13

Conducted submerged patrol off North-
east side of JALUIT ATOLL.

- 0751 (L) (Air) sighted DAVE over ATOLL. Remained
in the air until 0903L. contact #6)
- 0952 (L) (Contact #7) Sighted armed Sampan patrol
which went up and down the coast all
day.
- 0955 (L) Sighted MAVIS landing in lagoon.

March 14

Conducted submerged patrol along JALUIT-
KHAJALEIN route southwest of
AILINGLAPALAP ATOLL.

ORIGINAL
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Case 16, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 15

- Conducted submerged patrol off south-west side of KNAJALUIN ATOLL.
- 0618 (L) Contact #3. Sighted ships inside lagoon. During the day counted six AP or AX at anchor. No traffic seen outside.
- 0625 (L) Sighted DAVE apparently on anti-submarine patrol off ATOLL. Took pictures of ATOLL, negatives being forwarded herewith.

March 16

- 0435 (L) Contact #9. Made radar contact bearing 245⁰T., range 12,350 yards. Started tracking and approach.
- 0510 (L) As the sky was getting bright behind us, submerged to radar depth (36 feet) but lost radar contact. Being unable to pick up target by periscope at
- 0526 (L) Surfaced.
- 0541 (L) Sighted target again and submerged to periscope depth. Continued approach.
- 0711 (L) The target, a small AX without escort, having disappeared to the Northwest, surfaced and set off in chase with the intention of running around her to the westward to get ahead, keeping contact by periscope.
- 0716 (L) Sighted target bearing 302⁰T., range 20,000 yards.
- 0744 (L) Lost sight of target, turned to close.
- 0824 (L) SD radar contact at 8 miles. Lookout saw the plane coming out of the sun at about the same time and later identified it as KATE.
- 0825 (L) Submerged to 150 feet. No hostile action by plane. Having been stopped by air coverages this target was abandoned. After dark surfaced. Being already to westward of area and due to leave it by orders anyway, set course for TRUK.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 16, No. C-2 (Cont.)

Made dispatch report of failure to date, observations of JALUIT and KWAJALEIN and an estimate of the amount of time we could remain on new station based on fuel remaining.

March 17-19

Standing to westward passing 12 miles south of FOMAPE. Numerous radar contacts, alarms and excursions, all of which turned out to be rain squalls.

No. C-3

Description of contacts

Number: 8
Time: 0618 L
Date: March 15
Position: KWAJALEIN ATOLL at
KWAJALEIN ISLAND
Description: Six enemy AK or AP, 4000 to 6,000 tons each. Possibly other ships at KWAJALEIN. Saw what appeared to be tops of mast along-side KWAJALEIN ISLAND inside lagoon.
Remarks: Appeared to be inside KWAJALEIN ATOLL.

Number: 9
Time: 0435 L
Date: March 16
Position: 7-57 N. 165-25 E.
Course: Zig-zag 310^{CT}.
Speed: 8-12 knots.
Description: Enemy, small AK (M.F.M.) about 2500 tons. Possibly a "decoy" or "Q" ship. Not escorted.

ORIGINAL
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Case 16, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Description of Contacts (Cont.)

Remarks: Contact by 3J Radar, bearing 245°T.
Dist. 12,350 yds. Lost radar
contact upon diving at 0510.

U.S.S. Flusser

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See III, Case 2, C-1.

No. C-5

March 12

0640 (L) With nothing in sight, secured from
battle stations. With one torpedo
remaining forward, set course for
Pearl.

March 13-14

Enroute.

March 15

0125 (L) Played tag with phantom radar contact
until 0227. Eventually located ground
causing trouble.

0553 (L) Dived. Made reconnaissance of UJELANG,
passing down entire southern side of
atoll. Only desecration of nature
seen was lone JAP in a lookout tower
and a building at spot labeled beacon
on UJELANG ISLAND. KALO ISLAND appears
to be about 40 feet high, densely covered
with trees about 50 feet high.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 16, No. C-5 (Cont.)

March 15 (Cont.)

- Other islands are a little lower and also covered with foliage and trees. Quite extensive installations could be hidden in these islands. No boats or masts could be seen. UTILANG ISLAND was searched carefully at 3,000 yards. 0525 Dived off ENIWETOK. Patrolled 4 miles off SOUTH PASS until noon, then proceed to EAST CHANNEL. 1407 Commenced approach on MTM freighter sighted bearing 353. 1452 abandoned approach when target was plotted anchored inside lagoon. 1620 (L) Sighted two masts that turned out to be a sail boat anchored NW of JARTAN ISLAND. 1858 (L) Surfaced, set course for BIMINI.

March 16

- 0458 (L) Dived. Patrolled off EAST CHANNEL, ENIWETOK. 0652 (L) Sighted medium sampan standing to eastward out this channel. Avoided. Thought he was going out to escort something in. 1106 (L) Sighted Commandant's sail boat with triangular sail in lagoon. 1616 (L) When we were a little further north than we had previously been, sighted MTM freighter anchored west of PARRY ISLAND Same as day before. 1815 (L) Sighted periscope bearing 190, estimated 1500 yds. Ship was taken deep and turned away and contact reported. Sound heard nothing. Swung right to true bearing of target, coming up to periscope depth. Shut down unessential machinery to reduce own noise transmission and to improve our listening,

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 16, No. C-5 (Cont.)

March 16 (Cont.)

set our torpedo, on 45 feet, made tube ready, and stood by for quick set up.

- 1829 (L) Nothing sighted or heard.
1932 (L) Surfaced.

March 17

- 0200 (L) SJ radar interference.
0220 (L) Radar contact bearing 193 T, range 8100 yards.
0225 Commenced gaining station ahead of target on three generators. (one out of commission).
0251 (L) Second smaller ship picked up in company. Tracked target on course 310, speed 12, checked perfectly.
0517 (L) Getting daylight, 8000 yards, 30° on target's port bow. Came to 90 P track and dived to 35 feet. Continued to track by radar till 0528. OKITU MARU freighter now in sight, went to 50 feet. Closed track at standard speed to 1650 yards. 0530 c/c ten degrees right to 80 P track.
0533 (L) Fired our one torpedo, zero gyro, periscope bearing 016. Sound heard it running, but tracked it out on 345 relative. Watched target until we knew torpedo had missed. Made sweep for escort, but did not see him. As no more hitting power remained, went deep to avoid escort that we knew was near. Immediately after order to go deep one depth charge exploded, not close. This was the only one on this attack. Sound tracked target going away.
0600 (L) At periscope depth saw our target and escort going away undamaged. Set course for PEARL, all tubes empty.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 16 (Cont.)

No. C-6

Description of Contacts

Number:	21
Time and Date:	0222(L) - March 17
Lat and Long:	10-30N - 162-20E
Type:	Medium AK
Initial Range:	8,600
Est. Course Speed:	310 12 knots
How Contacted:	R
Remarks:	Escorted. Fired one torpedo Erratic run. no hits. Attack #8

Case 17

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: No originator
TO: _____

14/1930 March

(Guard
Division 43)

INFO:

From Commanding Officer blank.
Itinerary PP (Palao) to RR (Rabaul) is as
follows:

Depart PP 15th/1300 blanks.
16th/1200 05-25N, 137(?) - 20E.
17th/1200 03-45N, 139(?) - 00E.
18th/1200 01-30N, 143-15E.
19th/1200 02-00S, 143-30E.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 17, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Thenceforth along coast of New Hanover, Jaul Island and New Ireland. Expect to arrive RR on 20th at 0600. Speed 15.

NSS COMMENT: All latitudes and 2 longitudes correct. At speed of 15 knots, first 2 longitudes seen cut unless other than great circle course taken.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBMARINES
INFO: COMINT NFM FOX
PREC: PRIORITY

16/0811

ROY BENSON IN TRIGGER MAY USE THIS ULTRA
SERIAL 8 X BLUE WHALE HALIBUT FINBACK X
CONSIDERED AS FAIR DOPE 1 MAPLE POSIT QDID
3015 (1-30 NORTH 143-15 EAST) ON THE 18TH
AT 3 HOURS GOT X POSIT SAME TIME NEXT DAY
WILL BE VMCC 0030 (2-00 SOUTH 148-30 EAST)
X GOOD LUCK

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Trigger

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 1, C-4.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 17 (Cont.)

No. C-2

March 17

0127 (X) (9th contact) (No attack)
Lat. 2-03N. Long 144-12E.
Convoy of 6 freighters with one escort.

March 18

We are now so low on fuel that,
considering 10% reserve, we can just
reach Midway on one engine. Sent
message that for that reason we are
leaving area on the 21st.

March 19

No entry.

March 20

0805 (X) Lat. 3-44N., 144-12 E. Convoy of 4
freighters. Made one torpedo hit in the
leader, 7,000 tonner. Sighted smoke.
Commenced tracking and circling.

1220 (X) Lat. 3-44N. 144-08E. One large
freighter. Avoided as we are busy.
Sighted, coming out of rain squalls, a
freighter (about 3000 tons) angle on
the bow nearly 90, relative bearing
nearly abeam, close enough for us to
see nearly down to his main deck.
As we were already circling the convoy
we ignored this vessel. She challenged
us, sending "NO", with a light but
we did nothing.

1248 (X) Submerged and commenced approach.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 17, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 20 (Cont.)

1410 (K) Fired a spread of three bow torpedoes at the leader (a 7000 tonner) 95 port track 1800 yards. One hit. She listed over to port about 10 degrees, stopped and the other three ships commenced circling her. All of them dropped depth charges and fired guns at our periscopes. Soon, and before we could get into position to fire our two remaining torpedoes (stern tubes) they were all four again on the way at not much reduced speed. The one hit had been a detonation of low order. The target listed, slowed, corrected her list and was surprisingly soon back in formation. Our target now occupied third place in the column. Did not give chase because we could not even afford the fuel used on this chase. Also pursuit is rather futile with 2 stern torpedoes left and one of these always floods.

March 21

1410 (K) Sent contact report and resumed course for home. The convoy of four freighters in one column unescorted. The leader was hit with one torpedo. Her appearance was like the Asuka Maru of 7,530 tons.

Case 18

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (5th Base
Force, Saipan)
TO:

15/2133 March

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 18, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFC: (4th Fleet)
(Combined Fleet)

Identification of vessel, destination, etc.,
lacking due to additives. Readable portion:

Noon positions:

16th, 15-20 North, 141-47? East.
17th, 18-18 North, 139-17 East.
18th, 23-00 North, 139-10 East.
19th, 27-47? North, 139-19 East.
20th, 32-34? North, 139- East.

No. A-2

FROM: (Okitsu Maru) 17/0657 March
TO: (Air-Flot 22)
(Cdr. Azuchi
Maru)
(Cdr. 6th Base
Force, Jaluit)
(4th Fleet)
(Hille)
INTO: (Garbled)
(Tarawa Address)

1. This vessel leaving RYA (Makin) for PQ (Kwajalein) on 20th at 0800, speed 10, expect arrive 22nd at 0800.
2. Noon position 20th, 03-30 North, 172-30 East; 21st, 06-40 North, 170-25 East;
3. (---) 08-10 North, 168?-25 East, thence course-----.
4. Please arrange for escort.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 18, No. A-2 (Cont.)

NBS COMMENT: Long. of posit in part 3 not recovered, but 168 seems best fix here.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS CARRYING NFM
FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

18/0400 March

SERIAL 9 IS COMSUEPAC ULTRA X ALL TIMES COT X
FOR POLLACK 074 POPCORN DEPARTING MARIN 2300 19TH
ARRIVING KWAJALEIN SAME TIME 21ST X AT 0300
20TH LTLZ 30 30 (3 DEG NORTH 30 MINS 172 DEGS
EAST 30 MINS) ALGAROA LVL 40 25 (6 DEGS 40
MINS NORTH 170 DEGS 25 MINS EAST) X

FOR SUNFISH AND SAWFISH IF ANYWHERE NEAR X
1 MAPLE AT 0300 19TH BLNQ 47 19 (27 DEGS 47
MINS NORTH 139 DEGS 19 MINS EAST) ALGAROA
DPNQ 34 41 (32 DEGS 34 MINS NORTH 139 DEGS 41
MINS EAST)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pollack

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Last consecutive serial sent - No. 5
Last consecutive serial received
No. 91.
There was very poor reception
during the entire time we were

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Casa 18, No. C-1 (Cont.)

in the area.

Serials 48, 53, and 62 able, were received garbled. (The latter being cancelled.) Serials 42 and 46 were received garbled and later cancelled after an entire day and night had been spent trying to decipher them and in checking the I.C.M.

No. C-2

March 19

Submerged at dawn with south point of Jaluit bearing 070° distant 9 miles. Passed down the southwest coast of Jaluit 4,000 - 5,000 yards off the reef. Had a good look into the lagoon through the open spaces between islands and the harbor appeared to be empty.

1910 (M) Surfaced. Decided to spend tonight and tomorrow on a line between Jaluit and Makin.

March 20

- 0619 (M) Submerged and commenced patrol on NW-SE line.
- 1606 (M) Sighted smoke to SE about 13 miles distant. Commenced approach.
- 1630 (M) Sighted masts of what later appeared to be a freighter of the KENTO MARU Class. (Attack #1) She was zigzagging on a base course of 330° and making 13 knots. We were too far to the eastward of her track so had to make two thirds speed to close. The sea was glassy flat with a long heavy swell which made periscope exposures and depth control very

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Casa 18, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 20 (Cont.)

- difficult but the target made frequent puffs of heavy black smoke which greatly assisted in locating her on each exposure.
- 1658 (M) Sighted a catcher type patrol vessel about 1000 yards ahead of the target and patrolling across the bow.
- 1729 (M) Fired four torpedoes at a range of 1600 yards., torpedo run 1,300 yds., track angle 40° starboard. We had her zig-zag plan well outlined by this time and as she was soon due to make a big zig to the left it seemed wise to fire then in spite of the sharp track, or, as I look back on it now I may have had a touch of "Buck Faver", and although I tried to wait for a good track, and had the impression that the gyro angles were small, the itchy finger couldn't be controlled. Fired the first torpedo at her stack, the second at her stern, and the third at the bow. After the third torpedo was fired, the target turned toward us so I fired the fourth torpedo at her stern. While firing we rose to 40 feet so that the escort sighted us and turned toward us. Flooded negative and went below periscope depth before the torpedoes arrived at the target. Tried desperately to bring the periscope out again but with no success, then judged it expedient to go deep as the escort was close and boiling down on us when last seen. Heard one torpedo explode which should have been the fourth. Went to 250 feet and received a very close depth charge attack. Two escort vessels were heard, there apparently having been another one patrolling the offside quarter of the target. No pinging was used, only

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 18, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 20 (Cont.)

alternate running and listening. Sound could not hear the target's screws but kept hearing the escorts for about an hour.

1920 (M) Came to periscope depth, nothing in sight.

1940 (M) Surfaced and started chasing target at three engine speed. The night was extremely clear and the moon was full and bright.

2115 (M) Sighted smoke from our target after a run of only an hour and a half. Manuevered until target was in plain sight and we could get radar ranges then circled slowly ahead of him, taking care to remain always outside of 12,000 yards. The "TBT" bearings checked very closely with the radar ranges which were fed automatically into the "TDC" and by the time we had arrived up ahead of him.

March 21

0045 (M) We had a very accurate picture of his course, speed, and zig-zag plan. The target was zigging between 310°T and 350°T at a speed of 10 knots, a loss of three knots since last night's attack so we must have put one fish in her. The night was far too bright for a surface approach and our chances of a successful submerged approach were better during daylight so we steadied down on the target's base course with the ship in plain sight astern and varied speed to keep it there. At times he would appear too close, making me feel that we should increase speed, but a check on the range by radar would place the target at the

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 18. No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 21 (Cont.)

usual 12,000 yards, then we'd settle down again and wait for dawn. About a half hour before sunrise the sky clouded up and rain squalls filled the area but it was too late for a surface approach.

0606 (M) Reversed course and dived with the light growing bright in the east. Ran up periscope and found that we were in the middle of a rain squall - a few bad moments where had no target in sight but at

0614 (M) Target was sighted coming out of the rain and following the same zig-zag plan with one escort on the port quarter and we on the port bow. With an angle on the bow of zero, range 3,000 yards, we were headed across his track and waiting for a forty degree zig which was due 2 minutes later. At 2 minutes plus I raised the periscope and there he was on the new course. All we needed was a final bearing check and at

0702 (M) Fired at a range of 800 yards, track angle eighty port. (Attack #2) Fired the first three at eight-second intervals. Just after firing the third torpedo a terrific explosion rocked the boat and the target was completely blocked out by a rising wall of water. My first impression was that this was a premature which had exploded about three hundred yards off our bow but I later decided that it could have been an aerial bomb. Although I had seen no planes it was reasonable to expect that he have an air escort, especially after his experience of the night before. The fourth torpedo was not fired until after the column of water had subsided. Dug the periscope to locate the port screen. Heard two more explosions. His escort was

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 18, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 21 (Cont.)

sighted at 300 yards, angle on the bow zero. Took a last look at the target as we started down; she was listing to the port and enveloped in a blue, smokey haze. Went deep. Three popped valves stuck open and the torpedo room had about six inches of water over the deck plates by the time the emergency stops were closed. The first barrage of depth charges were well astern and we all breathed a sigh of relief but this was wasted breath - the second attack was too close and beautifully laid. This was the worst the POLLACK has ever experienced but there was no apparent damage other than the usual flying of paint chips and pushing in of cables. Both escorts were again in on the deal and they milled around for over an hour without dropping any more charges before we left them astern. We pumped the bilges, reloaded, and returned to periscope depth at 1015 (M) with nothing in sight. There had been little or no sleeping the night before and as we were all pretty shaken up by the depth charging went to 100 feet on a NW course and took in the slack. The target must have had three and possibly four torpedoes in her and if not actually sunk she was very badly damaged.

1915 (M) Surfaced on course 315°T.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Date and Time:	3-20-43	1729 (M)
Position:	3-58.5N	172-09.3E
Course:	330	
Speed:	13 knots	

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 18, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Description: Kenyo Maru Class Freighter
lightly loaded. Zig-zagging
Speed made good - 10 knots.
"Catcher" type patrol boat.
Escorting Kenyo Maru.

Date and Time: 3-20-43 2113(M)
Position: 4-10.5N 172-02E
Course: 330
Speed: 10 knots
Description: Kenyo Maru and escorts.
Still zig-zagging.

U.S.S. Surfiah

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See III, Case 3, C-6.

No. C-5

March 19

0519 (I) Dived.
1119 Surfaced. Nothing seen.

March 20

0438 (I) Dived.
1044 Sighted type 97 H patrol plane,
10 miles, course 000T.
1848 Surfaced.

March 21

0500 (I) Dived. Visibility poor; rough seas,
rain, and low lying fog patches.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 18, No. C-5 (Cont.)

March 21 (Cont.)

0628 Sighted mast and stack of unidentified ship bearing 018 T, course notherly. Commenced approach.
0715 Ship disappeared in fog.
0726 Surfaced and ran toward last bearing. At 8,000 yards sighted patrol vessel or trawler. Rough seas precluded use of deck gun and vessel too small for torpedo so headed east as trawler disappeared in rain squall.

March 22

0100 (I) Entered Marcus 500 mile circle.

No. C-6

Description of contacts

Number: 24
Time and Date: 0628(I) March 21
Position: Lat. 29-39N Long. 141-46E
Course: North
Speed: 10
Description: Small tug or trawler, single stack. Diesel driven. May have been patrol vessel. Gray. One stick mast.
Remarks: Disappeared in rain squall at 6000 yards.

U.S.S. Sawfish

First War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Reception of NFM Fox Schedule was good on all allotted frequencies except the low frequency 26.1 kcs.

ORIGINAL
27 November 1945

Case 16. No. C-7 (Cont.)

At the particular time considerable fading out was encountered. All schedules were received intact. Last Serial received was 29.

No. C-8

March 19

0533 (J) Submerged during twilight and surfaced at 0634.

March 20

0512 (J) Submerged during twilight and surfaced at 0608.

1216 (J) Sighted patrol vessel bearing 110°T, distance about 10,000 yards. Closed range at 18 knots. Enemy saw us and changed course to cross our bow. We changed course to 045°, but the seas, which were very heavy on our beam. Enemy, who had speed at least equal to ours, continued to cross bow and eventually obtained weather gauge during engagement.

1227 (J) Opened fire with 3" gun, enemy replied with gun about 4 pounder and turned towards us, range about 5000 yards. As range was reduced, we opened fire with 20mm and .50 caliber, making innumerable hits with both. In the face of this the enemy turned to get on our stern presenting his broadside which we raked with small calibers at range of 1500 yards, but were unable at this close range to hit with the 3" due to the seas, which were so large that the enemy at times entirely disappeared from sight

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 18, No. C-8 (Cont.)

March 20 (Cont.)

of the 3" gun crew. 20mm and .50 caliber kept up effective fire, twice cleaning out enemy's gun crew and twice knocking over a machine gunner who was firing a machine gun from the top of the pilot house. The machine gunner was not accurate, we could hear the bullets passing overhead but have found no evidence of being hit. With the enemy on my quarter, I had to fish-tail to bring him to bear, first to starboard, then to port, since the seas prevented me from turning sufficiently to bring him abeam.

1250 (J) Obtained three 3" hits in rapid succession, one forward, one aft, and one in pilot house. They seemed to do little damage, as the enemy maintained his speed.

1255 (J) Enemy broke off engagement and retired at full speed towards northwest. We turned but could not chase him in seas. We twice almost lost our gun crew overboard, the sea picking them from their stations and piling them up against the life lines. The gunnery officer, Lieut. Clarke, actually went between the life lines, but saved himself by grabbing the lower one with both hands. His left hand was torn from the wire by the weight of the water and his class ring stripped from his finger. He managed to hold on with his right until danger was past. At the commencement of the engagement, the patrol vessel sent out three long dashes on 500 Kcs, evidently a submarine warning signal.

1311 (J) Sighted plane to westward, distance 8 miles, closing. Cleared decks and submerged to 150 feet. If this plane came in response to the signal, it would

ORIGINAL

29 November 1943

Case 18, No. C-8 (Cont.)

March 20 (Cont.)

indicate a very alert crew, since the patrol vessel only sent out one warning to my knowledge. Patrol vessel was about 150 feet long, of about 300 tons, built on sampans lines with steel hull. He was capable of making at least 18 knots, since we could not close him at that speed.

No. C-9

Description of contacts

Number:	25	
Time and Date:	1227	March 20
Position:	33-00	152-30
Course:	000	
Speed:	10	
Description:	Patrol Boat (See attack #6)	

D - Verifications

No. D-1

FROM:	((Base Force #6-Jaluit)	21/0759 March
TO:		Serial 771
INFO:	((22nd Airflot)	

"At 0400/21, the Okitsu Maru again received a torpedo attack by an enemy submarine (3 fish). Position 05-40N, 171-08E. No damage. An attack with depth charges was carried out (4 ash cans) results unknown."

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 18 (Cont.)

No. D-2

FROM: (6th Base
Force)(B)
TO:
INFO: (22nd Air Flot)(B)

"At 0400/21 March in posit 05-44N, 171-08E, the Okitsu Maru was attacked by an enemy submarine which fired 3 fish. However, no damage was sustained. Dropped 4 depth charges. Results indeterminate."

Case 19

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base Force (B) 17/0720 March
TO:

INFO: (Aircraft works at
Yokosuka)
(CofS Kure Naval
District)
(Combined Fleet)

(X57267 unident unit) will depart RR (Rabaul)
at 1500/17th. Scheduled to arrive NAA (Yokosuka)
at 1200/27th. Noon posits from the 19th to the
27th will be as follows: (all north and east)

19th 1-18 146- (—)
20th 4-16 141-28
21st 7-15 139-55
22nd 11-22 136-45

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 19, No. A-1 (Cont.)

23rd	16-00	136-37
24th	20-38	136-30
25th	25-18	136-18
26th	29-53	136-08
27th	34-16	136-30

B - Operational Dispatch

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPTING
NFM FOX
INFO: - - -

20/0650 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUEPAC SERIAL 13 IS ULTRA FOR FINBACK X
AT 3 HOURS GCT MARCH 20 X 1 MAPLE X 04-16
NORTH 141-28 EAST ALCARORA 07-15 NORTH 139-55
EAST 11-22 NORTH 139-45 EAST

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Finback

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 9, C-1.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 19 (Cont.)

No. C-2

March 20

At
2145 (I) Reversed course to patrol across
Rabaul to

March 21

0930 (I) Conducting surface patrol along Rabaul
to Empire lane. At
1040 (I) sighted large steamer on J2 periscope
at 17,000 yards coming out of rain
squall. Dived and commenced approach.
Target was making radical zigz at high
speed. At 2,000 yards, target gave us
a zero angle on bow, forcing the use
of our stern tubes which contained
MARK XV TORPEDOES with small heads.
1122 (I) (Attack #1) (Contact #11) Fired three
torpedo spread, first torpedo 30° right
gyro, 120° starboard track, range 700
yards. Spread used 7°, depth setting 8
feet. Result - two hits. Target
tentatively identified as KIKI MARU,
9,310 tons, Page 44 of C.N.I. 208-J.
First torpedo observed to hit about 20
feet inside of stern. Second hit
definitely identified as torpedo ex-
plosion but not observed due to peri-
scope being awash. Sound tracked third-
torpedo astern of target. Swung left and
made two tubes ready forward. Target
pulled away turning stern toward us. De-
cided not to waste any torpedoes on 180°
track with a fast target. At range of
3,500 yards target has slowed perceptibly.
Went ahead 6 knots for six minutes
hoping to close for another shot. Range
began to open slowly as target repaired
damage and built up speed. Target ap-
peared to be used as Naval Auxiliary.
Numerous personnel topside in whites.
Believed to be flying a Jap Ensign.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 19, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 21 (Cont.)

- 1147 (I) Reloaded aft and checked two torpedoes forward preparatory to starting surface chase in hope we had slowed him down.
- 1247 (I) Surfaced and started surface chase. Target appeared to be down by the stern and slowed down.
- 1301 (I) With target on our starboard beam and barely visible, the target commenced challenging us with a large searchlight sending KING and four dashes. He had apparently picked up our fairwater against the horizon provided by the setting sun.
- 2000 (I) Abandoned chase after crossing his track line at expected intersection point and proceeding for one-half hour. Our speed differential of about four knots would have been reduced to two on his discovering us if he stopped zigzagging. He could have made Yap Island which was now 37 miles distant. Set course to get on Saipan - Palau Lane.

No. C-3

Contact Report

Number:	11
Date:	3-21-43
Position:	L 07° - 40'N / 139° - 43'E
Type:	Freighter-Passenger similar to Kinka Maru
	9,310 tons
Range Sighted:	17,000
Closest:	600'
Course:	315°
Speed:	18 knots
Remarks:	Damaged with two hits seemed to be used as Naval Auxiliary

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 20

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (CofS Yokosuka 19/0955 March
Naval District)
TO:
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(garbled)

_____ departed Yokosuka for Marcus Island
at 0900 on 19th. Will pass through following
noon positions.

20th 32-(--)N, 142-40E.
21st 30-50N, 145-30E.
22nd 28-45N, 143-15E.
23rd 26-40N, 150-55E.
24th 24-35N, 153-30E.

NSS COMMENT: Dates, except 19th, are supplied
by translator.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: NPM 21-0032 March
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

WE USE GREENWICH CIVIL TIME IN THIS ULTRA
FROM COMSUBPAC SERIAL FOURTEEN X ONE TYPE
UNKNOWN AT THREE HOURS 21ST 30-50 NORTH
145-30 EAST ALGAROA 26-45 NORTH 148-15
EAST 26-40 NORTH 150-55 EAST X SUNFISH
MAY BE IN POSITION TO USE THIS

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 20 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sunfish

Second War Patrol

No. C-1.

• Radio Reception: See III, Case 3, C-6.

No. C-2

March 21

0500 (I) Dived. Visibility poor; rough seas, rain, and low lying fog patches.
0628 Sighted mast and stack of unidentified ship bearing 018T, course northerly. Commenced approach.
0715 Ship disappeared in fog.
0726 Surfaced and ran toward last bearing. At 8,000 yards sighted patrol vessel or trawler. Rough seas precluded use of deck gun and vessel too small for torpedo so headed east as trawler disappeared in rain squall.

March 22

0100 (I) Entered Marcus 500 miles circle.

March 24

0702 (I) Sighted mast. Dived and commenced approach. At 3,000 yards identified as a large sampan with built up stern, gun mounted aft, two masts, foremast taller, with crow's nest. Pilot house aft of amidships. Vessel was patrolling north and south, across SUNFISH track, at 5-10 knots. Her armament too imposing for gun attack, so opened out and surfaced at 1239.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 20, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 24

1329 Sighted mast bearing 105 T. Dived and commenced approach. Identified as same vessel or identical to above. Believe SUNFISH sighted. Did not attack. (380 miles bearing 019 T. from Marcus)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No.	24
Time	0628 (I)
Date	Mar. 21
Position	Lat. 29-39N - Long. 141-46E
Course	North
Speed	10
Description	Small tug or trawler, single stack. Diesel driven. May have been patrol vessel. Gray. One stick mast.
Remarks	Disappeared in rain squall at 8,000 yards.
No.	25
Time	0702 (K)
Date	Mar. 24
Position	Lat. 30-31N - Long. 156-20E
Course	090-270
Speed	Various-----5-15
Description	Large sampan type patrol vessel. Raked bow, pilot house aft of amidships. Built up poop; counter stern; 2 single masts with crow's nest for'd. For'd mast higher. Lgth. 150 ft. 3" gun aft on built up poop.
Remarks	Patrolled East and West along return track.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 21

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Resident Naval
Officer-Moji)

TO:

INFO:

(Bako Commandant)
(Transportation Office or
Resident Nav. Officer South
China Area)
(Chief of Staff Naval Station)
(Chicago Maru)

3 Army cargo ships _____ departed Moji for
Manila at 1800 on the 19th, speed 10.5 knots.
Will arrive at 1000 on 2050 _____

Will pass through following
noon ? positions.

21st NI 1506 ..
22nd 20-30 North, 126-00E.
23rd 20-00 North, 123-00E.
24th 16-44 North, 119-44E.

NSS COMMENT: Position on 21st is in special
grid. Believe that longitude
for 23rd should be 122 but we
are unable to make anything
but 123 out of the code group
08067 used here.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOR
PREC: OP

21/0557 March

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 21, No. B-1 (Cont.)

FOR INFORMATION OF KINGFISH X ULTRA SERIAL
15 FROM COMSUBPAC X 3 BIRCHES POSSIBLY ARMY
SUPPLY SHIPS MAKING 10½ KNOTS WILL PASS
THROUGH 20-30 NORTH 126-00 EAST ON MARCH
22ND AND 20 NORTH 123 EAST FOLLOWING DAY
X TIME OF DAY PASSING THESE POINTS UNKNOWN
BUT POSSIBLY 3 HOURS OCT

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Kingfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 3, C-4.

No. C-2

March 21

Visibility decreased to 1200 yards
due to rain squalls, closed target
and at 0000 H fired three torpedoes
at range of 800 yards, 130° port
track, depth setting of 8 feet.
Divergent spread 0° - 2° - 3° F.
First torpedo passed under bow of
target, second torpedo passed ahead,
third torpedo passed under after
part of ship. No explosions three
missed. Opened out from target for
another approach.

0005

Two torpedo explosions. Target course
was checked as we crossed his stern.
and checked on with TDC.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 21, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0006 Targets reversed course speeded up to 12 knots and began to throw depth charges from depth charge throwers on after well deck, and appeared to fire a gun once. At this time he was joined by a patrol boat which had evidently been trailing him. Visibility about 3000 yards. Nine depth charges were dropped within the next 15 minutes. Discontinued approach and lost target on Radar. Target was about 4000 tons with 2 stick masts, one stack, and well deck forward and aft, composite superstructure. Estimated draft 12 feet, sea moderate to rough.

0500 (H) Submerged about 15 miles north of HOKA SHO.

1013 (H) Sighted patrol vessel of about 800 tons, shallow draft, distance 5 miles heading north.

1216 (H) Sighted smoke bearing 1400T distance 6 miles. Identified as patrol vessel of about 1000 tons followed by 10 sampans ranging in size from 25 - 200 tons. All on course north. Unable to close range on patrol vessel under 4000 yards.

1712 (H) Sighted what appeared to be the same two patrol vessels standing back towards HOKA SHO. During next 10 minutes seven depth charges were heard.

1856 (H) Surfaced and opened out to eastward to patrol across traffic lane north coast of HOKA SHO. All traffic both north and southbound seems to make a landfall on HOKA SHO Light.

ORIGINAL

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Case 21, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 22

- Submerged patrol along traffic lane north and east of FORMOSA.
- 1625 (H) Sighted 3 trawlers of about 200 tons with what appeared to be machine guns mounted on pilot house. Estimated speed 12 knots. They searched about in our area for about one hour and then disappeared to the south.
- 1900 Surfaced and stood over to patrol in vicinity of transport sinking.

March 23

- 0300 (H) Sighted ship bearing 150°T, distance 5000 yards, angle on bow 90° starboard. Appears to be a destroyer. Manned battle stations with intentions of gaining position ahead for a dawn attack.
- 0325 (H) Everything was working nicely and we were gaining position ahead when target apparently saw or heard us and headed for us at 16 knots. Opened out on target very slowly at flank speed. At 0345 target trained searchlight on us at range of about 5500 yards at which time we dove. Did not attempt a shot at target as visibility was too poor to stay at periscope depth and try an approach against a high speed zig-zagging target that had sighted us before we dove. Submerged to 250 feet, rigged for depth charge attack and ran silent changing course frequently. Thought we were evading successfully but at 0448 (H) commenced the first of eight run during which the enemy dropped 40 depth charges. All except the last ones at 1228 (H) were close and were estimated at 2-150 yards.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 21, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0752 (H) Heard screws of another vessel joining in the hunt. We ran silently as possible at 300 feet in 350 feet of water making anywhere from 40-60 turns but our adversary seemed to have no trouble staying on us with both listening and pinging, several times after daylight we started up for a torpedo shot, but as soon as we would reach 200 feet he would start another run. Up until 1225 (H) we had escaped serious damage but at 1227 (H) on his last run he dropped two charges over the engine room at an estimated distance of 25-50 feet. These bulged in the hull over the engine rooms about 4 inches and bottomed us in 350 feet of water. Water commenced coming thru the engine hull flappers where their seats had been sprung. Rigged chain falls on these and stopped leaks. Silenced ship completely and waited for dark. Destroyed ECM and rendered TDC inoperative. JK - QC sound heads apparently knocked out of line by depth charging. Unable to lower QB sound head before bottoming and after surfacing. Unable to train either sound head.
- 1700 (H) Same screws heard for about 15-30 minutes.
- 1830 (H) Manned battle stations and completed plans for scuttling ship in case escape seemed impossible.
- 1843 (H) Surfaced and sighted patrol vessel of about 1000 tons lying to about 2000 yards on our starboard bow. Cleared area at flank speed on 4 engines.
- 2000 (H) Started battery charge on one engine. Night is dark and sea is rough. By
- 2200 (H) the engine induction and bilges were dry and we were able to dive. Depth charging and damage incurred covered under A/S measures.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Date & Time	1625 (H) - 22 Mar.
Location	Twenty miles N.E. of HOKO SEO
Type	Trawlers - Three (3)
Initial Range	8,000
Est. Course	Var.
Est. Speed	12
Description	About 200 tons with machine guns on bridge.
Date & Time	0300 (H) - 23 Mar.
Location	1-26-20-N - Long 121-55 E
Type	AM or DD
Initial Range	5,000
Est. Course	270°
Description	Either a mine layer or a destroyer on patrol. The most tenacious and persistent JAP we have ever encountered.

Case 22

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

18/1102 March

Army cargo vessel _____
Takao at 1200 March 18th?

departs
for PP

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 22, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Palau) arriving 1200 the 23rd,
speed 12. Noon positions:

19-123 (approximately)

16-126

13-129

10-132

Army cargo vessel _____ (garbled)
departs Takao 0900 on 19th, for Palao ar-
riving 1100 24th, speed 11 knots. Noon
positions.

19-123

16-126

13-129

10-_____

COMMENT: Final longitude omitted in text,
probably 132 degrees. All positions
presumed north and east. Not
designated in text.

No. A-2

FROM:

21/0928 March

TO:

INFO:

Army cargo ship _____ departs Takao
at 1800 the 21st for Palao arriving 1000 the
26th, speed 11.5 knots.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 22. No. A-2 (Cont.)

Noon posits:

19 North,	123 East.
16 North,	126 East.
13 North,	129-30 East.
09-30 North,	132-35 East.

_____ additives follows in
which places other ships are probably listed
but "1300 the 21st" and "28th of March ?
' are mentioned).

Noon posits:

19 North,	123 (?) East.
16-30 North,	127 East.
13-30 North,	131 East.
10-30 North,	135 East.
07 North,	138 East.
01 North,	147 East (or 143 East).
3 ? 30 ? South,	151 East.

_____ Maru departs Rabaul at 1300 the 21st for
Palao arriving _____ time, 28th, speed 8 knots
rest _____.

COMMENT: Work continues on this.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: FINEBACK
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
22/1810 March

THIS GOES ULTRA IN A HURRY FOR FINEBACK & ALL
TIMES GOT A EVIDENCE MOVEMENTS ARMY FREIGHTERS
FROM TAKAO TO PALAO & FIRST ONE MOVING 12 KNOTS
DUE PALAO 3 HOURS 23 & AT SAME TIME ON 22ND BE

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 22. No. B-1 (Cont.)

PASSED THROUGH 10 NORTH 132 EAST X ANOTHER
ONE MAKING 11 KNOTS DUE 2 HOURS ON 24TH
PASSES THROUGH 10 NORTH 129 EAST AT 3
HOURS 23 RD X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 19 X MORE
DOPE ON TONIGHTS SEEDS

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX

23/0530 March

PREC: PRIORITY

MORE DOPE FOR FINBACK ULTRA USING GGT TLE
X ANOTHER ARMY FREIGHTER LEFT TAILO AT 9
HOURS 21ST AND DUE PALAO 1 HOUR 26TH NOON
POSIT 23RD FIRE (16 N 126 E) ALGAROBA KILL
0030 (13-00 N 129-30 E) CBDZ 3035 (9-30 N
132-35 E) X FOR WHALE LOOKS LIKE YOU HAVE
BEEN BUSY BUT IF YOUR AREA STILL APPEARS
UNPROFITABLE AND FUEL REMAINING PERMITS
WE CAN MOVE YOU DOWN TO AREA VACATED BY
TRIGGER X NOT NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REPLY
UNLESS YOU CONSIDER IT ADVISABLE TO MOVE
X SUBPAC SERIAL 21

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Finback

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 9, C-1.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 22 (Cont.)

No. C-2

March 22

Patrolling submerged about five miles off entrances to Malakal Harbor. Saw one small fishing sampan during day. On surfacing proceeded to round Babelthaup Island to northward via Ngaruangi Passage to patrol off Toagel Mlungui (West Channel) tomorrow.

March 24

Patrolling submerged off Toagel Mlungui. At daylight discovered we were five miles south of our expected line of patrol which was the approach line to Toagel Mlungui. At

- 0635 (I) (Contact #12) sighted two funnel steamer similar to Taizan Maru, 3930 tons, page 20 of O.N.I. 208-J, at range of 16,000 yards, angle on bow 90° starboard. Started approach. Closest range 12,000 yards. Ship had air escort.
- 0745 (I) Sighted trawler type patrol boat coming out of channel as target entered channel.
- 0910 (I) Heard pinging and sighted two more small patrol vessels to northward searching along entrance approach line. Closed approach line as patrol vessels drew aft. This was a new type of patrol vessel which seemed about the size of our old subchasers. The trawler was pinging on 18 kcs and the patrol boats on 19½ kcs. The trawler circled us at about 8-10,000 yards for remainder of day.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 22 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Date	3-24-43
Position	L-7°-42' (N) 1-134-12' (E)
Type	Freighter sim. to TAICUI MARU 3930 tons
Range sighted	16,000
Closast	12,000
Course	120°
Speed	14
Remarks	Had air escort

Case 23

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	-	24/1400 March
TO:	---	Serial 093
	(Tokyo Transect)	
	(CofS Kure)	
	(Palao Transect)	
	(Osaka Transect)	
	(Kure Transect)	

Kunishima Maru arrived Anguar at 1230 on
24th. Will depart 0800 26th.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM:	COMSUBPAC	24/1910 March
TO:	ALL SUBS COPYING FOX	
PREC:	OPERATIONAL PRIORITY	

1 BEECH ABOUT 4,000 TONS NOW LOADING AT ANGUAR

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 23, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ISLAND AND IS SCHEDULED DEPART AT 23 HOURS
GCT 25TH X DESTINATION UNKNOWN X THIS ULTRA
FOR FINBACK IS COMSUBPAC SERIAL 24

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Finback

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 9, C-1.

No. C-2

March 24

- 1645 (I) Sighted smoke inside reef to right of channel entrance.
- 1710 (I) Came to normal approach course on leading vessel of five. (Contact #15) Ship convoy as his masts gave us angle on bow of 60° starboard, range 18,000 yards as they all turned south to course 185°T. No escorts except air sighted but supersonic pinging was heard on the bearing of the last steamer. Commenced trailing submerged.
- 1921 (I) Surfaced and commenced chase.
- 2023 (I) Picked up convoy on SJ Radar at 17,000 yards. Decided to trail to determine enemy track on rounding Anguar Island.
- 2150 (I) While 13,000 yards astern of nearest radar target, we were challenged by searchlight. Dived in order to convince escort his contact was doubtful. Apparently a stern escort had dropped aft of the convoy and thought he saw us in the improving light due to moonrise. Heard two distant depth charges on submerging and supersonic ranging. Original surmise proved correct as he soon rejoined convoy.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Casa 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2313 (I) Surfaced after giving convoy time to be well out of visibility range.

March 25

0023 (I) Regained sight contact on smoke of convoy at estimated range of 23,000 yards. No ships sighted off Anguar Island which was passed at 6 miles in bright moonlight.

0126 (I) Discovered convoy was rounding Anguar Island and taking easterly course. Continued to trail to determine convoy's course and speed after rounding Anguar Island. Hoped to get targets in open sea and emulate the WAHOO.

0511 (I) Made trim dive and allowed convoy to open out to daytime visibility range.

0730 (I) Started rounding convoy for attack position at four engine speed. Convoy's course was 100°T, and speed of advance 8.5 knots. Convoy was zig-zagging.

1313 (I) In position ahead of convoy.

1330 (I) Reestablished contact and started closing in for attack.

1426 (I) (Contact #16) Dived and commenced submerged approach which netted the FIN-BACK good experience, but no hits. The convoy formation (see attached diagram) consisted of three columns in a line with an escort on outboard bow of leading ship in the outer columns. The outer columns consisted of two ships each, while the center column consisted of one lagging the convoy. Three different sets of supersonic ranging equipment were heard, but no escorts were sighted until the range had closed to 5,000 yards. In view of this, it was decided to attack from the starboard flank as the convoy was maintaining a

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

constant helm zig-zag plan. These two ships were the largest in the convoy. The leading ship was tentatively identified as the TOTTORI MARU, 5,973 tons, and the second as the TAIBUN MARU, 6,581 tons, pages 2-5 respectively of ONI 208-J. About two minutes before reaching the firing point, sound reported that the star-board escort was close and had a definite supersonic contact on us. Discovered we were dead ahead of escort at 900 yards. On raising periscope to look at target found he had swung right giving us a distance to track of 300 yards. Only paint was visible in high power. Swung hard right in hope of getting a 120° track on second ship in column. Sound then gave bearing on escort indicating he was passing. Found escort with 90° angle on bow, range 600 yards. At this point, the diving officer lost depth control. When able to see again, found all target opening range with 160° to 180° angles on bow at 1,500 yards range. Could have fired with this unfavorable set-up but decided against it because of small chance of hitting and probably loss of contact with convoy if held down by escorts.

1910 (I) Surfaced and resumed chase. Ran at four engine speed to get position ahead. Sky became overcast, with moon providing enough light to prevent making radar approach and too little light for periscope approach. Did not feel Radar approach submerged would be practicable due to formation of ships, zig-zagging of targets, and no help from periscope. Decided to track from ahead until daylight. This decision was based on the fact that we wanted to get more than one ship out of the convoy.

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

March 26

- At daylight the sea had become oily smooth making an undetected periscope approach on this convoy impossible. Decided to track from ahead until more favorable conditions existed. Smoke was kept in sight during morning.
- 1215 (I) Sent message to ComSubPac reporting our position and situation.
- 1316 (I) Ran into a rain squall with strong wind and good seas. Decided to close convoy in rain squall and attack.
- 1347 (I) Dived at an estimated range of eight miles in order to prevent convoy suddenly catching us on coming out of rain squall.
- 1443 (I) Picked up smoke of convoy which had apparently slowed down some during day. In view of yesterday's experience placed ship on convoy axis and headed down the middle. We were able to check the convoy's zig-zag plan exactly. The convoy was zigging 40° either side of the base course with 4 minute legs. At 3,000 yards the escorts were abaft our beam. The set up looked perfect. We swung left to fire bow tubes at the left hand column. At exactly this time (1700) the convoy changed course to 150°T, and the closest range seen on any target afterwards was 3,000 yards. It was not realized at first why the targets had failed to zig back as previously tracked. Again we had been done out of a good shot, but due to an unusual coincidence.
- 1849 (I) Surfaced and resumed chase. Planned to conduct surface radar approach before moonrise. It would be nip and tuck as to whether we could get to a firing position ahead of moonrise. Moonrise expected at 2157.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 2021 (I) Slowed to convoy speed at distance of 10,000 yards on their starboard beam to check convoy disposition and locate escorts.
- 2101 (I) Speeded up to get in attack position on bow.
- 2130 (I) Commenced closing convoy on battery at ten knots with forward group flooded down. Approached on a constant bearing from 8,000 yards with targets angle on the bow of 56° starboard. This made us present a 45° port angle on bow. We were forced into presenting other than bow on appearance in order to attack before moonrise. Visual contact with the targets was maintained at all times. The leading escort was sighted at 6,400 yards. The exact formation was held to determine if the two nearest and largest ships were in column and ahead of the other in bearing. Picked these for our attack. A flashing light was seen momentarily on the second ship.
- 2141 (I) When 4,400 yards from the track the moon came over the horizon much to the Commanding Officer's surprise and the Navigator's chagrin. Continued in with a nice red ball rising. Here luck favored us and the moon ducked under a cloud. Escort still held course though quartermaster on watch believed she was exchanging signals with convoy with shielded lights whose loom was seen.
- 2145 (I) When distance to track was 1,900 yards, escort commenced challenging with white light and turning toward us. He then turned on in rapid succession one red light, two vertical red lights, and one red light. On first light we swung left to fire.

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 2146 (I) (Attack #2 & #3) First and three torpedoes at second ship, fired spread of three torpedoes. Blew forward group after firing first three and ordered flank speed. The target ships began firing their guns while we were still firing the torpedoes. A red flash followed by a black puff of smoke rising 100 feet in the air was seen on the second ship. At this time while the Commanding Officer was concentrating on the Pelorus bearings, the Executive Officer reported a shell splash 100 yards ahead and the Quartermaster remarked. "They have the deflection, but not the range." Dived as gunfire became more accurate. The soundman heard three torpedo explosions as did people below decks. The TDC and radar setup checked perfectly prior to and during firing. From the times of the explosions and watching the tracks of the torpedoes it is believed that the first torpedo hit the leading target and two torpedoes in the second spread hit the second target. These are believed to be the same two ships previously seen in the right hand column. Sounds of ships breaking up were heard prior to depth charge attack.
- 2154 (I) Following picking up supersonic pinging and screws in sound gear received first depth charge attack consisting of pattern of five fairly close.
- 2158 (I) Received pattern of three closer. Continued to hear pinging and faint screws. Believed escort had lost us. Looked like we could come up. This was the normal depth charging we had expected.

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Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 2228 (I) Received pattern of three depth charges. Closer this time. After torpedo room reported water coming in. The torpedo tubes outboard vent had jarred open and inboard vents were open. This attack had been made by one of the vessels who ran silent and was directed on by the pinging vessel. From now on the attacking vessels stayed right on us and proceeded with best sound school doctrine.
- 2304 (I) Received five charges which really jarred us. Charges seemed to be set deeper. Conning tower hatch was lifted off seat permitting small leakage. After torpedo room reported Hot Run in #7 tube which proved to be the jarring open of the water filling valve on the firing valve. This allowed about 50 pounds of impulse air to escape before the filling valve was secured. Quick action in closing this valve prevented lifting of the firing valve which would have actually given us a "Hot Run." Valve wheels and wrenches flew in all directions. Gyro Azimuth motor commenced smoking forcing securing of follow-up system.
- 2335 (I) Received four depth charges. Not as close as fourth attack, but still too close for comfort. Continued to hear pinging and screws.

March 27

- 0030 (I) Lost sound contact indicating that escorts must have rejoined convoy which we assumed had completed picking up survivors and clearing area. After our experience of losing the escorts following the second depth charge attack, decided to take our time in going to shallower depth with such efficient opponents.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0135 (I) Came to periscope depth and sighted nothing. Reloaded torpedo tubes forward, pumped bilges and checked trim, drained down after torpedo tubes, and repaired SJ Radar. SJ Radar slip rings were salted by seepage during attacks.
- 0200 (I) Surfaced and resumed chase at full speed. Noticed strong smell of gun powder.
- 0930 (I) When we estimated we had passed convoys position by one hour, commences a re-tiring search on each flank. Visibility was excellent.
- 1700 (I) Cleared message to ComSubPac reporting lost contact.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

<u>15</u>	
Date	3-24-43
Position	7°-33' (N) 134°-25' (E)
Type	Five Freighters - old, well deck, two masts, one stack, 5,500 to 6,500 tons.
Range Sighted	18,000
Closest	12,000
Course	260° c/c to 135°
Speed	9
Remarks	Chased for two days - two damaged or sunk.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 24

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Yokosuka Naval
District CCPE)
TO: (2nd Escort Force)
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(4th Base Force - Truk)
(5th Base Force - Saipan)

" will depart NAA (?) (Yokosuka) for
PT (Truk) at 1800/21.

NOON POSITS

March 22 - 32-25N, 142-30E.
March 23 - 29-20N, 144-25E.
March 24 - 25-05N, 146-50E.
March 25 - 22-55N, 147-20E.
March 26 - 19-45N, 148-50E.
March 27 - 16-40N, 150-10E.
March 28 - 13-20N, 151-35E.
March 29 - 10-15N, 152-55E.

Scheduled to pass "A" point at 0400 and "B"
point at 1200/30th".

No. A-2

FROM: (Chief of Staff
Yokosuka Naval
District)
TO:
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(4th Base Force - Truk)

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29 November 1945

Case 2L, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"(1) The #2 _____ Maru departed NAA (Yokosuka for PT (Truk) at 1230/22nd.

NOON POSITS (23rd to 30)

32-40N, 142-20E.
29-30N, 144-20E.
26-15N, 145-55E.
23- N, 147-35E.
19-40N, 149-05E.
16-20N, 150-40E.
13-10N, 152-10E.
10- N, 153-05E.

(2) Scheduled to pass through point "A" at _____ on 30th and through _____ at 1200 hours 31st".

GI COMMENT: HSS version gives (HSS 230200 March) NAA as Yokosuka on basis of traveling distances.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 17
TO: ALL SUBMARINES
COPYING FOR NPI
INFO: CINCPAC

24/0359 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOLLOWING GOES ULTRA FOR BOTH WHALE AND TUNNY
X ONE TYPE UNKNOWN X BLACK X BLACK X MINUS 900
X PLUS 11 X (19-45 N 148-50 E) ALGAROSA (16-40
N 150-10 E) X (13-20 N 151-35 E) X (10-15 N
152-51 E) ANOTHER TYPE UNKNOWN BLACK BLACK
MINUS 900 PLUS 12 (19-40 N 149-05 E) X (16-20
N 150-40 E) X (13-10 N 152-10 E) X (10-00 N
153-05 E)

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 24 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 27, C-4.

No. C-2

See III, Case 27, C-5, C-6.

U.S.S. Whale

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: We copied on 4415, 8230, and 12345 kcs, with good results, excepting for about an hour starting at 1700 GCT, when reception was only fair.

No. C-4

March 25

0541 Dove. Patrolled submerged Empire-Truk routes.
1840 (K) Surfaced.
0958 (K) Sighted smoke of vessel, later made out as a small freighter. Began approach.
1122 (K) Broke off submerged approach; distance to track too great. Trailed until:
1450 (K) Surfaced and gave chase tracked target by smoke during the remaining daylight hours on "end around".
2215 (K) Worked ahead of target and dove. Moon rising. Fairly good visibility. Took last radar range at 4000 yards, then shifted to sound ranges.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

2308 (X) Fired two stern torpedoes; no explosions. Set up was as follows: 1300 Yard firing range, 92° port track, 20° left gyro angle with a spread of 3½° between torpedoes to give a linear spread of 230 feet at the target. Sound tracked the torpedoes to the target. The T.D.C. had checked perfectly. Depth setting was 12 feet. Either one or both of the torpedoes should have hit. The torpedo wakes apparently were undetected as the target did not maneuver at all. One torpedo exploded at the end of its run, 5 minutes, 56 seconds (high power).

March 27

0014 (X) Surfaced; began second end-around run.
0513 (X) Submerged, gained position ahead of target and closing on opposite course.
0606 (X) Fired spread of three torpedoes, bow tubes. All missed. It is impossible to understand how these torpedoes could have missed unless they ran deep, as experienced in the last patrol. A 4° divergent spread was used to give a linear spread of 180 feet between torpedoes at this target, range 900 yards, practically zero gyro angle, 93° port track, depth setting 12 feet, estimated draft 16 feet. Continuous sound ranges were obtained with frequent periscope observations. The set-up was ideal and checked exactly "on" with the T.D.C. The target speed had been checked for a period of about ten hours by radar plot. About one minute after firing target turned left and commenced firing deck guns at periscope. We swung left for a stern shot and at:

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

0613 (X) Fired two stern torpedoes, spread $3\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ apart to give a linear spread of 245 feet of the target, set at 8 feet, 106° port track, sound range 1400 yards and gyro angles at about 37° left. Again both torpedoes were tracked to the target by sound with no results. As far as we can ascertain either the target's draft was greatly overestimated or the torpedoes ran deep or both. Target course remained steady during run of torpedoes. This target had the number 436 painted on her side.

0618 (X) Target zigged away at full power, smoking heavily. A total of seven torpedoes fired at a small freighter and no hits. The thought of the fuel expended on the long end-around runs, coupled with the loss of the torpedoes themselves, made "heart-breaking" but an inadequate euphemism. And yet, each firing had been preceded by a careful track and, except for the last two torpedoes, an undetected approach. Ranges and other data were accurate. While I had originally committed myself to the "torpedo worthiness" of the vessel, I refused to commit myself or my ship to fire one more torpedo at her - particularly since I could not hope to fire under better conditions than had previously prevailed. Secured from battle stations and devoutly requested the Lord that if He couldn't help the WHALE, please don't help the Jap!

1845 (X) Surfaced.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

March 28

- (KING) - Patrolled on the surface on two engines, on course 240, intending to cross to Saipan-Truk route.
- 0807 (K) Sighted smoke of small freighter bearing 227⁰T headed for Truk. Began end-around run on surface.
- 0930 (K) Sighted second ship at 14 miles range, on port quarter, apparently headed north towards the Empire. As a position had been reached slightly ahead of beam of 1st target, continued to work ahead of him leaving second target to continue, for the time being toward the Empire.
- 1145 (K) Dove. Went to battle stations.
- 1310 (K) Intended to fire a 3 torpedo 3¹/₂⁰ divergent spread, range 1250, 90⁰.
- 1314 (K) Track 10⁰ left gyro. Started to fire spread. While firing the target was observed to start a zig. Two torpedoes were fired before this was obvious. First torpedo had been fired to hit 2nd spread to go ahead and
- 1311-18 Fired third torpedo corrected for course and with spread angle 2⁰ right to allow for diminution of speed due to turn. All three missed, probably ahead. From a post firing analysis, it has been determined that these misses had been due to firing on the knuckle; it should have been known that a zig was due within 2 or 3 minutes. The fact that the target made a zig slightly early should have been anticipated, especially with a veteran control party. All hands concerned are hanging their heads over this attack. Due to our previous experience with the punctuality of Saipan's bombers arriving at our firing area, decided to continue submerged until dusk and then conduct an end-around on the target.
- 1345 (K) Surfaced. Began first leg of search curve for enemy.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 24. No. C-4 (Cont.)

March 29

- 0405 (X) Sighted target. Tracked and gained position ahead.
- 0508 (X) Lost contact in haze and rain squall.
- 0542 (X) Dove ahead of target on tracked base course.
- 0618 (X) Sighted target, commenced approach.
- 0740 (X) Distance to the track 10,000 yards. Target had changed base course to the left at sunrise during period of adverse visibility. Standard speed submerged was used but was insufficient to close target. Since insufficient fuel remained to allow another end-around run to gain position ahead of target, was forced to abandon any idea of pursuit. The disappointment here was tempered, however, by the fact that only one torpedo remained, and I had reason to hope that another, and perhaps larger target might be encountered on our return northward along the Empire-Truk route.
- 1831 (X) Surfaced. Headed north, course 340 along Truk-Empire routes. These attacks just about cured us of attacking any small freighters with following characteristics: Rake bow. Heavy mast forward and aft, length approximately 200 to 300 feet. Small mast on coal post forward of pilot house, composite superstructure, high funnel, 3" gun forward and aft, (and plenty of ammunition). Very heavy appearance but of about 2000 tons or less. Neither this vessel nor the one preceding it have been identifiable. The above characteristics apply to both of these vessels.

March 30

(KING) Patrolled on the surface along Truk-Empire route.

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29 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-4 (Cont.)

March 31

- 0125 (X) Started surface patrol on Wake-Saipan route, near junction of Empire-Truk routes.
2243 (X) Departed area for Midway with one torpedo remaining, fuel sufficient to reach Midway.

April 6

- 1412 (Y) Entered Midway. Moored at 1643.
1645 (Y) Completed fueling.

No. C-5

Description of Contacts:

No.	30
Time & Date	Mar 26 - 0958
Position	18-59N - 149-16E
Description	Small freighter, bearing 313 T, made chase. Missed made another chase, missed.
Initial Range	32000
Min. Range	900
Est. Course	150

No.	31
Time & Date	Mar 28 - 0807
Position	13-36N - 150-56.7E
Description	Sighted ship on Stbd. bow bearing 227 T. Missed.
Initial Range	32,000
Min. Range	1000
Est. Course	150

No.	32
Time & Date	Mar 28 - 0930
Position	13-23N - 151-05.5E
Description	Sighted another ship on port qtr. 040 T, chased ship on stbd. hand.
Initial Range	20,000
Min. Range	20,000
Est. Course	350

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Case 25

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ (concealed identity) 18/1430 March
TO: _____ (6th Fleet)
_____ (Base Force 4)
INFO: _____ (2nd Escort Force)
_____ (Truk Base Force 4)

Blanks. Scheduled route of blank maru: blank
1000/25th, 11-30N, 143E. Thence on course 105.
1200/26th, 10-N, 142-30E. Thence on course 152.
at 1900, bearing (260?) degrees distant 20
miles from _____ (Ulul Island?). Thence on
course 113. Blanks.

NCS COMMENT: Cannot confirm Ulul Island else-
where but fits perfectly here.
The 260 degrees bearing is
approximate.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 24/0611 March
TO: ALL SUBMARINES COPYING
NPM FOR
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 23 X ALL TELLS MINUS 9 X
MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) AT 10 HOURS ON 25TH

ORIGINAL

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Case 25, No. B-1 (Cont.)

IN 11-30 NORTH 143-00 EAST (BORED 3000)
THENCE ON COURSE 105 TO MOON ON 26TH AT
10-00 NORTH 148-30 EAST (KLCC 0030) THENCE
ON NEW HEADING OF 152 UNTIL 1900 SAME DAY
ON BEARING 260 TRUE FROM ULUL ISLAND
COURSE CHANGE TO 113 DEGREES

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: We copied on 4115, 8230, and
12345 kcs, with good results,
excepting for about an hour
starting at 1700 GCT, when
reception was only fair.

No. C-2

See III, Case 24, C4, C-5.

Case 26

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Keelung R.H.O.) 24/1530 March
TO: (Garbled)

INFO: (In Shanghai Area
Carries CoFS)
(CoFS Sasebo Naval
Station)
(CoFS Chinkai
Defense Zone)

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 26, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Comdt. Bako)
(South China Fleet)
(Amoy Radio)

Blank Maru) (Cargo 8,000 tons ---- and 500
tons ---- from Saigon) speed 11 and
Blank Maru) (Cargo 8,000 tons ---- and ----)
speed 9 at 0700 on 24th depart Keelung for
Yokohama via Shimonoseki. Blanks
Noon posits (all north and east):

24th 25-32, 122-20
25th 32-14, 123-30
27th 34-03, 125-47
28th 34-07, 130-10

Thence pass through Shimonoseki Strait at 1730
on 28th at ----. Arrive on 29th.

NSS COMMENT: Position for 26th not sent.

No. A-2

FROM: (R.N.O. Keelung)
TO: (R.N.O. Moji)
INFO: 6 addresses in area.

Blank Maru (cargoblanks) speed 9 knots,
without escort?, departing Keelung at 0700
24th for Yokohama via Shimonoseki Straits.
Route: Noon posits:

24th blank.
25th (or 26th) 32-14N, 123-30E.
27th 34-03N, 125-47E.
28th 34-07N, 130-(blank)E.

Pass through Shimonoseki Straits at 1745
the 28th.

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Casa 26 (Cont.)

No. A-3

25/1100 March

FROM:

TO: (Keelung Rdo) (B)
(Moji Rdo) (B)
(Fusimi Maru) (B)
INFO: (CorS Sasebo Navsta.) (B)
(Chinkai Def. Zone) (B)
(In Shanghai area-Has C of S.)
(B)
(Bako Comdt) (C)
(Amoy Radio) (B)

"Revise SMS #----- - 05.

Under noon posits change to read:

25th - 28-47N, 123-02E.

26th - 32-14N, 123-30E.

No. A-4

FROM: (Keelung R.N.O.) 25/1100 March
TO: (Moji R.N.O.)
(Fusimi Maru)
INFO: (Sasebo Chief of Staff)
(Chinkai Defense Zone)
(In Shanghai Area)
(Bako Comdt.)
(Amoy Radio)

Change noon posits in blank SMS blank # to
the following:

25 March 28-47N, 123-02E.

26 March 32-14N, 123-(blank)E.

HYPO COMMENT: This must be correction to TOKUZA
message in N 250555 which does not
make sense in original.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 26 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC • 25/1857 March
TO: • ALL SUBS COPYING
 NPM FOX
 WAHOO
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY •

FOR WAHOO ULTRA SUB PAC SERIAL 298 X 2 MILES
X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 PLUS 11 X DPFA
1430 X 32 DEG 14 MIN N 123 DEG 30 MIN E)
ALCAROBA FOUR 0347 (34 DEG 03 MIN N 125 DEG
47 MIN E) X FOUR 0710 (34 DEG 07 MIN N 130
DEG 10 MIN E)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Wahoo

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good and
complete.

No. C-2

March 25

0157 (H) (Ninth attack) Sighted ship. He had
a green light burning constantly which
appeared in every respect to be his
starboard side light. Three hours
prior to this our SJ radar training
gear jammed and we were still trying

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 26. No. C-2 (Cont.)

- to repair it when this contact was made consequently had to conduct approach without radar. The moon was bright, so maneuvered for a favorable position ahead.
- 0355 (H) Dived and commenced submerged approach.
0436 (H) Fired a spread of two torpedoes at a medium sized freighter, later identified as the SIMSEI MARU 2,556 tons, range 1,300 yards, 87° starboard track, speed 8½ knots. First torpedo exploded prematurely at the end of a 26 second run. Second torpedo exploded prematurely at the end of a 49 second run and about fifty yards short of target.
- 0444 (H) (FIRST GUN ATTACK). Battle surfaced. First 4 inch shot hit target in after deck house at 3,600 yards range. Closed in on target and raked him with 20mm, and holed him with almost 90 rounds of 4 inch. Target caught fire in several places. Her life boat was dangling from the forward davit. Passed about twelve survivors in the water all sort'a chattering. The crew yelled to the survivors, "So Solly, Please."
- 0510 (H) (SECOND GUN ATTACK). Lookout reported ship on the horizon. Proceeded at flank speed to investigate, leaving first freighter on fire and listing. Upon closing found target to be a neat little diesel driven freighter quite similar to the HADACHI MARU, 1,000 tons, but definitely a cargo ship.
- 0535 (H) Commenced firing on second freighter with 20mm. and 4 inch. He caught fire several times, but the fire was extinguished by her crew or it went out on its own accord. She speeded

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 26, No. C-2 (Cont.)

up to about 13 knots and appeared to be trying to ram the WAMCO. We had no trouble in keeping clear. A member of her crew was in the fore-top waving his arms-maybe he was conning ship. A few 20mm. hits in his vicinity caused him to slide down a guy wire like a monkey. Repeated gun fire soon had her blazing all over and dead in the water. Quartermaster reported first freighter listing badly during this engagement and before cease firing he reported first freighter sinking rapidly, and finally she was seen to sink.

0614 (H) After expending 170 round of 4 inch and about 2000 round of 20mm. on these two freighters, proceeded on our course for our patrol point off O to light. Anyone who has not witnessed a submarine conduct a battle surface with three 20mm and a four inch gun in the morning twilight with a calm sea and in crisp and clear weather, just "ain't" lived." It was truly spectacular. Our deck took a beating. Practically every blast of the 4 inch would give a hit on the target and a partial hit on the WAMCO. The wooden decking would tear and take off with each shot.

0625 (H) Watched freighter sink through No. 1 periscope.

0640 (H) Aircraft contact. Dived. This is bad for us, because it spoils our new hunting ground. The aircraft is bound to have seen the freighter burning and then sink. So remained submerged conducting high periscope observations.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 26. No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1222 (H) Sighted large passenger freighter with large angle on the bow with range about 16,000 yards. Commenced high speed approach. Took observation at 8,000 yards generated range. Our setup checked surprisingly well. Continued high speed approach. Took another observation when generated range was 5,000 yards. Target had reversed course and the range was about 12,000 yards. It was possible the target sighted us, but we doubt it. We believe he had an air escort hovering our area warned him. Anyway we lost the best target we have seen this trip.
- 1345 (H) Sighted aircraft. Something was evidently cooking. As our battery was low, we cleared the area on new course at best speed.
- 1458 (H) Sighted a new destroyer range 8,000 yards angle on bow 15° port. He searched with his Q.C. Went to 150 feet, and rigged for depth charge. As water was about 30 fathoms deep, did not dare tackle this fellow with only two torpedoes aboard which from late experience would likely be premature. It hurt our pride to have to hide in our shell and crawl away.
- 1655 (H) Heard one distant explosion. This could have been either a bomb or depth charge. The pinging had ceased after getting very faint. We figured our Dog Dog had no chance of finding us then. He may have picked up one of the two freighters sitting on the bottom and depth charged it.
- 1855 (H) Surfaced and cleared present area on three engines.

March 26

- 1012 (H) (THIRD GUN ATTACK), Sighted trawler.

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Case 26, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1020 (H) Opened up with 20mm. guns and 4 inch on a diesel trawler of about 100 tons. Holed him several times. A few fires started, but was so water-soaked they soon died out. Threw aboard some home made MOLOTOV cocktails concocted and manufactured by the MIDWAY marines. They did not burn well, due probably to the water-soaked wood. This trawler had a nice radio antenna which he probably opened up on.
- 1050 (H) Departed leaving the trawler in pretty much a wrecked condition. It was too rough to board her. Otherwise we could have had fresh fish and also opened up some sea valves in her. During this engagement all three 20mm guns were jammed at the same time. These guns really do jam often. Our cooling tubes prevented several explosions like we had last trip. The guns actually boil all the water out of these tubes. Other boats should get larger tubes.

March 27

No entry.

March 28

- Conducted surface patrol on SHANONGSEKI FORMOSA shipping routes. We have not had a good fix since night of 25th. Took occasional soundings throughout the day.
- 1235 (H) Dived on radar contact; did not sight the plane.
- 1338 (H) Surface. Visibility was poor all day.
- 1800 (H) (FOURTH GUN ATTACK). Sighted two lighted motor sampans (FISHI MARUS).
- 1808 (H) Opened up with 20mm. guns on the two sampans.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 26, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1820 (H) Secured 20mm. guns and crews after expending about 500 rounds on each sampan. They did not sink, but they have a lot of holes in them and they are quite wrecked. It was still too rough to go aboard for a mess of fresh fish. Our mouths watered at such a possibility.

March 29

0255 (H) (TENTH ATTACK). Sighted ship and commenced radar tracking.
0400 (H) Dived when we had gained a favorable position ahead and it was light enough to see the target through the periscope.
0416 (H) Fired a spread of two torpedoes at fairly large freighter identified as KIMISIMA MARU 5,193 tons, range 900 yards, 90° port track, speed 8½ knots. First torpedo hit under his mainmast which was our point of aim and completely disintegrated everything abaft of his stack. The forward section sank two minutes and thirty-two seconds later. The torpedo was set at 15 feet due to rough seas. This was a Torpex head and it is believed was an influence explosion. The target made a lot of noise as she sank and broke up. We all could hear it through our hull. The second torpedo was aimed at the foremast. It missed, because the first torpedo stopped the foremast in its tracks.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Date	March 25	March 29
Time	1222 (H)	0416 (H)
Position	38-01N 123-36E	30° 25'N 129° 41'E
Course	--	060°
Speed	10 knots	8.5 knots
Type	Passenger Freighter large.	1-AK 5,193 tons KIMISIMA MARU

ORIGINAL
29 November 1946

Case 27

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

24/0806 March

FROM: _____
TO: _____

INFO: (5th Base Force - Saipan)
(Saeki Defense Force)

"From _____ To Cinc 4th Fleet.

This ship (XAN) will depart (or departed) Truk at
0730 _____ March and will pass through the
following positions:

25th/_____ (70239)

09-50N, 151-20 E.

27th/0700

12-05N, 142-50 E.

30/_____ (23922)

_____ - 05N, 134-40 E.

(Hours blank)

31st about _____

Arrive Bungo Channel.

Pass through first _____

will arrive Kure 0800/01

April.

No. A-2

26/0010 March

FROM: _____
TO: _____
INFO: _____

Originated by Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Your
SMB 251 blank Chookai accompany
0322SX (Unyco?) departing Yokosuka 3 April for Truk.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 27. No. A-2 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: WHALE
ALL SUBMARINES COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: POMPAHO
TUNNY
CINCPAC

26/0955

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 31 ULTRA X FOR WHALE 1 HICORY HEADING FOR
AREA 7 X COURSE BLANK X SPEED BLANK X TIME 2200
GCT X DATE 26TH X 12-05 NORTH 142-50 EAST X
FOLLOWING FOR INFO POMPAHO AND TUNNY 026 AND
036 PEANUT AND PROBABLY SOME LEMONS (ESCCRT VESSELS)
LEAVE AREA 4 FOR AREA 15 X COURSE BLANK X SPEED
BLANK X TIME BLANK X DATE 3RD

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Whale

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 24, C-3.

No. C-2

Radio Reception: See III, Case 24, No. C-4 and
C-5 for the ad...

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 27 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Nothing was sent or received on 459 KCS. NPM surface reception was good except for Subpac Serials 48 and 62 of April which were missed.

No. C-4

April 3

0910 (I)

Patrolled TRUK lanes to E. of MIYAKE SHIMA. Radar position could at least be kept here on MIYAKE and MIKURA SHIMA. Heard distant underwater explosions.

April 4

Patrolled E. of NOJIMA SAKI. Again had to use 2/3 speed for about 4 hours to clear shoals off KATSUURA in onshore set. Present South winds and seas make submerged approach off this coast dangerous in rain and lost visibility. Only safe land fall is along E. side of islands of IZU SEOTO. From present limited observations, information from last submarine's patrol here and other sources, believe TOKYO traffic enters at sunrise and departs at sunset passing thru area during darkness. MIYAKE SHIMA, NOJIMA SAKI and KATSUURA lights have been observed burning which indicated night traffic.

April 5

1848 (I)

-34-11N, 139-38E, surfaced and picked up SJ radar contact at 6,400 yards. Tracked, course 105°, speed 8.5 and identified as a small or medium size DD in company with

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 27, No. C-4 (Cont.)

April 5 (Cont.)

a small patrol vessel. Possibly escorts out to meet a ship. Abandoned approach since a torpedo running at six feet to hit the DD would probably premature in these force 5 to 6 seas. Could make no more than 1 engine speed in the wind and sea and probably couldn't follow on surface next day so did not continue tracking.

U.S.S. Turney

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Radio reception during this patrol was satisfactory. Comsubpac serial number forty eight missed. Last serial received 3. Last serial sent 211450.

No. C-6

April 5

Conducted surface patrol north of McLaughlin Bank.

April 6

Conducted surface and submerged patrol north of Mogami Bank.

April 7

2234 (X)

Conducted surface patrol west of McLaughlin Bank. At- made radar contact range 13,000 yards. (Contact #7 and 8). Tracked target and escort on zigzag courses at speed of

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 27, No. C-6 (Cont.)

April 7 (Cont.)

nine knots. Crossed astern to gain advantage of dark background and closed target at 20 knots on the starboard flank. While closing the range on the target from about 3500 to 2500 yards, we passed through a rain squall of very fine rain drops (considerably more than a mist). This squall lasted for about four minutes during which time the antenna of the SJ radar was glowing with St. Elmo's fire or similar phenomenon. The SJ radar was in use and the SD was secured with mast lowered, yet both SD radiator tips were glowing in the same manner. As soon as the rain stopped this effect stopped. Target identified as AP similar to Buenos Aires Maru, escort destroyer of ESBIE Class was patrolling ahead. At range of 1200 yards escort challenged - missed a wonderful chance to sink him at this time as the forward room was having trouble opening the outer doors at the high speed. My kingdom for some hydraulic doors.

2353 (K)

At range of 960 yards fired two torpedoes at AP (would have fired another had it been ready). (Attack #3). One hit amidships, one aft. Submerged to 300 feet and rigged for depth charge which followed immediately and continued until destroyer lost contact in heavy rain.

April 8

0227 (K)

Surfaced in downpour, continued patrol surface and submerged north of West Faya Island.

1703 (K)

At sighted 200 ton trawler heading toward Truk. (Contact #9).

2100 (K)

Set course for rendezvous with convoy, southwest of Truk.

No. C-7

Description of Contacts:

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 27, No. C-7 (Cont.)

Date: April 7
Time: 2334 (K)
Position: Lat. 8-50 N
Long. 147-06 E
Course: not given
Speed: 9
Type and Description: Buenos Aires Maru (AP) and
1 Hibiki Class Destroyer.

Case 28

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Kwajalein Dist.
Trans. Office) (A)
TO: (#6 Base Force
(B)
INFO: (4th Fleet) (C)
(#64 Guard Div-
ision-Waka) (B)
(1st Section Naval
Gen. Staff) (A)
(Yokosuka Naval
District CoPS) (B)

departs Jaluit 1000, March 25th, arrives
Wake at _____ on 26th. Arrives Yokosuka 1200,
April 3rd.
Moon positions:

DATE	LONGITUDE	LATITUDE
March 26th	12-50 North	-10 East
March 27th	16-40 North	---
March 28th	Wake	---
March 29th	22-00 North	162-25 East
March 30th	25-30 North	159-20 East
March 31st	29-00 North	154-00 East
April 1st	31-10 North	147- East
April 2nd	-15 North	Latitude unknown

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 23 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 26/1920
TO: TUNNY
ALL SUBS COPYING
MPI FOX
INFO: - - -
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR TUNNY X 1 MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN)
ARRIVING WAKE 28TH X DEPARTS AFTER SECRET STAY
X AT 3 HOURS GET 28TH POSITION MDJP 0025 ALGAROBA
XRL 3020 X SUGGEST TRYING TO GET HIM AT ANCHOR
BEFORE HE LEAVES X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 32

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 27, C-5.

No. C-2

March 26

1005 (M) Sight contact only with plane believed to
be friendly PSY, approaching from direction
of Wake, distance eight miles. (Plane
contact #5). Dove for one-half hour.
Worked over SD. Received Comsubpac
serial No. 32

March 27

Inside Wake 200 mile circle all day.
Pleased but surprised not to encounter air
patrol. Circled Wake outside radar range

29 November 1945

Case 28, No. C-2 (Cont.)

and approached from direction of Ponape.
Flooded down inside thirty mile circle to
decks awash.

March 28

- 0353 (M) Submerged at estimated distance of ten miles from anchorage.
- 0615 (M) Sighted Wake and checked position obtained by moonlight fix at 0300.
- 0625 (M) Wake woke up one-half hour before sunrise. Lights were observed from Tent Village on Wilkes Island, flood lights came on on runways, and two searchlights were noted, located on Peale Island and at southwest end of Wake Island. While making those interesting observations was interrupted by the approach of a Motor Torpedo Boat followed closely by two patrol boats - a Pyc and a trawler, all of whom passed rather close aboard, distance 4-600 yards. (Contact #1, 2 and 3). A search in the direction in which they receded disclosed at -
- 0650 (M) An AK similar to the Sydney Maru bearing 190°T, range 12,000 yards, angle on bow 40° port. (Contact #4). Went to battle stations. Speed check at 11 knots.
- 0654 (M) Observed sunrise.
- 0713 (M) Took single ping range - 1100 yards. Checked masthead height 120 feet. Sound reported screws, slowing from 200 to 120 rpm. Reduced target speed setting to 9 knots and at -
- 0719 (M) Fired two torpedoes at range of 700 yards. (Attack #1). Was ready to fire third when the explosion of the first was observed to figuratively blow the stern off so, considered it unnecessary and secured it. When last seen the target was settling rapidly by the stern, about three miles off anchorage. Second torpedo missed astern due to last minute change of speed which had not had time to take effect. Ship was extremely light with

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

plenty of reserve buoyance, therefore did not sink. Thus ended the first and second lessons. Watch escort drop three depth charges across bow range 300 yards, maneuvered at periscope depth to avoid escorts, was doing so nicely, when at -

0737 (M) First of several bombs (aerial) fell close aboard. Went to 280 feet.

0830 (M) With both escorts drawing aft nicely, planed up to 120 feet, when another bomb dropped close aboard. Went back to 280 feet. When escorts had been shaken for the third time about -

1014 (M) Came to 150 feet, cut in air conditioning and set course for area.

1930 (M) Surfaced.

March 29

Was again pleased, but very surprised not to contact air patrol out of Wake.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts:

No:	4
Date:	March 27
Time:	0650
Position:	Wake Island
Description:	Sydney Maru (AK)
Remarks:	Damaged by one hit in after hold. Attack #1 very light-beached.

D - Verification

No. D-1

See III, Case 34, A-1, 2, and 3.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 29

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Truk Comm.
TO: Unit) (B)

INFO: (Combined Fleet) (B)
(Combined Fleet) (C)
(Kure Condt.)

1200/March 28 - 13-12N, 146-32 E.
1200/March 29 - 11-22N, 146-22 E.
1200/March 30 - 9-32N, 147-11 E.
1200/March 31 - 7- N, 149-01 E.
Blank time arrive Palmarat?
0600/ April 1 - depart
1200/ April 1 - 7-13 N, 149-41 (?) E.
1200/ April 2 - 7-12 N, 151- E.
1300/ arrive South Channel, Truk

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SUBS COPIING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

27/1830 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS GOES ULTRA SERIAL 35 FROM COMSUBPAC X 5 SHIP SLOW
SPEED CONVOY AT 3 HOURS GCT 28TH KILU 1232 (13-12
NORTH 146-32 EAST) ALGARCEA EQLU 2222 (11-22 NORTH

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 29, No. B-1 (Cont.)

146-22 EAST) CEGJ 3211 (09-52 NORTH 24-19 EAST) AND
THEN TO VICINITY PULUHAT ISLAND X FINBACK ATTEMPT
INTERCEPTION ANYWHERE WEST OF 149 DEGREES AND SOUTH
OF 11 DEGREES AND THEN HEAD HOME PASSING THROUGH 11
NORTH 130 EAST X IF FUEL PERMITS HEAD FOR JOHNSTON
ISLAND FOR FUEL INSTEAD OF MIDWAY X WHALS AND
HADDOK ALSO ATTEMPT INTERCEPTION OF CONVOY BUT
WATCH OUT FOR FINBACK AND EACH OTHER X SUBS
CONCERNED SHOULD NOT FIRE AT ANOTHER SUBMARINE
UNLESS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS ENEMY X TUNNY NOTE
ROUTE TO BE TAKEN BY FINBACK.

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Finback

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (a) No difficulty was experienced
in copying NPI schedules. Subpac
serial #98 was not received and it
was assumed that it was sent in a
channel not held by the FINBACK.

No. C-2

March 28-29

0830 (I) Speeded up and set course to northwest-
ward to patrol across trade lanes from
Empire to Rabaul and Mandates.

March 30

Patrolling along lane from Empire to
Puluhat. At

1312 (K) dived on plane radar contact which moved in to
ten miles. At
1353 (K) Surfaced and continued patrol. At

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 29. No. C-2 (Cont.)

1444 (K) Sighted submarine bearing 335° (T).
Submarine fired red smoke bomb. Sub-
marine was U.S.S. HADDOCK. Closed to
hailing distance and exchanged information.
Continue patrolling to east of above line.
At dusk set course to pick up return
routing to Pearl via Johnston Island.

No. C-3 See Case 24, C-5.

No. C-4 See Case 24, C-4.

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Reception was good at all times on
one or more frequencies while on
station and enroute.

No. C-6

March 28

1356 (K) Surfaced. Shifted position to vicinity
of Lat. 10-43-30N., Long. 146-44-00E.,
planned to conduct a submerged high peri-
scope patrol.

March 29

0315 (K) SD Radar picked up indication of a
directional radar; pip of ordinary size,
together with high noise level, moved
rapidly across the screen once every few
seconds for about fifteen seconds and
then disappeared for about six minutes.
Picking up their transmitted pulse as we
did gave further evidence that the
Japanese radar is near our SD frequency. We
were 315 miles from TRUK. Lat. 10-04-00N.,
Long. 147-23-30E.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 29. No. C-6 (Cont.)

- 0531 (X) Submerged. High periscope patrol.
0310 (X) Sighted small sampan, distance one mile.
No guns, depth charges, or other indications
of a war-like character were observed.
Not wishing to reveal our position let him
pass unharmed. Lat. 10-52N., Long 146-38E.
1735 (X) Surfaced, commenced a thorough search
of entire area.

March 30

- 0514 (X) Sighted FINBACK on surface bearing 070° T.,
distance 4 miles. To inform him of our
presence and make certain we kept clear
of each other after night fall, and to
exchange information with him
1422 (X) Permitted him to get well clear, then fired
the proper color smoke signal. When he
had had time to see it, surfaced and
present silhouette so he could recognize us.
He was still heading away, so fired a
second signal. He answered, and we closed
each other exchanging further recognition
signals by light and call signs. Discussed
areas we had searched and agreed on area to
cover for remainder of day. Informed him
we would head for Palau that evening. He
told me about conditions there - especially
that they had their first team on hand
for anti-submarine patrol. Advised him
of the air activity north of TRUK and the
large amount of traffic recently seen going
north to SAIPAN. We have only the WHALE
to worry about now. By having effected
this unexpected rendezvous we were able
to make a more comprehensive and co-
ordinated search of this area.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 32

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A -1

FROM: - - - 25/1200 March
TO: - - - ((Comb. Fleet)
INFO: - - - ((Surface Escort Unit #2)

_____ speed 10.5 knots, departs NAB (Euro) at
1000 on _____ and proceeds as follows:

At 1030 hours on 27th, Bungo Channel offing.
Course 145.
1900 on 28th, 28-04 North, 135-40 East,
Course 170.
1745? on 29th, 24-23 North, 136-24 East,
Course 140.
1700 on 30th, 21-__ North, 139-19 East,
Course 125.
_____ on 31st, 18-32 North, 143-37 East,
Course 157.
1100, on 1 April, 15-51 North, 141-22 East,
Course 105.
_____ on 2 April, __-22 North, 146-17 East,
Course 160.
1600 on 3rd, 08-23 North, 143-41 or 51 East,
Course 116.
1100 on 4th, enter West Channel.
1300, arrive Truk

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 30 (Cont.)

No. A-2

25/1400 March

FROM:
TO:
INFO: (11th Air Fleet)
(1st Section Naval
General Staff)

Landing operations at OIB (Hansa Bay) will be carried out with 2 Army transports (3 knots) Blanks. A total of 5500 men and about 9080 cubic meters of gear. Will depart from Palao on 7th April and arrive OIB on 12th April. 60 landing barges will be used to complete disembarkation within a 24 hour period. Blanks. Army blanks at RZN (Wewak). Escort will be provided by 2 subchasers of #2 Base Force but also desire to use the 2 destroyers referred to in Combined Fleet Serial 191655. Rest blanks.

NSS Comment: Hope to clear up blanks in this latter, but in meantime essentials of operation are as given above.

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

28/0422 March

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 30, No. B-1 (Cont.)

CRYSTAL GAZERS GAZETTE IS COMSUBPAC ULTRA SERIAL 36 X PED FINBACK X WATCH OUT SCOTTY THE FLY FLY BOYS FROM WAVE ARE AFTER YOU X GUESS THEY MUST BE MAD X REPORTS INDICATE TARGET DID NOT SINK AND IS BEING BEACHED ON SOUTH SHORE X

FOLLOWING FOR WHALE X SOMETHING IMPORTANT EITHER CONVOY OR LARGE SHIP MAKING TEN AND ONE HALF KNOTS WILL PASS THROUGH 15 - 32 NORTH 143 - 07 EAST AT UNKNOWN TIME ON 31ST AND THEN STEERS COURSE 156 IN ORDER TO PASS THROUGH 15 - 51 NORTH 144 - 22 EAST AT 2 HOURS GOT APRIL 1ST WHERE HE CHANGES COURSE TO 105 DEGREES X

TENNY NOTE THIS OUTFIT IS SCHEDULED PASS THROUGH 05 - 28 NORTH 148 - 51 EAST AT 7 HOURS GOT APRIL 3RD AND THEN STEER COURSE 116 AND REACH WEST CHANNEL TRUK AT 2 HOURS GOT 4TH X

HADDOCK NOTE THAT 2 ARMY TRANSPORTS CARRYING ABOUT 5000 PAIRS OF SLANT EYES ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE PALAO FOR THE SOUTHEAST ON APRIL 7TH X EXACT DESTINATION UNKNOWN X WILL MAKE 8 KNOTS AND WILL HAVE TWO SMALL ESCORTS AND 2 DD IF AVAILABLE X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 24, C-3.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 32 (Cont.)

No. C-2

See III, Case 34, C-4.

U.S.S. TURNER

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See III, Case 33, C-3.

No. C-4

See III, Case 33, C-4.

U.S.S. HADDOCK

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See III, Case 34, C-1.

No. C-6

See III, Case 34, C-2, C-3.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 31

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 25/1630 March
TO: _____
INFO: _____ (4th Fleet) (C)

(Yokosuka Naval Station
CofS) (B)

Enciphered Ujina
Enciphered Army Staff Section
of Imperial Headquarters

The _____ Yama Maru left _____ (Wake?) at 1500
March 25th and expects to arrive Saipan at 1200.
April 1st. Following are noon positions:
26th March -- 17-41 (or 42) North, 166-11 East.
27th March -- 17-12 North, 161-00 East.
28th March -- 16-42 North, 159-00 East.
29th March -- 16-00 North, 155- (or 156) -26 East.
30th March -- 15-50 North, 152-13 East.
31st March -- 15-36 North, 149-00 East.

No. A-2

FROM: _____ (Maru) 24/1600 March
TO: _____ (CofS Yokosuka
Naval District)
_____ (11th Air Fleet)
_____ (3th Fleet CofS)

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 31, No. A-2 (Cont.)

INFO: (Harbormaster's
Office #12)
(Yokosuka Military
Stores)
(11th Air Fleets)

Departed PS (Saipan) for NAA (Yokosuka)
escorting _____ Noon positions:

25th, 15-40 N, 143-20 E.
26th, 17-39 N, 141-22 E.
27th, 20-30 N, 141-15 E.
28th, 23-44 N, 139-41 E.
29th, 26-41 N, 138-49 (?) E.
30th, 29-44 N, 138-49 (?) E.
31st, 32-45 N, 138-49 (?) E.

Expect arrive 1100 on the 1st (April).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC 29/0324 March
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOR
INFO: - - -

PRIC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY.

SERIAL 38 FROM COMSUEPAC ULTRA FOR WEALE X IF
NOT OTHERWISE ENGAGED X 1 MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN)
ENROUTE YOUR MAIN PORT X BLANK X BLANK X -900
(0300 GCT) X = 15 (30TH) GXY2 (15-50 NORTH
152-13 EAST) ALGARROBA GXY (15-36 NORTH 149-00
EAST) X ANOTHER MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN) CONCERNING
POMPANO X BLANK X BLANK X -900 (0300 GCT) X =
15 (30TH) X ECAL (29-44 NORTH 138-49 EAST)
ALGARROBA DPAL (32-45 NORTH 138-49 EAST)

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 31 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Whale

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 24, C-3.

No. C-2

See III, Case 24, C-4.

U.S.S. Pompano

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See III, Case 27, C-3.

No. C-4

March 30

0505 (T) SJ Radar signal at 7,200 yards for 5 minutes, lost and never regained though we closed for 10,000 yards.

0457 (T) Submerged 50 mi. W of MIYURA SHIMA.

1200 (I) Entered area; conducted surface and submerged patrol across E. part of area.

2055 (I) 33-43N, 140-04E, sighted glow of ship's lights over horizon. Chased on four engines for fifty minutes. May have been lighted Hospital Ship enroute TOKYO. Unable to close so abandoned chase. Enroute to a position E. of W. side of area.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 31, No. C-4 (Cont.)

April 1.

Enroute to E. side of area since heavy weather, poor visibility and uncertain currents make it unsafe to try to enter Western approaches to SAGAMI NADA with no near high land for Radar fix. First fix in 40 hours showed us set 57 miles to N.W. when expected set was E. Passed 2 1/2 mi. S. of ZEMI SU, submerged and never saw it.

Case 32

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base Force 8)
TO: (Subchaser 24)
(Subchaser 16)
INFO: (9 addressees along the route)

"R" area Defense Force Opord 192.

1. Army ? transport _____ Maru and #4 Transportation commander* embarked _____ Maru, Maya Maru? _____ depart Rabaul 1500/28th for Palao. 1700/29th position 2-44 S, 149-30 E. Course _____.

Noon Positions for 30th to April 4th:

30th, 00- S, 148 E.
31st, 1-32 N, 146-20 E.
1st, 3- N, 144 E.
2nd, - N, 141- E.
3rd, 4- N, 138-25 E.
4th, 6 N, 136 E.
At 0500/5th arrive _____ Palao.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Casa 32 (Cont.)

2. Blanka, in tactical command of Subchaser #16, escort the above (as far as the equator).

3. Subchaser #16 at above 2130/March 30th leave convoy at 147-20 E. on equator and after carrying out anti-submarine sweep proceed in time to arrive Kavieng morning of April 1st. Depart on afternoon escorting Army transport to Rabaul.

(T2W-290711-MAR-DI)

No. A-2

23/1621 February

FROM: -
TO:
INFO:

(first part largely unrecovered)
lists a convoy consisting of a number (at least 6 probably several more) of marus and directs _____ (garbled) to escort them as far as 10-00N.
Estimated speed 5 knots.

Noon positions follow:

25th 13-26 N, 143-27 E.
26th 11-____ N, 147-19 E.
27th ____-48 N, 148-09 E.

From the afternoon of the 28th until the 1st ____.
Estimated speed from here on 3 knots.

2nd 07-29 N, 150-22 E.

3rd 07-39 N, 155-31 E. (doubtful)

Expect to arrive North Channel in the afternoon.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 12 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOR
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
30/0200 March

WHAT COMES THE ULTRA CODE IN COMSOPAC SERIAL
AO X FOR HADDOCK X 3 ARMY TRANSPORTS ENROUTE
PALAO AT 3 HOURS GCT 31 MARCH X THEY PASS THROUGH
CELLU 3220 (01 - 32 NORTH 146 - 20 EAST) AND AT
3 HOURS GCT 4 APRIL THEY PASS THROUGH IVPC (06
NORTH 136 EAST) AND ARRIVE PALAO 20 HOURS GCT
THAT DAY X AT 3 HOURS GCT ON 3 APRIL THEIR LATI-
TUD E IS UNKNOWN BUT LONGITUDE IS 133 - 26 EAST X

FOLLOWING FOR PORPOISE 1 MAPLE (TYPE UNKNOWN)
HEADED FOR TRUK AT 3 HOURS GCT APRIL 2ND EODT
3922 (07 - 29 NORTH 150 - 29 EAST) X AT SAME
TIME FOLLOWING DAY HER LATITUDE IS 07 - 39 NORTH
LONGITUDE UNKNOWN AND 3 HOURS LATER REACHES TRUK
NORTH PASS WHICH THEY SHOULD NOTE.

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 14, C-1.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 32 (Cont.)

No. C-2

See III, Case 34, C-2, C-3.

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See III, Case 27, C-5.

No. C-4

See III, Case 33, C-4.

U.S.S. Porpoise

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See III, Case 5, C-1.

No. C-6

April 1 - 3

Homeward bound.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 33

A - Source of Intelligence

(The intercepted Japanese dispatch is not available. Ed. Note.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSHEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOR
INFO: CINCPAC

31/1100 March

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 45 ULTRA FOR WHALE AND TUNNY X 1 MAPLE
BLANK BLANK X MINUS 900 X MINUS 14 VOLU 2155
(12-21 W, 146-55 E) ALGAROBIA SNCC 4382 (6-43 N
142-32E) AND THEN PASSES THROUGH DOCK 2609 (7-26
N 167-51 W) X TUNNY NOTE THAT PORPOISE HAS DE-
PARTED AREA 15 SOUTH FOR JOHNSTON ISLAND X
AREA 15 SOUTH WILL BE VACANT UNTIL PINE ENTERS
IT ABOUT 10 APRIL X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 24, C-3.

No. C-2

See III, Case 24, C-4.

ORIGINAL .
29 November 1945.

Case 33 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See III, Case 27, C-5.

No. C-4

April 2

Patrolled submerged to westward of Truk, still no signs of life on the water or in the air, so at

1600 (X) surfaced and set course for channel between Puluwat and Pulap Islands.

2106 (X) Radar contact with Akita Maru dead ahead, range 12,600 yards (Contact #5). Plotted enemy course 150°T, speed 10.5 knots, apparently to pass to westward of Alet Island. Went to flank speed to pass astern and attack from the westward when at a point about 1½ miles from Alet Island he changed course to 090°T, heading for Truk. This put TUNNY on the beam, so headed in for a flank attack. At range of 2200 yards sighted DD escort of MOMO class about 1000 yards astern of target. (Contact #6)

2137 (X) Was challenged repeatedly by MOMO.

2140 (X) Fired three torpedoes at range of 960 yards. (Attack #2) TDC operator missed first firing bearing given on TBT but got second in before firing second and third torpedoes. First went out with radar bearing 11° off, second missed ahead, due to spread and third hit in forward hold. By this time MOMO having become slightly suspicious turned toward TUNNY. Dove, went to 300 feet and reversed course.

2146 (X) Took nine depth charges close but set too shallow. (I didn't think we could get to 300 feet so quickly either!)

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 33, No. C-4 (Cont.)

2200 (K) Started up to take a look. At 260 feet took one depth charge set deep (300-400 feet estimated) which shook our eye teeth but did no material damage other than one broken steam tight globe in engine room bilge.

2300 (K) MOMO gave up.

2347 (K) Surfaced, nothing in sight. Set course to the north to patrol Saipan and Empire traffic lane, east of Nanonuito Island group.

April 4

Had a little trouble with the Third Officer wanting to lead the TUMBY Commandos and take Truk, when news arrived that he had become a father.

2030 (X) Headed west to intercept reported traffic north of McLaughlin Bank.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

No.	5	6
Date	4/2/43	4/2/43
Time	2108	2130
Position	Alet Island 7°-23 N 149°-12 E	Alet Island
Description	Akita Maru (X)	MOMO Class-Destroyer
Remarks	Damaged by one hit in forward hold. Heavily laden, probably sunk, Attack No. 2	Leads the class in artistic depth charging, but an awful dope.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (6th Base Force,
Jaluit) (B)
TO: (AirFlot 22) (B)
INFO: (Fleet) (B)

Enciphered Wake Detachment of _____

Request steps be taken by Wake planes to _____
enemy submarine for Suwa Maru.

No. A-2

FROM: (Wake Island 22/0600 March
Defense Force)
(Guard Div. 65)
TO: (6th Base Force)
INFO:

(4th Fleet)

(All Base Forces or Units
in Marshall's Area)

RE-TRANSLATION:

At blank time blank miles south of Wake,
Suwa Maru received torpedo attack and is in danger
of sinking. Is attempting to beach herself on
southern end of Island Blank unit now after sub-
marine.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 34 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM:

At 0425 the Suwa Maru was torpedoed by submarine south of Wake (?). Because of danger of sinking she was run aground on a reef south of island (?). The enemy submarine is being attacked by vessels of Guard Division 65. Blanks.

No. A-4

FROM:

29/2300 March

TO:

(Combined Fleet)

(Sea Escort Force 2)

INFO:

(Naval Transportation Section)

One garbled

From Communication Officer of
The ... with a cargo of heavy oil departs
Balikpapan at 1100 on 30th March and after crossing
the Celebes Sea will pass to north of Palao pro-
ceeding to point 10-30N, 134-00E (average speed
14 knots). Thence east along that parallel to
longitude 146-00E. From that point proceed to
point 07-08N, 150-49 (?) E, and head for West
Channel, arriving West Channel at 1500/April 6th.
Noon positions as follows: (all positions north
and east)

31st	02-19N, 120-20 E.
1st	04-10N, 125-37 E.
2nd	07-36N, 130-10 E.
3rd	10-30N, 135-10 E.
4th	10-30N, 140-48 E.
5th	10-30N, 146-25 E.
6th	07-08N, 151-09 E.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: . COMSUBPAC 31/1115 March
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NFM FROM
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR HADDOCK LARGE LOADED BIRCH I PROBABLY NO
LEMON X BLANK I PLUS 4 X MINUS 900 X MINUS 14
I RSJN 1037 (4 10N 125 37E) ALGAROBIA DCUX
3610 (7 36N 130 10E) KILU 2010 (10 30N 135 10E)
KILY 3048 (10 30 N 140 30E) I KILU 30-25 (10 30N
146 25E) I DCUX 0809 (7 08N 151 09E) I TURENY
NOTE POSITION FOR 5TH AND 6TH X FOR FINBACK
SCOTTY REPORTS PUTTING LARGE HOLE IN 100
POPCORN OFF WAKE ON 28TH X SHIP MAY HAVE SUNK
BUT BELIEVE SHE ATTEMPTED BEACH HERSELF ON
SOUTH SHORE WAKE X IF YOU ARE HEADING FOR MIDWAY
TAKE A LOOK AS YOU GO BY AND DELIVER THE COUP DE
GRACE IF SHE IS STILL SITTING THERE X THIS IS
ULTRA SERIAL 44 FROM COMSUBPAC

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See III, Case 14, C-1.

No. C-2

March 31

0030 (Z) Set course for PALAU.

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29 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-2 (Cont.)

April 2

- 0511 (I) Commenced submerged patrol north of PALAU.
- 1247 (I) Went deep to check for density layers. Lat. 8-43-00N., Long. 134-04-30E. Found layers at 145, 240 and 270 feet of greater density. It was necessary to add 4,000 pounds to obtain a trim for two knots necessary to pump out 9,000 pounds while running at 3.5 knots to get through the density layers. This checks well with the data that other boats have found in this area.
- 1343 (I) Surfaced. Set course to patrol in the vicinity of Lat. 9-20-00N., Long. 133-10-00E.

April 3

- 0300(I) Shifted patrol to vicinity of Lat. 9-42-00N, Long, 133-45-00E.
- 0653(I) Sighted ship hull down bearing 135°T., distance 19,000 yards on course 310°T. Lat. 9-31-00N., Long. 133-38-30E. The officer-of-the-deck first reported a convoy, and it did look like one as there were masts sticking up all over the horizon. However, we soon saw that it was just one very large ship. Went ahead full on four engines to gain position ahead. Ran down SD antenna mast to reduce chance of being sighted by target and to keep the lookouts especially alert. Target soon zigged 110° to the right, to 060°T., and then commenced zigging 20 to 30 degrees on each side of the base course. Opened the range to 24,000 yards. to make sure were not sighted, but kept target constantly in sight with periscope. We tracked his speed as 14 knots. After five hours we gained position ahead.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 34, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1205 (I) Submerged, and commenced approach.
1230 (I) Sighted escort on starboard quarter of target; had thought for awhile we were going to get something free. Took position on starboard bow of target, now identified as large passenger freighter, similar to YASUKUNI MARU, 11,930 tons. It was painted grey and looked as if it had been converted to an auxiliary naval vessel. The escort was not identified as a corvette. Planned to come in for a 90° starboard track, straight bow shot and accept a 70° starboard track with a 20° left gyro angle, on the corvette, firing two torpedoes at the corvette, and four at the target. Made all tubes ready. Depth setting of 8 feet was used for the corvette and 15 feet for the target. Those for the corvette would have been set at less depth but due to the choppy sea we wished to avoid prematures, especially since we were firing at the escort first. Had to fire at the escort first to insure any chance of hitting him at all - catching him flatfooted if we could.

1255 (I) Due to target's maneuvers found we were too close to escort's track, so swung to right for stern tube shot. Kept the TDC set up on the target until just prior to firing, then shifted to the escort, took two setups and fired at 1301-45, with the bearing exactly on. If the escort had been patrolling this would have been harder to accomplish. Range 1,400 yards, torpedo track 80° starboard, gyro angle 4° left. Shifted to the target and with a completely new setup commenced firing at 1302-15, with the bearing checking for each shot. Range 1,590 yards, torpedo track 100° starboard, gyro angle 20° right. Divergent spread was used to

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 34. No. C-2 (Cont.)

spread the torpedoes 45 yards apart along the target's track. Firing interval of 10 second. Lat. 10-26-30N., Long. 136-00-00E. The torpedo if fired at the corvette did not explode, but was believed to run under him as it was heard to run straight and normal. The other torpedoes hit the target exactly as they were placed, the first hit in the forward well deck, blowing sections of the bow away; the second hit amidships and possibly ignited gasoline stores for at this moment the entire ship burst into a raging inferno; the third torpedo hit in the well deck aft. The ship immediately took a list to starboard and began to go down by the bow. Its screws stopped immediately and were not heard again. Sound conditions excellent. It is seriously doubted if there were any survivors. This ship sank beyond a doubt. The escort and target were unaware of our presence until after the first torpedo hit. After the third hit the escort started our way.

1303-50 (I) Ordered deep submergence.

1305 (I) With boat passing 250 feet first two depth charges came close and shook us up considerably. The next five found us between 250 and 350 feet. During this time we heard a strange noise on the port side of the conning tower, but could not determine the cause. Our attention was immediately diverted by more depth charges, the closest yet - these shook us up plenty, and came from right overhead. We were then at 350 feet. We now started to drop gradually so increased speed, blew more water from negative and sent men aft in the boat to help obtain an up angle. Escort started another run at 1316 and dropped another 4 directly on top of us. We had dropped to 390 feet at this time.

ORIGINAL

29 November 1945

Case 34, No. C-2 (Cont.)

The escort seemed to know exactly where we were, so we naturally hesitated to blow anymore or to increase speed. His screws could be heard plainly through the hull as he crossed overhead.

1325 (I) Dropped 8 more, not so close.

1344 (I) Dropped 5 more, which makes a total of twenty-four. These were not close, and it seemed he was tired and wanted to go home. At this time the boat had eased down to 415 feet, and we again tried to get water out of the boat and get it back to 300 feet.

1347 (I) At 415 feet we heard cracking, crunching sounds in the conning tower and saw the chart desk break loose from the bulkhead, cork bulge in and break up, as part of the starboard side came in about 4 inches. Ordered the conning tower abandoned. Experienced some tense moments when we could not close the lower hatch. All hands commenced breathing again when a few blows with a sledge hammer freed the latch and the hatch was closed. Despite increased speed and additional water blown out, we reached 422 feet before the boat started up to 300 feet.

Needless to say, the density layers encountered this day were not the same as found the day before. Instead of flooding in 4,000 pounds for a trim at 300 feet, we had to pump out 13,000 pounds.

Manned the emergency sound gear in the forward torpedo room - nothing heard.

1750 (I) Came to periscope depth. All clear except for enormous clouds of dense black smoke and oil burning on the water where the target sank. We were close enough to see the target had it been still afloat but there was only the burning oil. That the passenger-freighter was carrying so much oil would seem to

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34, No. C-2 (Cont.)

substantiate the statement in "The ONI Weekly" of Feb. 17, 1943 (Vol. II, No. 7, page 443), "...there are some indications that cargo vessels are being altered and used to transport large amounts of fuel in bulk".

Inspection revealed that the port side of the conning tower had given away as well as the starboard but not quite as much. This accounts for the noise heard on the port side at 1305, during the depth charging. It was the same sound as was heard later when the starboard side gave way.

The plates had come in about 4 inches on each side, over the area between one set of strengthening ribs opposite No. 1 periscope. It is here that I beams to support the bridge structure partially replace the strengthening ribs.

There also appears to be a 3/8 inch permanent set in the next section aft on the port side, opposite No. 2 periscope. The SJ Radar training system was the only equipment damaged, and even this was only a matter of bent shafting and misalignment of gears which was temporarily repaired by the next day.

The commanding officer feels that the underlying cause of this casualty is a defective conning tower. He has experienced far more severe depth charging in the SILVERSIDES, under similar condition.

2320 (I)

SPECIAL TOKYO NEWS FLASH:

TODAY APRIL THIRD AN IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVAL VESSEL OF THE CORVETTE TYPE SANK AN AMERICAN SUBMARINE WHILE ESCORTING A LARGE CONVOY THROUGH JAPANESE MANDATE ISLANDS.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34, No. C-2 (Cont.)

Interesting - but fortunately not true; the main damage to the conning tower occurred after the twenty-fourth and last depth charge. Because of damage to conning tower decided we could not properly carry out our mission, so left area enroute Midway.

Since Japs believe they sank the HADDOCK will not notify Comsubpac of damage and information on leaving area until tomorrow night.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No.	6
Time	0653 (I)
Date	April 3
Lat.	9-31N
Long.	133-39E
Type	1 Passenger Freighter
Initial Range	19,000
Est. Speed	14
Est. Course	070
Description and Remarks	Fully loaded Passenger Freighter. Similar to YASUKUNI MARU (11,930 tons) (carrying fuel). 20 divergent spread. List to stbd. going down forward whole ship on fire. Oil burning on water 5 hours later. Sunk.

U.S.S. Tunny

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

See III, Case 33, C-3.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Finback

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-5 :

Radio Reception: See III, Case 29, No. C-1.

No. C-6

April 1

0104 (X) Changed course for Midway via Wake Island. At
1100 (X) informed Consubpac by dispatch of action taken.

April 2-4

Enroute to Wake Island.

April 5

Dived before sunrise to make submerged approach on Wake Island, distance 15 miles. When Wake was not picked up as expected, decided we had received a set to westward during the night and changed course to 090°T. At
1200 (L) sighted Wilkes Island bearing 118°(T).
(Contact Sighted a steamer of BRISBANE MARU class,
#17) 5,425 tons, beached with bow on reef south of Wake Island. The steamer was well down by the stern. Changed course to southward to clear reef and approach ship from the South. At
1218 (L) sighted trawler type patrol boat at 4,000 yards; angle on bow zero. At same time sighted observation plane circling ship. Decided to run at 140 feet between looks to avoid detection by plane while getting into position for attack. Patrol boat

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34, No. C-6 (Cont.)

1515 (L) circled us and headed south. At sighted patrol boat heading into boat landing and two engine bomber patrolling along reef. The beached MARU was on heading 060° (T). Decided to work to eastward and fire with target on about 130° track. When 1100 yards off reef and 1400 yards from target turned so as to fire stern tubes. As target seemed to be well up on coral reef, aimed torpedoes to hit just abaft stack so as to avoid hitting reef. At
1752 (L) fired tubes #7 and #8. Result one hit. Both torpedoes were set to the left of the point of aim indicating a current from the eastward for which we had not allowed. The first torpedo hit inside the stern with excellent effect jarring us considerably. The second torpedo just missed the stern and exploded on hitting the reef. The torpedo explosion was not heard in the boat but was heard in the sound gear and seen thru the periscope. This probably was a low order explosion. No patrol boats or planes in sight. Retired to southeast at high speed and rigged for retaliation by planes. At
1823 (L) two more bombs, at
1829 (L) two bombs heard only in conning tower. At
1834 (L) two bombs closer this time. At
1852 (L) two more bombs. At
1928 (L) one last bomb which was a surprise considering time since sunset. None of the bombs were very close. At
2103 (L) surfaced and set course for Midway.

April 6-8

Enroute to Midway.

ORIGINAL
29 November 1945

Case 34 (Cont.)

No. C-7

Description of Contact

Date	April 5, 1943
Position	On Reef South of Wake
Type	Freighter - similar to BRISBANE MARU 5,425 tons.
Range Sighted	9,000
Closest	1,200
Course	060°
Speed	0
Remarks	Ship already beached, hit aft with one torpedo.


No. D-1

Verification

FROM:	IMO 5 (KISA) (5)	03/1310 April
TO:	TIGOMU	
	TIWOTA	21413
	II 3	

At 1305 the (Yasukuni Maru Type) was hit as a result of an enemy torpedo attack and is unable to navigate. Counter-attack with depth charges is proceeding. Position 10-12N, 134-35E.

(Yasukuni Maru X13 - M/U 11933 tons. This ship later sank - believed to be Haddock's work).



(G) - 7 (H) - 8 (I) - 9 (K) - 10 (L) - 11 (M) - 12 (N) - 13 (O) - 14 (P) - 15 (Q) - 16 (R) - 17 (S) - 18 (T) - 19 (U) - 20 (V) - 21 (W) - 22 (X) - 23 (Y) - 24 (Z) - 25